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The Chechen Revolution and the Future of Instability in the North Caucasus 
Michael C. Russo, MPIA 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007 
Dzhokhar Dudayev’s Chechen Revolution in 1991 unleashed a series of cascading social and 
political effects both in the North Caucasus and Russia as a whole.  The revolution eventually led 
to two brutal wars and an escalating terrorism campaign by various insurgent groups.  While 
some analysts over-generalize and attempt to place all the militant groups into a universal 
construct, the reality is that the Chechen national revolution is one of two revolutions. Both 
Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russian states have intervened militarily to put down Chechen separatism 
but ignored the rebirth of the Islamic Revolution occurring across the entire North Caucasus.  
Ironically, these wars led the two revolutions to converge under a unified front led by Shamil 
Basayev.  The successful assassination of Basayev in the summer of 2006 metastasized the front 
and reduced the large-scale operational capability of the militants.  Much to the chagrin of Putin, 
this success has reduced the ability of the state to penetrate and destroy the remaining networks.  
Additionally, the Chechen Revolution is subsiding and entering a Thermidor stage, while the 
pan-Caucasian Islamic Revolutionary vanguard now dominates the insurgency; it is this second 
group that will continue to create political instability in the region for the near future.  Moreover, 
demographic and economic trends threaten to fuel the growing insurgency, making prospects for 
long-term stability bleak at best.  Russia will be involved militarily in the North Caucasus for a 
long time to come.  
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PREFACE 
This thesis is the product of four years of fascination with Russia’s most rebellious republic. This 
fascination is perhaps in part due to Chechnya’s geographic and cultural aspects.  Chechnya is a 
locus, a point of interaction between America’s Cold War rival and its post-Cold War struggles 
in the Middle East and Central Asia.  
When I was an intern serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), I took the 
opportunity to have discussions with various people on the situation in the North Caucasus—
what is now Russia’s Southern Federal District.  To be sure, I found some OSD staffers who 
appreciated that Russia’s Chechen problem was worthy of diligent study, but these people did 
not come out of the elite, politically-appointed class of the building.  One conversation in 
particular with an aide to a very high level OSD appointee (who will remain nameless) was 
extremely disillusioning.  I was astounded by the level of sheer indifference to the Southern 
Federal District and Chechnya in particular. “It’s great that you are interested in this, but frankly 
I don’t care,” he said to me as I sat there stunned.  
Chechnya and the North Caucasus are important.  There are countless lessons that can be 
drawn from their rigorous analysis. Those functional experts interested in counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations and low-intensity conflict (LIC) will find a treasure trove of information 
awaiting them.  Moreover, regional experts on Russia cannot understand many recent political 
developments absent of Chechnya and the North Caucasus.  Additionally, there are lessons for 
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those riding the recent wave of terrorism studies.  On paper, the Russian Federation is an ally in 
the Long War.  Exactly what this means, other than both states engaging adversaries who 
espouse the use of terror, I do not know with any level of certainty.  States have and act upon 
their interests.  Russia’s quagmire in the Southern Federal Zone is a function of the state’s desire 
to maintain the territorial integrity of its borders, secure the control of Caspian Sea hydrocarbon 
deposits and their transit routes (especially to Europe), the relative economic deprivation of the 
region despite the hydrocarbon deposits, and the legacy of mountaineer resistance to outside 
control.   
On the surface, the story of Chechnya is an almost-bizarre confluence of a Western and a 
horror movie.  That being said, there are some romantic qualities surrounding the North 
Caucasus that need to be admitted.  Historically, the Chechens as a people were noble, 
egalitarian (with each other at any rate), and fierce warriors.  There is also a David and Goliath 
element to the Chechen struggle.  The Russian military and security services have fought two 
major wars in the republic and twice reduced the Chechen capital to rubble in the process.   
Presently, the situation in Chechnya is relatively calm.  But in this sense we are 
distinguishing between degrees of instability.  President Ramzan Kadyrov, President Putin’s 
personal choice, is firmly in power.  The Chechen Revolution is not over; it is ongoing and the 
catalyst of chronic instability in the entire Southern Federal Zone. [The Preface is optional.] 
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1.0  A THEORY OF REVOLUTION 
“Insurrection is a phenomenon, revolution a process” 
- Robert Taber, War of the Flea 
 
 
There exist rare moments in history that prompt mankind to believe that the world will 
never be the same.  Some are marvelous, others malevolent; but the underlying belief is 
consistent.  Such is the case with all revolutions; but this study focuses solely upon the Chechen 
Revolution. 
In order to understand the nature and process of the Chechen Revolution, theory must be 
considered.  As it pertains to this study, a revolution is “a rapid, fundamental, and violent 
domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, it its political institutions, social 
structure, leadership, and government activity and leadership.”1  Defined as such, these events 
are monumental upheavals in the history of man and cause cascading effects in regional and 
international politics.  According to Stephen Walt, revolutions “cause sudden shifts in the 
balance of power, alter the patterns of international alignments, cast doubt on existing diplomatic 
                                                 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1968), p. 264. 
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agreements and diplomatic norms, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to improve 
their positions.”2   
Politics in revolutionary situations becomes the prerogative and enabler of out-groups in 
the old regime.  As Huntington notes, “The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion 
of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which 
makes it impossible for the existing institutions to assimilate them.”3  While rare in occurrence, 
they are also difficult to divine.  Indeed, “evolutions may be as ‘inevitable’ as thunderstorms—
and often as useful as a storm in a parched countryside.”4  They are rare because revolutions are 
the result of the collapse of the old regime.5  Moreover, they are rare because revolutions require 
a crisis in order to be unleashed.6  This stimulus can be any number of things (a disastrous war, a 
financial crisis, a religious conflict, etc.); what is important is that, for whatever reason, the old 
regime becomes discredited, stripped of legitimacy in the eyes of the polity. 
 Regardless of their causes, once underway revolutions follow similar paths.  The 
destruction of the old regime empowers a new class of political elites into power, more or less 
confirming the writings of Vilfredo Pareto.7  Once in power, the unity of revolutionary elite 
often becomes bifurcated between revolutionary moderates and revolutionary radicals.8  For a 
variety of reasons, the moderates prove incapable of consolidating a new political order that can 
fulfill the various promises made their supporters.  The more radical members of the 
                                                 
2 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1. 
3 Ibid., p. 266. 
4 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution revised ed (NY: Vintage, 1965), p. 6. 
5 Anthony James Joes, From the Barrel of a Gun: Armies and Revolutions (Washington D.C: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 
1986), p. xii, 206; Hannah Ardernt, On Revolution (NY: Viking, 1965), p. 112;  V. I. Lenin, Selected Works 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers), p. 343; and Huntington, 268. 
6 Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1991), p. 9. 
7 Vilfredo Pareto, Sociological Writings (NY: Praeger, 1966), p. 134. 
8 Huntington, p. 268-270 and Brinton, p. 122-123. 
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revolutionary party then make their move for power.  Eventually, the political tug-of-war 
between the groups leads to a period of dual sovereignty, known by the Russian term 
dvoevlastie9, in which it is not clear which group truly rules.  Following this period of dual 
sovereignty, the radicals often emerge victorious, the true vanguard of the revolution.  Upon their 
ascendancy, they unleash terror and hunt down the enemies (whether real, perceived, or made 
up) of the revolution.10  Finally, the terror subsides and politics shifts back to a relatively 
conservative form on the Thermidor period; which is not to ay that the mark of the revolution is 
gone.11
 Another important question that needs to be addressed is under what conditions 
do revolutions lead to intervention and war?  Walt argues that because revolutions often bring to 
power those who fundamentally oppose the policies of the old regime, the likelihood of war is 
subsequently increased.12  Additionally, Walt argues that the threat of the revolution spreading 
beyond its original geographic borders is especially destabilizing.13  Moreover, the easier the 
revolutionary regime believes it can spread the revolution and the easier opposing regimes 
believe that they can put an end to the revolution, the greater the likelihood of war .14
Using the theoretical frameworks of Brinton and Walt, we will try to determine the 
underlying and immediate causes of the Chechen Revolution, discover the nature of the 
revolution, track its course, explain why it led to two Russian interventions, and consider the 
future of the revolution and its effects on the North Caucasus.  
                                                 
9 Huntingotn, p. 271 and Brinton, p. 132-136. 
10 Brinton, 176-204. 
11 Brinton, 205-236. 
12 Walt, p. 5. 
13 Ibid., p. 5. 
14 Ibid., p. 5. 
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2.0  SUMMARY AND RESEARCH ROADMAP 
The pervasive political instability and religious radicalism in the North Caucasus is a 
product of two revolutions: the November 1991 Chechen Revolution and the advent of a Pan-
Caucasian Islamic fundamentalism.  The Chechen Revolution was led by core of national 
radicals whose political grievances were forged in the fires of exile during Stalin’s reign.  
Despite its direct challenge to Russian sovereignty, Chechnya’s search for self-determination 
was parochial in scope and far less radical then the radical Sunni Islamic revolution that began to 
transpire across the entire North Caucasus.  To explain the causes and events of these 
revolutions, this paper will describe the North Caucasus as strategic region with a long history of 
attempted foreign domination and fierce indigenous resistance to outside control.  Unified 
Caucasian resistance, until Basayev’s leadership in the late 1990s, was almost always led not by 
Chechens but rather by Dagestani Avars.   
Second, the paper discusses the impact of Soviet policies upon the region.  Despite 
promises of autonomy and cultural respect the Stalinist Russia pursued the wholesale deportation 
of the entire Chechen population to Kazakhstan, providing the crises for the 1991 Chechen 
Revolution.  Additionally, Soviet attempts to root out—and in some cases control—the teaching 
s of Islam contributed to the Islamic reawakening of the early 1990s and the formation of a 
radical Islamic revolutionary elite.  This core became the leaders and acolytes of a much more 
radical vanguard than any of the Chechen national radicals.   
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Third, the paper then goes on to explain how the aborted putsch by Soviet hardliners 
provided the opportunity for General Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Chechen national radicals, all 
of which were representatives of the exile generation, to seize power and announce 
independence.  Next, the paper discusses how the complete success in seizing power by the 
national radicals was only matched by their inability to govern the revolutionary state, resulting 
in the criminalization of Chechnya.  The radicals’ failure to build and consolidate a functioning 
state and Moscow’s unwillingness to allow Chechen self-determination resulted in a disastrous 
war from 1994-1996—a war which introduced Islamic foreign fighters to the North Caucasus 
and allowed many young Chechen guerrillas receptive to radical Islamic proselytizers.    
Fourth, while the revolutionary state managed to survive the war, its leader did not.  
Dudayev was killed by a targeted assignation and his military Chief of Staff, Aslan Maskhadov, 
was elected president in 1997.  Maskhadov’s regime was more of a fiasco than that of Dudayev.  
Admittedly, this was not for the same reasons.  Maskhadov inherited a bombed-out shell of a 
country.  Additionally, Chechnya was awash with weapons and groups in fighters whose loyalty 
only extended as far as their field commander, facilitating the criminalization of the resistance 
movement.  The resulting political conflict between Maskhadov and many of his former 
subordinates paralyzed his government, rendering it impotent.  Maskhadov’s attempts to co-opt 
the field commanders and the Islamic radicals in a desperate attempt to maintain his state robbed 
him of legitimacy from both his lingering supporters and the Russian government. 
Fifth, two internal crises in Dagestan led to a convergence between the radicals of both 
revolutions.  This revolutionary synthesis doomed Chechnya’s hopes of self-determination and 
forever intertwined the two revolutions. Paradoxically, this alliance was between two movements 
whose intended end-states were fundamentally at odds with each other. That being said, the 
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alliance began as a relationship of convenience following the exile of Dagestani religious 
radicals into Chechnya in 1998.  The relationships forged in this alliance eventually led to the 
invasion of Dagestan by a multinational army of Islamic radicals, provoking the Second Chechen 
War.  It was this war that created the unification of the revolutionary movements.          
Finally, the paper will discuss the aftermath of the revolutions and how Shamil Basayev, 
a guerrilla leader who later became castigated as “Russia’s Osama bin Laden”, became the first 
Chechen to lead a pan-Caucasian insurrection against Russia.  Basayev’s death in the summer of 
2006 bifurcated the unified structure of the two revolutions, resulting in a situation akin to the 
interwar period.  Presently, the core of the radical national elite is either dead or has been co-
opted Moscow, leading to the Chechen Revolution’s thermidor; however, the radical religious 
revolution continues.  Demographic and economic trends suggest that high Caucasian birth rates 
and lack of economic opportunity—viewed in the context of the unfolding radical Islamic 
revolution—will combine with shattering effects for the Russian state.  Put simply, the future of 
political stability in the North Caucasus is a future of increasing instability 
 6 
3.0  THE MOUNTAIN GATE BETWEEEN EUROPE AND ASIA 
 
 
source: http://www.unlv.edu/Faculty/pwerth/caucasus-map.jpg 
 
The present-day Russian Federation (RF) is linked to Central Asia by the North 
Caucasus, part of the Southern Federal District.  In reality a mountain-covered isthmus, “the 
seven republics of the North Caucasus region constitute a fragment of the Russian Federation’s 
territory (0.66%) and population (4.6%).  Yet these statistics mask the asymmetry between the 
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size and the political significance of the North Caucasus.”15  When viewed as a whole, the 
peoples inhabiting the North Caucasus constitute approximately 6.6 million people spread over 
roughly 43,243 square miles (112,000 km2), just under the size of Greece.16  
 The North Caucasus is a land of glaring diversities.17  It is the northern expanse of 
the Transcaucasia mountain chain, a topographical spine running 1,100 miles18  The chain has an 
average width of 100 miles, with the Daryal Pass serving as the easiest navigable route by which 
to travel through from the Terek plains to the South Caucasus.19  Additionally, the Argun Pass in 
southern Chechnya leads to the Pankisi Gorge in neighboring Georgia.  
 
 
Source: http://www.livelaughlovelearn.com/Playwrighting/Pankisi_Gorge_location_on_map.jpg
                                                 
15 John B. Dunlop and Rajan Menon, “Chaos in the North Caucasus and Russia’s Future,” Survival, Volume 48, 
Number 2 (Summer 2006), p. 97. 
16 Ibid., p. 103. 
17 C W Blandy, “Chechnya: Two Federal Interventions: An Interim Comparison and Assessment,” Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, Caucasus Series P29 (January 2000), p. 3. 
18 Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya (New York: TTP, 2006), p. 2. 
19 John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. 
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 The tallest of the mountains, Mount Elbrus, reaches a peak of 5,642 meters, significantly 
higher than the legendary Alps.20  The jagged southern mountains are contrasted by the grass-
filled foothills and plains to the north.  Indeed,  
there are few regions in the world with such extremes and diversity of nature, including the 
numerous microclimates of the mountains and foothills. The cycles of flooding and drought in the 
valleys, and the contrast of the mountains with the steppe—near desert along the Caspian sea—
and the swampy Terek lowlands.  Here the camel butts head with the ox, the buffalo with the 
mountain goat.21  
 
The North Caucasus is also a great geo-strategic asset to the Russian Federation (RF).  
Traditionally, the North Caucasus was the geographic point of contact between the Russian, 
Ottoman, and Persian Empires.22  In many ways, this struggle continues today.  Post-Soviet 
Russia still retains sovereignty in the North Caucasus and political influence in the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia; Iran seeks regional hegemony in both Central Asia and the Middle 
East; and Turkey appeals to many Turkic-speaking Central Asians through a strategy of pan-
Turkism.  The Caspian Sea region is also known to have plentiful hydrocarbon deposits. 
Sebastian Smith adds that the Caspian deposits are “one of the world’s last untapped sources, a 
possible Persian Gulf of the 21st century.”23   
Aside from the oil that passes through the Chechen Capital of Grozny, there are many 
benefits to presiding over the North Caucasus:  
It provides Russia’s entrée to the South Caucasus area, which contains Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan; Dagestan abuts Azerbaijan, the arch foe or Armenia, Arguably Russia’s closest ally in 
the Region, and overlooks 400km of the Caspian Sea’s littoral; the Georgian Military Highway 
                                                 
20 Smith, p. 8-9. 
21 Thomas M. Barrett, “Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the North Caucasus,” Slavic Review, Volume 54, 
Number 3 (Fall 1995), p. 583. 
22 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (UK: 
Curzon Press, 2001), p. 18, 24. 
23 Smith, p. 3. 
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run through Ossetia to the breakaway, Russia-backed Georgian republic of South Ossetia and 
points south.  Most importantly, the Kremlin likens the North Caucasus as the first domino, which 
if allowed to fall, would spawn revolts in Russia’s other ethnic republics.24
As two analysts quite correctly put it, “This southern Russia borderland could prove to be 
the tail that wags the Russian dog.”25  
 There exists a myriad of myths deeply held by Transcaucasia’s inhabitants. The 
mythology of the region’s importance is not a unique aspect of Caucasian culture; most, if not 
all, peoples develop deeply-entrenched creation stories and legends. Nevertheless, in this region 
it is particularly colorful.  According to Nicholas Griffin: 
In Armenia, Noah’s Ark lies on the borders. In Azerbaijan, the Garden of Eden is said to lurk 
somewhere in the south. Georgia is not to be outdone. If her neighbors boast of the genesis of 
man, Georgia claims to have been the one of the gods. Prometheus was bound to be one of her 
great peaks, his lever torn daily by the circling birds of prey.26   
                                                 
24 Barrett, p. 101-102. 
25 Ibid., p. 97. 
26 Nicholas Griffin, Caucasus: Journey to the Land Between Christianity and Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), p. 2 
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  11 
 The North Caucasus is a place of extreme ethnic and linguistic diversity. More often than 
not, maps of these factors simply resemble a “psychedelic quilt”.27  “Imagine walking around the 
Eiffel Tower on a busy summer’s day and hearing the sounds of a dozen nationalities. Now 
imagine that no one has traveled more than fifty miles to get there.”28   According to one legend 
as retold by Sebastian Smith, God “clumsily dropped his shaker” in the Caucasus when 
distributing the people and nations of the world, providing an explanation for the extremely high 
concentration of ethno-national groups in the North Caucasus.29  The abnormally high level of 
ethno-national stratification in the region, especially given their close geographic proximity, 
imparts a distinctively-ethnic characterization to North Caucasian politics.  In fact, the North 
Caucasus rivals even former Yugoslavia in ethno-political complexity.30       
                                                 
27 Smith, p. 7. 
28 Griffin, p. 2. 
29 Smith, p. 7. 
30 Cornell, p. 17. 
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Source: www.geocities.com/valentyn_ua/DagestanMovyG.gif
 
Despite the obvious benefits of controlling the North Caucasus, it is a region of  
economic deprivation.  The standards of living of all North Caucasian regions rank the lowest 
among the 88 RF regions; per capita output is “barely 50% of the Russian average, wages are a 
third below the Russian mean, and enrollments in education per 10,000 remain substantially 
below the Russian average.”31   
 
                                                 
31 Even President Putin intervened at one point to publicly to chide “the abominable economic state of the North 
Caucasus.” See Dunlop and Menon, p. 105, 107. 
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4.0  THE NORTH CAUCASUS: A CONTESTED REGION 
In an effort to make sense of the present we must first look to the past.  The 
‘mountaineers’ who inhabit the North Caucasus are an extremely interesting breed.  One of the 
most oft-repeated characteristics is that, they are a very difficult people to subdue.  
The first serious efforts to capture the region came a decade after the death of the prophet 
Muhammad under the leadership of Suraqa bin Amr.32  Suraqa’s army “had conquered the whole 
of Persia in a mere ten years, and they now stood ready to burst north into the Eurasian 
interior,”33 along the Caspian coast of present-day Dagestan.  Intense tribal resistance to the 
Arabs led them to abandon their northern advances, only to  resume it again years later under the 
orders of Caliph Omar.34  By 652, the recalcitrant mountaineers again rose to the task, this time 
executing the Arab commander.35  Although they failed militarily, the Arabs did manage to plant 
the seeds of Islam, albeit among a minority of those who resided around the Arab seat of power 
in Derbent, Dagestan.36  
                                                 
32 Reynolds, “Myths and Mysticism: A Longitudinal Perspective on Islam and Conflict in the North Caucasus,” p. 
32.  Describing its strategic importance, Reynolds describes that the Arabs came to call the area “Bab al-Abwab”: 
The Gate of Gates. Ibid., p. 32. 
33 Ibid., p. 32. 
34 Ibid., p. 33. 
35 Ibid., p. 33. 
36 Interestingly enough, Reynolds describes that those who embraced the Arab religion came under attack by 
mountaineers with the same ferocity endured by the Arabs.  Moreover, the group who is believed to be responsible 
for these punitive actions is possibly the ancestors of the ethnic group who will have the highest percentage of 
Salifite Islamists before the 1999 incursions, 
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The second group of would-be conquerors unlucky enough to enter the region was the 
Mongols.  By 1233 the Mongol armies invaded and occupied the same territory along the 
Caspian coasts of Dagestan as that of the Arabs, only to share the same fate.  As Reynolds 
describes it: 
 the mountaineers did not merely resist the Mongols but also eventually turned to raiding them, 
and succeeded in compelling the scourges of Eurasia to send gifts and delegations in exchange for 
halting their attacks.37
 
Not to be deterred, from 1395-1396 the Timurid “Crusher of Kings” Timurlenk tried 
where all others had failed and drove his forces into the territory of modern-day Dagestan—and 
later Georgia (1386-1387, 1403-1404)—with the same degree of ineptness.38  Somewhere 
around the early 1600s, the Persians attempted the first in a series of attempts to seize and 
occupy the Caspian coast of Dagestan.  It was during this time of Shiite invasion that Hadji-
Daud, bolstered by Kazi-Kumukh’s ruler Surhai-Khan and Kaitag’s Akhmed-Khan, rallied his 
Sunni mountaineer kin to armed rebellion.39     
Having secured their southern flank, the North Caucasian mountaineers turned their 
attention to the northern encroachments of a growing Tsarist Russian empire.  The Russian road 
to Baku in 1722 brought them through the northern plains and southern mountains of 
Chechnya.40  In a fascinating comparative work on potentially secessionist regions in post-Soviet 
Russia, Cornell professor Matthew Evangelista recalled one instance when a Russian cavalry 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 34. Emphasis added. 
38 Ibid., p. 34. 
39 Enver F. Kisriev & Robert Bruce Ware, “Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance: Ideology and Political 
Organization in Dagestan 1800-1930,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), p. 493-94. Kisriev and 
Ware also add that this inter-communal war managed to expel the Shiite Persians from both Dagestan and the 
northern parts of present-day Azerbaijan by 1721.  This is not to say that sectarian differences were the primary 
catalyst of the conflict.  While the Sunni/Shiite chasm surely existed, it is more likely that the true concern of Hadji-
Daud’s coalition was resistance to foreign occupation, rather than charges of apostasy.   
40 James Hughes, “Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Post-Soviet Conflict,” Civil Wars Volume 4, Number 4 
(Winter 2001), p. 18 and Kisriev & Ware, “Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance: Ideology and Political 
Organization in Dagestan 1800-1930,” p. 494. 
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unit was cut to pieces by the Chechen guerrillas.41  Peter the Great’s forces did manage to take 
the Dagestani towns of Derbent, Tarku, and Kuba before withdrawing  in a strategic 
retrenchment designed to defend other areas of the Tsarist Empire, ceding all territorial claims to 
Nadir Shah’s Persia42 —prima face a Persian stroke of luck that would soon turn out to be a 
curse. 
Peter the Great’s escapade through Caucasian isthmus was the first time the Russian 
Army truly attempted to pacify the mountaineers.  At the time, the mountaineers’ lands were less 
the objective than a speed bump along the way.  Truth be told, the men who swelled the ranks of 
the Imperial army would most likely have preferred to battle the regulars of the Persian Empire 
than to be picked apart by ‘bandits’ along the way.  Truly, as the defenders of Grozny more than 
two centuries later would claim, the Russians were entering Hell; if this is true, the Russians 
paradoxically became accustomed to the inhospitable environment—in Hell they remained.  
Catherine the Great made the move to expand Russian influence in their southern flank.  One 
scholar elaborated that: 
The growth of Russian power and the advance of the Russian state under Catherine the Great, 
however, ensured a clash.  In 1763, the Russians built the fort of Mozdok, and thereby initiated a 
14-year war with the Kabardians.  In 1783, the famous General Suvorov expelled the [Nogais] 
from the region to the north of the Kuban.  Two years later, Saint Petersburg established the post 
of governor-general of the Caucasus.43
 
The forcible expulsion of the Nogai was but one consequence of the Russian annexation 
of the Crimea; the second was the Mansur Rebellion.   
                                                 
41 Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings University Press, 2002), p. 12. 
42 Reynolds, p. 34-35. Reynolds adds while Nadir Shah’s exploits “earned him the titles of ‘Second Alexander’ and 
‘Napoleon of Persia,’” the mountaineers would drive out his forces in just two years and, like the Mongols, be 
subjected to subsequent raids.  Kisriev & Ware add that Hadji-Daud was captured by the Ottoman Turks and exiled 
to Cyprus. Kisriev & Ware, “Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance: Ideology and Political Organization in 
Dagestan 1800-1930,” p. 494.   
43 Reynolds, p. 36. 
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 THE MANSUR REBELLION  
Sheikh Mansur was a Chechen-born religious leader whose gazawat (Holy War) was not 
so much a war against the Russian Infidel—Infidel though they may be—but rather a war of 
liberation.  Mansur appealed to the anti-Russian sentiments and grievances of North 
Caucasians.44  These common grievances led to the regionalization of the resistance movement 
consolidated under Mansur’s leadership.45  Indeed, “Mansur attracted a circle of political and 
religious leaders throughout the region as far as Shirvan.”46   
 
Kura River 
Shirvan 
                                                 
44 Mansur did not enjoy the universal support of the North Caucasian peoples.  Particularly, the majority of 
Dagestani peoples, especially the Avars, did not unite under Mansur’s banner. What was particularly important 
regarding Mansur’s rebellion was that it was the first in a line of rebellions led by sheiks belonging to the Naqshbani 
Sufi brotherhood.  Ibid., p. 36-37. 
45 Cornell, p. 27. 
46 Ibid., p. 36. Shirvan is a region in present-day Azerbaijan located between the Caspian coast and the Kura River 
which bisects Azerbaijan. 
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 The Ottomans were more than happy to offer their aid to Mansur’s forces, in many ways 
embodying Machiavelli’s dictum that, “Once the people have taken up arms against you, there 
will never be lacking foreigners to aid them.”47  Even so, despite dealing several defeats to 
Russian forces, Mansur was captured following a 1791 raid upon the Ottoman fort at Anapa 
located in Krasnodar Krai.48      
The Russian Strategy in the North Caucasus was three-fold: First, the Russians weakened 
their Imperial peer competitors. Second, they engaged in expeditionary thrusts south, securing 
their presence with settlements and forts commonly referred to as “the line.”49  Third, short-term 
governance problems were addressed by local pacification campaigns and ethnic deportation.  
Thus, it was the committed strategy of the Tsarist regime to expand both Russia’s influence and 
its state into the Caucasian isthmus.       
 
CHARGING OF BEARS; VENDETTA OF WOLVES  
Russia’s handover of the North Caucasus to the Persians was nothing more than 
temporarily convenient; the bear was just waiting to again try going south.  Perhaps most 
responsible for the Russian return to the North Caucasus was the annexation of Georgia in 
1802.50  Additionally, by 1813 the Russians also managed to annex Azerbaijan. Ironically, it 
seems “rollback” was unofficially the strategy of pre-Soviet Russia toward the Persians.  This 
                                                 
47 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XX. 
48 Reynolds, p. 36. 
49 Specifically, “the line” first appeared as the Kizliar-Mozdok line (1769).  Further drives into the southern 
mountains became known as the Caucasus line.  Later, the Black Sea line was erected to prevent contact with the 
Ottomans.  Barrett, p. 578 and Hughs, p. 18. 
50 Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings University Press, 2002), p. 65 and P. Tolmachev, “Russia’s Annexation of the Caucasus,” Russian 
Studies in History vol. 42 no. 2 (Fall 2002), p. 16. 
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would produce increased strategic depth, access to warm water ports, and increased influence in 
the South Caucasus and Central Asia.  
 The combination of pacification and divide-and-rule strategies usually produced 
politically acceptable outcomes in most imperial holdings, but the demographic and social 
realities of the North Caucasus produced a much more complicated dilemma for Tsarist Russia.  
Much like the tale of the Soviet-Afghan War, rebellions in the North Caucasus rarely produced 
unified movements.  Very often, the mountaineer (gortsy) federations (tukhums) and clans (teips) 
that comprised the federations were far too busy fighting themselves to be concerned with the 
Russians—or at least to be concerned with them for very long .  That being said, there are 
examples to the contrary.  The most glaring of these are the wars of Imams Ghazi, Hamza Bek, 
and Shamil. 
 
THE WARS OF THE THREE IMAMS AND RUSSIAN ANNEXATION  
In 1828 the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire were at war.  Russia quickly won 
the war by 1829; however, Russia’s distraction with her peer competitor provided an opportunity 
for the mountaineers to strike.  Equally important—if not more important—quick and decisive 
action by a large Caucasian coalition served to preempt any attempts made by Dagestan’s pro-St. 
Petersburg ethnic Avars from negotiating a deal with the Tsarist administration.51  These 
conditions produced a series of 19th century Russian wars in the North Caucasus.  It was these 
wars—referred to by some as the Murid (“one who wants or seeks”52) Wars—during which: 
                                                 
51 Reynolds, p. 39 
52 According to Reynolds, “The mountaineer metamorphoses into a murid.  He ceases to be a native fighting for his 
land and way of life and becomes a militant monk, striving in the way of God.” Ibid., p. 39. 
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Russian writers such as Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy had made the North Caucasus a vivid 
and lasting fixture of the imaginations [of the Russian people]…rendering the mountaineers bigger 
than life and romanticizing their love of freedom, seeming lawlessness, and passion.53
 
By once again taking advantage of inter-imperial rivalry, the North Caucasian peoples proved 
that they could be much more than a nuisance.   
 The gorsty resistance that began in 1829 was led by Imam Ghazi Muhammad.  
Lasing until 1932, the first of the Murid Wars claimed the life of its largely-abandoned leader on 
the field of battle.  Aside from the factional nature of the North Caucasian peoples, the most 
compelling of reasons leading to the abandonment of Imam Ghazi was of his own doing.  Ghazi 
apparently tried to fight two battles at once: 
Among his first acts was to declare a comprehensive holy war, that is, a struggle against not only 
the infidel Russians but also against the un-Islamic practices and customs of the 
mountaineers…[First and foremost, Ghazi believed that Sufi] mysticism is to be pursued only in 
addition to the sharia, not as a substitute or alternative to the holy law and its strictures.54
 
Some might think that mountaineers’ common faith (Islam) might have served to 
unite the poly-ethnic North Caucasians. Ghazi, while being actively against the infidel 
Russians, undermined his legitimacy by attacking the relatively-liberal degree of Islamic 
orthodoxy the North Caucasians displayed.  In Orwellian terms, being a pig was better 
than a human, but some pigs are more equal than others. Thus, the puritanical, narrowly-
defined theological views of Ghazi alienated many of the mountaineers and ultimately led 
to his capture.    
  Ghazi’s capture opened the opportunity for more enlightened leadership to 
develop among the mountaineers.  Great times may call for great leaders; but as with most great 
leaders, the human condition of mortality has a uniquely abrupt nature.  Such was the case with 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 31. 
54 Ibid., p. 38. 
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Hamza Bek.  After only two years of agitation and anti-Russian—which in Hamza Bekian terms 
meant anti-Christian—maneuvers, the elites from within Dagestan’s ethnic Avar group conspired 
to have him assassinated.55  Bek’s pan-mountaineer Islamist program threatened to undermine 
the St. Petersburg-backed Avar domination of Dagestani society.  Internally, it threatened to 
form an ad-hoc anti-Russian coalition amongst Dagestan’s many other ethnic groups, upsetting a 
fragile political balance. More importantly, mountaineer militancy threatened to provoke large-
scale Russian intervention.  Such intervention might lead the Tsarist administration to search for 
new allies among Dagestan’s “ethnic kaleidoscope.”56  It was not until the third Murid War that 
the North Caucasians would experience both compelling and competent leadership. 
 Imam Shamil’s quarter-century-long war with Tsarist Russia is perhaps the most 
well-known of the Murid Wars and, in comparison with his predecessors, the most successful.  
Shamil, a native of Dagestan, was a personal friend of Ghazi Muhammad and the two shared a 
common Islamic teacher, Ghazi Ghumuqi.57  There are many reasons why Shamil’s quarter-
century war with Tsarist Russia is overly-romanticized; by the third of the Murid Wars, Shamil’s 
forces were pitted against what was perhaps the most powerful empire in the world.58  That 
being said, it was hardly the 19th century “clash of civilizations” that so many cite it to be.59  
Such an explanation seems to suggest that, had the mountaineers not been followers of Islam, the 
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 39. 
56 This phrase is attributed to John B. Dunlop and Rajan Menon. See Dunlop and Menon, p. 105. 
57 A bit of history is instructive: Ghumuqi, the theological tutor of Ghazi Muhammad and Shamil, was a disciple of 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaraghi.  Al-Yaraghi in turn received his doctrinal views from an Ottoman sheikh, Mawlana 
Khalid.  Khalid’s teachings were largely drawn from those of Indian the sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624).  
Reynolds explains that “the things that concerned Sirhindo seem to have been similar to those that worried Mawlana 
Khalid.  Theologically lax syncretism, the arrival of Christian colonial powers, and a rebounding Hinduism—all in 
the context of weakening Mughal political power—threatened the position of Islam…Sihindi saw the answer to this 
crisis in the combination of a sober mysticism with an unbending insistence on the importance of sharia and Sunni 
orthodoxy.  Unlike the Sufis who counselled [sic.] detachment from the affairs of this world, Sirhindi believed in the 
efficacy and need for political power, and he urged others to do the same.” Thus, Sirhindi can be called the father of 
the Sufi Islamism.  See Reynolds, p. 38-40.  
58 Ibid.,, p. 39. 
59 Ibid., p. 39. 
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mountaineers might have instead welcomed involuntary incorporation into the Russian Empire.  
The mountaineers did not need to be Islamic to know that the Russian Empire was determined to 
annex the North Caucasus.  In this sense, the religious differences between the Russians and the 
North Caucasians may have been largely irrelevant.   
Also, key to understanding the rise of Muridism, and contrary to the primacy attributed to 
inter-religious causes, was the manner of Russian rule.  In order to entice would-be elites to 
acquiesce to Tsarist rule, Russia created a  “pseudo-aristocracy of local elites” in the North 
Caucasus by seizing large tracts of land and parceling them up to ambitious locals.60 Thus, the 
desired political end of the Murid gazavat (war of liberation) was not religious per se, but rather 
one of anti-imperial national liberation.61     
The specifics of the third Murid War are not the subject of this work; of interest are the 
effects that Shamil’s actions had upon the region. Two things in particular are of interest. First, 
Shamil’s appeal to the primacy of Islam as a means of  mobilization allowed the North 
Caucasians to transcend their traditional inter-ethnic rivalries.  Second, Shamil’s Islamist 
political program is largely responsible for offering the only alternative to overcoming the 
orthodoxy of clan and ethnic politics in the North Caucasus: the state.62
Like Mansur and Imam Ghazi before him, Shamil implemented a comprehensive political 
and social transformation of the North Caucasus.  Shamil insisted upon the primacy of sharia 
                                                 
60 Kisriev & Ware, “Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance: Ideology and Political Organization in Dagestan 
1800-1930,” p. 494. 
61Ibid., p. 494. 
62 Reynolds quite brilliantly analyzes that by “drawing upon the Quran and the hadiths (compellations of the sayings 
and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad), as its sources, the sharia provides an extensive, codified body of law to 
regulate human social relationships.  Moreover, inherent in the sharia is the concept of dawlah, the state, as the 
enforcer of law.”  The sharia law was viewed in contrast from the adat  (customary law) of mountaineer society.  
Contrary to the sharia notion of individual responsibility, the adat stressed the idea of collective responsibility, itself 
a product of tribal society.  Reynolds, p. 36  Shamil’s Imamate was a fairly successful political enterprise.  Despite 
the high degree of ethno-national stratification of its inhabitants, the Imamate lasted nearly three decades. See 
Cornell, p. 27.  
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over the adat and declared blood feuds illegal on both moral and political grounds.63  To counter 
local resistance to his Islamist program, Shamil governed his unified state (comprising much of 
the present-day Ingush, Chechen, and Dagestani RF Republics) though pre-existing clan 
structures.  In essence, Shamil’s Emirate could be classified as a highly-centralized Theocratic 
Republic.  Specifically: 
Shamil used the tariqat to serve as a backbone for a quasi-state.  As Imam, Shamil stood at the top 
of the state structure, and he was the supreme authority on matters military, political, and spiritual.  
Shamil’s civil administration was geographically organized, with a naib, or deputy, in charge of 
each district.  Each naib in turn was responsible for guarding the borders of the state that lay in his 
district.  To protect the integrity of the central structure, Shamil preferred to appoint outsiders to a 
given district, rather than rely on local figures.  In addition to a voluntary militia, Shamil 
maintained a rudimentary regular army…Shamil’s state also possessed a social welfare system to 
look after widows and orphans.64       
    
In so doing, Shamil managed to band together multiple ethno-national and clan-structured 
groups of peoples into a unified Islamic Emirate, grounded in the sharia.  Indeed, the 
mountaineers themselves “referred to Shamil’s era not as ‘the time of the Great War against the 
Russians’ or as the ‘time of Shamil’ but rather as ‘the time of the sharia.’”65 Thus, while Sufi 
Islam’s relative social liberalism (explained later) made the mountaineers receptive to its 
teachings, Shamil managed to achieve the opposite: rather than having Islam conform to 
mountaineer culture, he envisioned and implemented a political program that sought to conform 
mountaineer culture to Islam.  More accurately, “the time of the sharia” was really the time of 
the Naqshbandi.  As Miriam Lanskoy has observed,  “the Naqshbandi order became the ideology 
of resistance and the founding principle of the Imamate.”66   
                                                 
63 James Hughs also points out such vendettas often took the form of kidnappings. Hughs, p. 19 and Reynolds, p. 40. 
In a rather brilliant understanding of mountaineer social customs, St. Petersburg’s search for regional allies carried 
with it the promise to incorporate the adat into the Imperial administration.   
64 Reynolds, p. 41. 
65 Ibid., p. 41. 
66 Miriam Lanskoy, “Daghestan and Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the State,” SAIS Reviw, Volume XXII, 
Number 2 (Summer –Fall 2002), p. 169. 
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Despite all this, Shamil’s Imamate was short-lived for two reasons.  First, nearly a 
century of intermittent conflict persuaded the mountaineers to seek political accommodation with 
the Russians.  Secondly, Shamil’s message of armed rebellion was met by Chechen Kunta 
Hajji’s program of non-resistance, himself a member of the Qadiriya tariqat (as opposed to the 
three Imams’ Naqshbani-Khalidiya tariqat).  This defection was a primary catalyst which led to 
Shamil’s 1859 surrender to Russian authorities.67   
Time and again, the inhabitants of the Caucasus proved ready and able to set aside tribal 
differences and form tactical alliances in the face of encroachments to their south.  Despite a 
complete lack of any political institutions resembling that of a state68, the mountaineers defended 
their territory and their way of life.69  First the Muslim Arabs, then the Mongols, and later the 
Persians, all brought their armies to the foothills and peaks of the Caucasus mountains—all 
returned home thanking whatever supernatural being they knew to have been able to live long 
enough to make the homecoming.  The martial nature of the mountaineers should not be 
overplayed; however, there is little doubt that even Aires would be proud to know them as his 
own. 
While by no means “successful” prior to the Murid Wars, Imperial Russia exposed the 
merit of diligence.  Attrition finally exacted a price too great upon the mountaineer population—
admittedly only after three rebellions and 77,000 Russian casualties70.  Not only that, inter-ethnic 
                                                 
67 Stephan R. Bowers, Yavus Akhmadov, and Ashley Ann Derrick, “Islam in Ingushetia and Chechnya,” The 
Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Volume 29, Number 4 (Winter 2004), p. 405 and Reynolds, p. 
41. 
68 Reynolds puts it much more bluntly, quoting Chantal Lermercier-Quelquejay’s assertion that the North Caucasus 
“remained ‘in a climate of permanent anarchy.’” Reynolds, p. 34. 
69 The principal strategy for this preservation centered on the various Dagestani princes “playing the Ottomans 
against the Safavids, who represented a more proximate threat to the mountaineers.” Ibid. p. 34. 
70 Tolmachev, p. 16.  Taken as a whole, the Murid Wars (1817-1864) exacted an annual attrition rate of 
approximately 1,638 Russian casualties.  Though by no means uniform, this number better reflects the intensity of 
the conflict than the astounding total figure.   
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and religious rivalries would lead some groups to view Russian domination as a lesser evil when 
compared to other local groups (traditionally the Dagestani Avar position for instance). Thus, 
Elise Giuliano correctly debunks the myth of mountaineer unity by summarizing that the gorsty 
“were incorporated into the Russian Empire between the 15th and 19th centuries, via both military 
annexation and voluntary transfer.”71  The communists later saw to it that only the voluntary 
became part of the Soviet history books. It would take the First World War and resulting 
Bolshevik coup d’ètat in Petrograd to change the political balance in the region.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Elise Giuliani, “Islamic Identity and Political Mobilization in Russia: Chechnya and Dagestan Compared,” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 11 (2005), p. 199. 
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5.0  NATION-BUILDING AND OFFICAL ISLAM: ACQUIRING SOVIETR SCARS 
The Soviet experience of the North Caucasian peoples is of paramount interest to those 
who wish to truly appreciate the underlying causes of the Chechen Revolution.  First, Soviet rule 
fashioned many, if not all, of the present territorial boundaries of the RF Southern Federal 
District.  Second, and related, these boundaries are largely responsible for a great deal of the 
current inter-ethnic tensions in the region.  Third, local resistance to Soviet rule resulted in harsh 
pacification measures whose effects are still felt today. Fourth, Soviet attempts to root out, and 
later control, Islam legitimized the wedding of church and state—something that will be 
particularly acute in Dagestan. 
The Bolsheviks sought to piece together a heterogeneous political entity whose roots 
were built upon common ideological persuasions.  Being good Marxists, they were convinced 
that ethno-national loyalties could be overcome, provided proper indoctrination, and given 
sufficient motivation.  Political issues relating to the governance of a multinational state led 
Soviet nationalities policy to recognize autonomous zones within the empire.  Equally important, 
these territorial-political zones were tailored to mitigate the conditions through which resistance 
to Soviet rule could be effectively constructed.  These attempts to reconcile ethno-national 
realities with acceptable political limitations incubated the later post-Soviet eruptions of self-
determination and created national grievances vis-à-vis both the Russians and other ethno-
national groups.  The second of the two grievances was particularly acute in the North Caucasus. 
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 THE COLLAPSE OF TSARIST RUSSIA AND THE RISE OF THE MOUNTAINEER REPUBLIC 
The Tsarist military governor’s administration did not end with the advent of Kerensky’s 
provisional government; in fact, military rule in the North Caucasus persisted until at least April 
1917.72  It was during this time that tribal and clan-centric social patterns particular to the North 
Caucasus gradually took over to fill the gap of collapsing central authority.  Two scholars of the 
region explain that, “Life in the djamaats gradually began to return to traditional forms of self-
governance.  The process was not without serious intra-djamaat conflicts, though these remained 
localized.”73   
Local djammat and clan governance carried with it an intrinsic weakness.  While 
providing for a governing apparatus that secured resources for one’s clan or ethnic group, the 
mutual inter- and intra-group distrust reduced the ability of the gortsy to resist future Russian 
attempts to reinstate foreign rule.  Thus, the Union of Allied Mountainers of the North Caucasus 
(Soiuz ob’edinennykh gortsev severnogo kavkaza or UAM) was formed.  The UAM “sought to 
unify the mountaineers, but not on the basis of ethnicity or language…or even on the basis of 
religion.  Rather, it sought to build on a shared mountaineer culture that included all the 
indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus.”74  On top of creating a local system of alliances, the 
consensus of the UAM was that Kerensky’s provisional government was sufficiently different 
                                                 
72 Kisriev & Ware, “Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance: Ideology and Political Organization in Dagestan 
1800-1930,” p. 498. 
73 Ibid., p. 499. 
74 Reynolds, p. 43. Emphasis added. 
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from its Tsarist predecessor to seek the inclusion of the North Caucasus into a new Russia as an 
autonomous zone.75
The Bolshevik seizure of Petrograd changed the political calculus of the UAM members.  
Having thrown their lot in with Kerensky, they now were forced to seek additional allies in the 
North Caucasus region.  Precisely because of the Provisional government’s early demise, the 
North Caucasus Federation, or Mountaineer Republic, was formed in May of 1918.76  Lead by 
an ethnic Chechen, Tapa Cermoev77, the Mountaineer Republic arose from the political 
unification of the Transcaucasian Federation and the UAM in order to counter the growing 
power of Trotsky’s Red Army.78  Regional consolidation was not enough, but the geographic 
proximity of the Mountaineer Republic to Russia’s traditional rival in the region, the Ottoman 
Empire, allowed the gorsty to find a major power which was more than willing to take advantage 
of the Russian Civil War to gain influence in the region.  Thus, on 11 May 1918, the Ottoman 
Empire officially recognized the independence of the Mountaineer Republic and dispatched a 
contingent of volunteer soldiers to the Caspian coast of present-day Dagestan.79
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid., p. 43. 
76 Mark Galeotti, “’Brotherhoods’ and ‘Associates’: Chechen Networks and Organized Crime,” Low-Intensity 
Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 11, Number 2/3 (Winter 2002), p. 340 and Dunlop & Menon, p. 104. 
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RUSSIA’S CIVIL WAR AND THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS  
The civil war in Russia was an unavoidable distraction for the gorsty.  Not only could, and very 
much likely would, the victor consolidate central authority, but the winning side would possess a 
veteran, professional military force that would likely wander south in the future.  Thus, the 
gorsty were compelled to pick a side.  General Deniken and his White Army made this choice 
very easy for the mountaineers.  Deniken arrived in the North Caucasus in August of 1919.  
Fully aware of the region’s complex ethnography, Deniken apparently characterized the region 
as a “volcano.” 80  Deniken’s proclamations to the gorsty breathed promises of future autonomy 
in return for service rendered to the counter-revolutionary cause, but very quickly became 
perceived as “attempting to restore the power of the Tsar.”81  This perception of Deniken and the 
counter-revolutionary forces as the heirs of Russian nationalism and imperial policy forever 
alienated the White armies from the local population and solidified their resistance to his 
presence82, perhaps costing him the war.  Naturally, mountaineer opposition to Deniken found 
favor among the Bolsheviks and played into the hands of the Red Army.  One student of the 
period notes:   
The Bolsheviks, playing to the mountaineer opposition to Deniken’s programme [sic.] of restoring 
tight central control in a unitary Russian state, wooed several influential skeikhs with promises of 
full autonomy under Bolshevik rule…The anti-Deniken mountaineers…contributed greatly to the 
defeat of the counter-revolutionary Volunteer Army by mounting repeated attacks on its rear, 
denying it any security or sanctuary.83
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In this manner, local insurgents symbiotically nipped at the counter-revolutionary forces, 
pushing them toward the northern plains, Nikolaï Gikalo’s 5th Red Army84, and certain 
destruction.85   
 
SOVIET VICTORY AND CONSOLIDATION 
Having sided against the devil that they did know (Deniken), the gorsty settled for the devil that 
they did not (the Bolsheviks); but the honeymoon would not last long.  Despite the litany of 
Soviet promises for North Caucasian autonomy, along with the Bolsheviks came all-too-familiar 
centralization.86
Perhaps the most famous Bolshevik commitment to gorsty autonomy was made by the 
Soviet Commissar for Nationalities, Joseph Stalin. These promises of de facto independence 
specifically addressed both the sharia and adat.  Making a personal appearance at the 1920 
Emergency Convention of the Peoples of Dagestan, Stalin assured: 
We have been informed that sharia has a very serious meaning among the peoples of Dagestan.  
We also learned that the enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumor that the Soviets will ban 
sharia. I am here to assure you, on the authority of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic, there these rumors are false.  The government of Russia allows every nation to govern 
based upon the local laws and traditions.  The Soviet government recognizes sharia as legitimate, 
customary law, practiced among other nations of Russia.  If the Dagestani people preserve their 
law and tradition, then they should be sustained.87
 
The Bolsheviks adhered to a gradualist strategy, rather than to implement a regional 
crash-course in administrative centralization.  It was the cumulative nature of  Soviet policies 
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which caused the gorsty to rethink their choice of friends.88  For instance, the application of 
sharia began to acquire Soviet scrutiny in 1921 and officially took the form of the District Sharia 
Legislative Department.  This was subsumed a year later to the authority of the Sharia 
Department of the Ministry (Narcomat) of Justice of the Dagestani Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (DASSR).  Parallel with this judicial bureaucracy, the Soviets created investigative 
committees to oversee the judicial process.  Additionally, eleven district-level “sharia” courts 
were designed as an official check to local sharia court rulings, enhancing central control.  
Following all these attempts to establish a judicial hierarchy, on 18 April 1927 the Dagestani 
Central Committee announced a decree that “abolished the djamaat and district sharia courts, 
and criminalized the practice of sharia.”89  The subsequent year witnessed the closing of 
religious schools and brought the local Islam clergy under the watchful eyes of the Soviet 
security services.  Indeed, “According to some sources, 38 Naqshbandi and Kadiri shaykhs were 
executed,”90 and “over 800 of the most respected gorsty elders were sent into exile in 
Archangelsk, near the Artic Circle.”91  If all this was not enough to antagonize the gorsty, the 
Tenth Article of the Criminal Code, titled ‘On Crimes Related to the Relic Tribal Way of Life’, 
surely exposed the hollowness of Commissar Stalin’s prior assurances.92      
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GORSTY RESISTANCE AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE  
Disenchantment with Soviet life was primarily to blame for the decade-long series of 
insurrections following the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War.93  Parallel to what the 
PDPA would do in Afghanistan decades later, the Soviet government sought to undermine the 
very structures upon which the fabric of North Caucasian society were built; Consequently, it 
became a predatory force.   
Mountaineer resistance mainly erupted in the more geographically-inaccessible (that is to 
say southern and mountainous) areas of the North Caucasus, leading the movement to be 
dominated by ethnic Chechens and Dagestani Avars.94  One such example was the 1920-1921 
rebellion led by Imam Nijmutdin Gotsinskii.  Gotsinskii was supported by Saïd Bek, the 
grandson of the legendary Shamil. “At its height,” wrote one scholar, “the ‘Sharia Army of the 
Gorsty People’ numbered over 10,000 horsemen and controlled large towns such as Derbent and 
Makahchkala. [sic]” 95  Even with this initial success, Imam Gotsinskii and Saïd Bek’s Sharia 
Army was subject to the reprisals of the 9th Red Army, commanded by M. K. Levandovskii and 
under the political control of Sergo Ordjonikidze.96  According to after-action and field reporting 
from both the Red Army and the Checka, the mountaineer resistance was never unified.97  
Though it never posed a permanent threat to Soviet control, not least because of the harsh 
reprisals upon the populace using artillery and air power, the resistance did lead the Soviets to 
formulate a political solution. “The Bolsheviks created local organs of power that were popularly 
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elected.  Revolutionary committees were replaced by ‘village soviets’ (councils)…[under] the 
Bolshevik slogan of ‘Power to the Soviets.’”98  The ‘victory’ came at the cost of “at least 
5,000”99 Red army soldiers; it would not be the last time significant amounts of Russian blood 
was spilled in order to  keep the region forcibly under Russian control.  Moreover, the recurring 
rebellions in the North Caucasus required the Bolsheviks to divert Red Army forces from the 
South Caucasus north in order to maintain sufficient military presence for pacification 
operations, which essentially “diverted Soviet attention and made it impossible for Moscow to 
effectively project its influence southward.”100
 
SOVIET NATION-BUILDING: A PARADOX 
For such a relatively small geographic area, the ethno-national diversity of the North Caucasus 
posed special challenges to Soviet nationalities policy.  The typical solution, naming the territory 
after the majority group and offering incentives to minority groups, worked against Soviet 
interests in two ways.  First, if Soviet grand strategy was intended to detach peoples from the 
illusion of nationality, exposing the true class struggle, then creating what one scholar 
characterized as “nation-states in embryo” was surely counterproductive.101  The creation of 
ASSRs along national lines, whether real or imagined, ensured that “each of these developed 
along separate lines, cultivating its own group identity and nationalism.”102  The only attempt to 
counterbalance these national designations was the import of significant numbers of ethnic 
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Russians.  Moreover, the unique level of diversity found in Dagestan, complicated by the mere 
existence of an Avar ethnic plurality, required much more tactful governance.   
Second, because the national ASSRs served to foster national identity, thus promoting 
group solidarity and resistance to Soviet rule, Stalinist Russia implemented the controversial 
policy of population resettlement, redrawing the national borders only after the troublesome 
groups were forcibly removed—thereby creating deep national grievances toward Moscow and 
exacerbating inter-group rivalries.  In this sense, the resettlement of ethno-national groups 
diluted the homogeneity of the ‘autonomous’ republics, creating a litany of territorial and 
national grievances.  Essentially, “Soviet-era map-making and state-creation [provided] the 
backdrop for the region’s current ethnic tensions.”103
Dagestan’s ethno-national diversity was simply too much for the Soviets to bear.  After 
all, it is always easier to work with smaller numbers.  In this spirit, the Soviet government 
divided peoples speaking a minimum of 32 tongues into 11 official nationalities.104  Despite the 
Soviet’s best top-down efforts to create political unities (or units?) in the North Caucasus, 
resistance forced them adopt more coercive measures.  One of the most controversial, population 
resettlement, was primarily responsible for the deep antagonism that developed between the 
ethnic Russians and the Chechens.  Not only that, because the ethnic realities were reflected in 
the map-making process, the Chechen and Ingush deportations exacerbated group resentments 
within Dagestan’s heterogeneous society. 
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THE CHECHEN AND INGUSH DEPORTATIONS 
Failed attempts to pacify the highlander groups led the Soviets to harsher measures.  In some 
ways, the later approach resembled an attempt to exterminate the recalcitrant groups, but it never 
approached anything near the brutality of the Nazis.  As Operation Barbarossa drove deeper into 
Russian territory, the Soviets feared, perhaps legitimately, that the Chechens and other 
nationalities would rebel.  This situation would call for the Soviets to re-pacify the population 
while defending against the Germans who were driving toward the Baku oilfields in 1942.105
With this strategic dilemma in mind, Stalin’s government chose to remove the problem, 
almost as if they were surgeons removing a cancerous tumor.  Code-named Operation Lentil, 
119,000 Red Army soldiers and NKVD personnel forcibly deported approximately 600,000 
people (Chechens constituted roughly 400,000 of the total) by train to Kazakhstan and 
Kirghizia106 during February 1944.107  The undertaking was massive, requiring 12,525 railcars108 
in a series of 194 convoys.109  The Soviets then proceeded to replace the exiles from Dagestan’s 
Akki district with more tolerable nationalities, resettling ethnic Laks in the territory once 
populated by ethnic Chechens. 110  Additonally, the Soviets artificially diluted the concentration 
of ethnic Chechens in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR by transferring ethnic Russians from 
Stravropol Krai.111  Moreover, the brutal conduct of the operation claimed the lives of thousands 
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of Chechens crammed into the endless convoys of trains due to disease, lack of water, lack of 
food, and exposure. In the minds of the Chechens, this was an attempt at ethnic extermination no 
different than that of Hitler.  
It was not until Khrushchev’s thaw in 1957 that they could return home from exile112, 
“often bringing the bones of their relatives for burial.”113  What is most important about the exile 
is that it provided the necessary crisis, laying the road to the November 1991 Chechen 
Revolution.  It created a political grievance amongst the exiled generation that could only be 
resolved with the creation of an independent Chechen state, assuring that such treatment could 
never again befall the nation. 
 
A DISASTROUS RECORD 
The Soviets failed to take into account the ethnic complexity of the North Caucasus.  This failure 
exposed complicated governance problems, which caused the Soviets to pursue extreme 
solutions.   Additionally, Soviet nationalities policy failed to help the Caucasians transcend 
group loyalties—and likely served to reinforce and exacerbate them.  In effect, “each of these 
[territorial-political units] developed along separate lines, cultivating its own group identity and 
nationalism.”114  Moshe Gammer claims that “the policy of ‘institutionalized multinationality’ 
created nation-states in embryo; for although most had no historical provenance as independent 
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and consolidated entities, they became the default political-administrative template for the post-
Soviet space. [sic].”115
Failure to assimilate the North Caucasian ethno-national groups was particularly acute in 
Dagestan.  The ethno-national diversity of the ASSR produced an impasse in Soviet assimilation 
programs.  “The ‘new Soviet man’,” write Oversloot and Van Den Burg, “in which all 
nationalities of the Soviet Union would finally become indistinguishable and to which all 
nationalities would be ‘elevated’, in fact made very little headway in Dagestan.”116 Regarding 
the realty of Soviet governance, Dagestan’s ethnic complexity forced Moscow to rule though 
ethnic elites, operating in the clan-based spoils system—much like Shamil had to do at the end of 
the three Imam wars.  Essentially, “The power of the communist party’s first secretary was both 
based upon and limited by the fact that he was expected to promote members of his own clan and 
nationality.”117  In this manner, Soviet policies only served to reinforce deeply-entrenched ethno-
national loyalties, setting the stage for the events to come. 
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6.0  ORIGINS OF A REVOLUTION 
 
 
 
The Chechen Revolution, like so many others in the 1990s, was a product of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Also like so many others, the revolution was influenced by the power struggle 
between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.  Unlike many of its neighbors in the North 
Caucasus, Chechnya became radicalized by a small, yet captivating, revolutionary elite.  The 
revolution was both anti-communist and nationalist, yet unlike other anti-communist or 
nationalist revolutions, it provoked Moscow to use military force to put it down—and on more 
than one occasion.  Indeed, the Revolution changed the entire political landscape of the North 
Caucasus.   
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 A 2-TIER SOCIETY 
Even though it was named the Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), the 
Chechen and the Ingush nations were second-class citizens in a ranked society.  Any position of 
worth or status was essentially reserved for ethnic Russians.  Every day existence in the 
Checheno-Ingush ASSR was a sad reminder of their status as a conquered people. While Mel 
Brooks reminds us that “It’s good to be the King,” Anatol Lieven reminds us that “it is hard to be 
a Chechen”118. 
The twin pillars of power in the republic were the First Secretary of the Communist Party 
and the Chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, both, of course, operating under the control 
of Moscow.119  Kremlin-directed policy also “required that the First Party Secretary, the local 
head of the KGB, the local police chief and all top administrators in the oil industry should be 
ethnic Russians.”120  Apparently, the highest echelons of power in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR 
were not the only reserved positions of employment. One Chechen informed reporters that it was 
extremely difficult for Chechens to even find employment as bus drivers, “especially on 
important routes.”121  
Comparative statistics are even more revealing. Hoover Institution Senior Fellow John 
Dunlop provides the following statistics from Alexander Nekrich’s book, The Punished Peoples: 
“Of 8,997 specialists with a higher education listed as living in [the Checheno-Ingush ASSR] in 
1959, only 177 were Chechens and 124 Ingush. Similarly, of 8,000 teachers employed in the 
republic after its restoration, only 1,440 were Chechens and Ingush, and, of these, only 190 had 
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educational degrees.”122  Russian Academy of Sciences Professor Valery Tishkov provides 
statistics of his own which,  he claims, show that the local inhabitants were “represented in the 
power structures at all levels.”123  Such claims, however, are not persuasive.  
The domination of ethnic Russians in positions of power and the civil service had its 
roots in the 1944 deportations.  The expulsion of the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and 
other areas along the Soviet periphery necessarily created a plethora of employment vacancies—
not that the former local inhabitants possessed influential positions to begin with.  When the 
deportees and theirs families were pardoned under Khrushchev’s administration, they returned to 
find Russians and Cossacks dwelling in their ancestral homes—except for the highlanders whose 
villages were razed to the ground and were forced to live in the northern lowlands.  
It is tempting to assume that elements of the newly-rehabilitated peoples would 
eventually rise up from low social status by way of their own merit.  Indeed, education and 
enterprise tend to facilitate upward mobility and become great enablers in the long run if the 
playing field is leveled—especially if you become a member of the Party.  The playing field was 
not level however.  The authorities made symbolic gestures such as affirmative action policies 
reserving slots in institutions of higher education for those of Caucasian descent; but in practice, 
the policies rarely served the interests of the local inhabitants. Dzhabrail Gakayev’s offers the 
following account: 
Schools [in the rural areas] had a shortage of financing, teachers, infrastructure, and books. Many 
children didn’t attend school because of their families’ poverty and the seasonal migratory work 
their parents asked them to do. At college entrance exams, those from village schools, mostly of 
Chechen and Ingush nationality, could not compete with the Russian-speaking city youth. In 
consequence, local colleges failed to train Chechen and Ingush specialists. The percentage of 
Vainakh students (particularly at the Petroleum Industry College) was low. Since Vainakh college 
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applicants were at a disadvantage, they often had to pay bribes to gain admission. Russia’s 
colleges had a system of reserving quotas for applicants from the ethnic autonomous region, but 
the republic’s Communist Party committee began admitting Russian-speaking applicants among 
the indigenous candidates in these reserved quotas. Those from the city schools—Russians, 
Armenians, Jews—received more opportunities.124  
 
Access to living accommodations in the apartment buildings in the center of Grozny, in 
close  proximity to the government buildings, were “reserved for ethnic Russians—something 
which later ensured that thousands of Russians died in the bombing of the city at the beginning 
of the [1994-1996] war.”125  Healthcare was also notoriously substandard (relative to other 
Soviet regions) in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR. When compared to ethnically-Russian regions of 
Stravropol krai, Krasnodar krai, and the Rostov oblast, the differences become glaring126: 
 
 
Stravropol 
krai 
Krasnodar 
krai 
Rostov 
oblast 
Checheno-
Ingush ASSR 
Number 
of Hospital 
Beds per 
10,000 People -
1991 
87.5 94.1 94.8 76 
Number 
of Doctors per 
10,000 People - 
1991 
112.6 98.2 81.5 58.9 
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127High levels of unemployment (estimated at 40 percent)  for the Chechens and the 
Ingush people were also a constant reminder of their status under Soviet rule.  In fact, “up to 
200,000 people, mainly rural-dwelling young men were out of work and thousands of Chechen 
men were forced to work as seasonal cheap labour [sic] in different parts of Russia.”128   
Moreover, much to the chagrin of the Chechens (and other non-Russian nationalities), 
Brezhnev’s Party Secretary for Ideology, Mikhail Suslov, set in motion a program that mandated 
the observance of their “voluntary union” with Russia; indeed, in 1982 Chechnya went through 
the “charade of official celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the ‘voluntary union’.”129  The 
notion of voluntary union was drawn from the analytical interpretation found in the works of a 
Chechen historian and archaeologist, Vitaly B. Vinogradov—authored with the support of the 
Checheno-Ingush Regional Communist Party of course.130
 Ethnic Chechens and Ingush living under the heel of communist rule were unable 
to achieve upward mobility.  Somewhere, there was always a roadblock waiting to trip them up.  
They lived in a republic named after them, only to be governed by ethnic Russians who—upon 
their deportation in 1944 - had gobbled up their land like a swarm of hungry locusts. 
Whatever the relative plights of the Chechens, the Chechen Revolution was the 
combination of historical opportunity and the resurgence of Chechen nationalism.  It was the 
realization and affirmation that the “essence of the nation is psychological, a vivid sense of 
                                                 
127 Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, p. 16. 
128 Gall and de Waal, p. 80. 
129 Gall and de Waal, p. 79. Local historians such  Magomed Muzayev and Abdula Vatsuev who protested this 
revisionist view of Russo-Chechen relations were censored by the authorities and removed from their places of 
employment. See Dunlop, p. 82. 
130 Tishkov, p. 48; Gall and de Waal, p. 79. 
 42 
sameness or oneness of kind, which, from the perspective of the group, sets itself off from all 
others in a most vital way.”131  This being so, it fell upon the shoulders of the enlightened few to 
lead the national movement, to educate the inert and unenlightened masses as to their plight and 
their opportunity.  The ultimate end of their struggle could be no less than a Chechen nation-
state.  Adolf Hitler, despite his diabolical legacy, offered the following insight in Mein Kamph: 
“We…are only able to imagine a State only to be the living organism of a nationality which not 
only safeguards the preservation of the nationality, [but]…leads to its highest freedom.”132  The 
radical nationalists understanding of national affiliation carried with it the corresponding duty to 
achieve independence from the Russian state in an altruistic fashion, to achieve self-
determination for the betterment of the nation as a whole.  Thus, to settle for less than statehood 
was to betray the nation and commit an act of treason against one’s own people, to be no better 
(and possibly even more morally compromised) than Judas.    
In many ways, the radical nationalists in the Chechen revolutionary leadership were 
grounded in the centrality of the national idea that Hitler was describing.  Any conception of true 
legitimacy with regard to ‘the state’ carried with it the necessary assumption that the state be 
purely Chechen.  Indeed, any set of governing institutions that were not grounded in the national 
image were those imposed upon the nation by foreign interference.  Such colonial governance 
could do nothing but trample upon the rights and inherent fundamental worth of the uniqueness 
of Chechen identity.   
The Chechen nation, as shown throughout the beginning of this study, proves to be a 
deadly adversary when its ranks swell with militant fervor.  Even so, history also teaches us that 
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the Russian state eventually overwhelms and temporarily pacifies Chechen resistance through a 
two-pronged strategy: co-option of the lowlander teips south of the Terek River and intense 
search-and-destroy operations for the remaining insurgent networks.      
 
DOKU ZAVGAYEV: THE FIRST AND FINAL CHECHEN FIRST SECRETARY 
 
 
Three particularly astute scholars on the leadership of post-Soviet governance observed, “To the 
surprise of most observers, the collapse of communist rule involved no comprehensive turnover 
of communist elites.  The founding of democratic regimes has instead been accompanied by a 
marked continuity in elite composition…”133  Chechnya’s Communist Party First Secretary 
Doku Zavgayev seemed to be another of these holdover communists clothed in the 
uncomfortable robes of reform.  To be fair, Zavgayev held the distinction of being the first ethnic 
Chechen to rise to the office of the First Secretary. 
Zavgayev was new to his office.  As described above, Kremlin policy desired to ensure 
that an ethnic Russian held the position of the republic’s Party First Secretary. According to this 
method of ethnic reservation, Vladimir Fortayev had assumed the office in 1989. When the time 
to fill the outgoing Fortayev’s vacancy came, the Moscow Politburo desired the appointment of 
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Nikolai Semyonov, then the Grozny Party Committee Secretary and most importantly an ethnic 
Russian.  Ethnic Chechen party officials, KGB, and MVD officers protested Semyonov’s 
upcoming ascendancy, believing that the time had come for a Chechen to hold the office.134  
Allegedly, Chechen Party official Lechi Magomadov politely suggested that Moscow consider 
Zavgayev for the vacancy, and by the spring of 1989 Zavgayev was appointed to the position.135  
With the end of the ethnic Russian monopoly on Party power in the republic, “the frozen 
political landscape in Chechnya began to thaw.”136  
Zavgayev was born in the northwestern village of Beno-Yurt, located in the Nadterechnyi 
district in 1940.137  Admittedly, there is some confusion as to exactly what teip he belonged to.  
Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas claim that Zavgayev belonged to the Nizaloi teip138, 
while Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal claim that his parents belonged to different teips: the 
gendargeno and the beno.139  That being said, Doku Zavgayev was a modernized lowlander and 
a typical member of the Sovietized ruling elite.  Zavgayev worked his way to the top of the local 
Party from modest beginnings.  His path to power began in unlikely professions as a teacher and 
mechanic; he then became a collective farm engineer, manager, and eventually rose to become 
the republic’s minister of agriculture.140  A relatively educated man, he attended the Mountain 
Agricultural Institute, the Moscow-based Academy of Social Sciences, and obtained a doctoral 
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141candidate degree in agricultural sciences.  By 1983, he rose to the rank of the second Party 
Secretary.142
Zavgayev is described as “a sleek man with probing, hooded eyes” and “a born back-
room manipulator, not a politician with the popular touch.”143  The single atypical characteristic 
of Zavgayev was that he was an ethnic Chechen.  In fact, since the 1957 return from exile in 
Kazakhstan, no Chechen spent a single day as First Secretary144; it was simply a position 
reserved for trustworthy ethnic Russians.  In other words, in most respsects Zavgayev was more 
of the same, a slightly more liberal-yet-loyal member of the partokratiia—the emperor had 
acquired new clothes.  Following his appointment in 1989, however, Zavgayev reversed the 
conservative policies of Fortayev and facilitated the loosening of restrictions on freedoms of the 
press and apolitical associations.145  To his credit—and perhaps his political survival—he also 
began replacing other outgoing ethnic Russian vacancies with indigenous peoples.  Yet, despite 
his relatively-liberal stance, especially when compared to the conservative Fortayev, Zavgayev 
was more cautious than his Caucasian counterparts in the other autonomous republics: Vladislav 
Ardzinbain Abkhazia, Mintimer Shaimiev in Tatarstan, and Murtaza Rakhimov in Bashkiria.146  
After all, it was by no means clear at this point what the power situation in Moscow would look 
like in the wake of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s political tug-of-war.  The best policy was to 
genuflect to both his puppeteers and wait to see which one would be holding the strings in the 
aftermath.  Given the circumstances, it was an understandable decision. 
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 ZAVGAYEV ATTEMPTS TO CO-OPT THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
“The most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways.” 
-Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution 
 
Corresponding simultaneously with the back-and-forth between Moscow and Grozny over who 
would replace Fortayev, local inhabitants in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR began to ask more of 
Moscow.  By no means representative of those to come, either in ideology or ethnic composition, 
they represented the liberal wave sweeping over the Soviet Union as a whole.  One such group 
was the Chechen-Ingush Popular Front in Support of Perestroika (Checheno-Ingushskii Narodnyi 
Front Sodeistviia Perestroike), or ChINFSP. 
ChINFSP’s membership was a mix of mainly urban, indigenous ethnicities and Russians 
whose aims were simultaneously general and specific. They requested the explicit freedom of 
religious persuasion, recognition of local languages and culture, observance of and reparations 
for the 1944 deportations, admission of forced annexation into Russia, while they also opposed a 
measure to construct a Biochemical plant in the city of Gudermes. 147  Thus, Zavgayev was 
forced to genuflect to the liberal spirits of the reformist republic elites; he found himself walking 
a very thin tightrope.  
In order to add additional nationalist credentials for his domestic audience, Zavgayev 
undertook a mission to promote the professional careers of ethnic Chechens, especially those in 
positions outside the republic whose ascent would not threaten his own position.  Specifically, 
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Zavgayev pleaded that, for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, there be a Chechen 
general. In October 1989 Zavgayev’s pleas bore fruit: Soviet Air Force Colonel Dzhokhar 
Musayevich Dudayev was promoted to Major General—a move Zavgayev would later deeply 
regret.148   
Thus, in order to avoid being replaced by new political elites, Zavgayev attempted to co-
opt the national movement.  As Huntington observed, “Historically strong party organizations 
have been built either by revolution from below or by patronage above.”149  In Chechnya the 
efforts of the patronage system to maintain the dominance of Party control eventually backfired, 
suggesting that Huntington’s first source of organizational strength was more accurate in this 
case.  
 
DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV: CREATING A REVOLUTIONARY 
“With a few exceptions, those who become revolutionaries are politically skilled individuals whose talents 
are potentially available to the incumbent government.” 
- John T. McAlister, Viet Nam: The Origins of a Revolution 
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The story of Major General Dudayev is compelling.  He is a man who lived in two worlds. As a 
Soviet officer he was an example of patriotism, and professionalism—the model officer in many 
ways.  On the other hand, his Weltanschauung was hopelessly romantic.  Ironically, his idealist 
passions (complimented with his keen understanding of Soviet politics) may have been the exact 
trait that allowed him to rise above his ethnic peers in a system dominated by Russians.  The 
military’s unique appreciation for merit became his vehicle to upward mobility.  In this 
institution, he developed the self-confidence, ambition, and discipline to become the leader of the 
radical wing of the Chechen Revolutionary movement.    
Dudayev was born on 15 April 1944 in the western village of Yalkhori, the youngest of 
fourteen children.150  Dzhokhar’s father, himself a former Bolshevik, did reasonably well for 
himself as a veterinary surgeon.151  Perhaps it was destiny that Dzhokhar entered the world just 
before the NKVD would carry out Stalin’s orders and deport the Vainakh nation to a harsh exile 
in Kazakhstan.  It was this experience that formed the future general and future revolutionary 
president. “Dudayev’s almost satanic pride in later years,” offer two journalists, “emerged from a 
childhood of great hardship and humiliation.”152  For all his father’s skill and education, the 
family only managed to survive by working as potato pickers on the Proletarsky Collective 
Farm.153  Despite the brief smell of the Chechen mountain air, young Dzhokhar suffered thirteen 
years in Kazakh exile, seven of which were in the city of Pavlodar.154
The redemption of the exiles under Khrushchev’s leadership allowed Dzhokhar to make 
the long journey home.  He was a far too ambitious young man to remain in a backwater of 
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Soviet neglect.  Instead, Dudayev went to the Tambov military high school in 1965 and 
eventually to the Yuri Gagarin Air Force Academy.155  Dzhokhar’s fateful choice to enter 
military service likely set in motion many of the events to come.  It was his time in the Air Force 
that gave the former-exile a chance to shine and overcome his past, and perhaps the past of his 
people as well.  
During Dudayev’s twenty-four years in military service, he served as a fighter pilot in 
both Siberia and Afghanistan.156  For his valor during the Soviet-Afghan war, Dzhokhar earned 
two very high Soviet military distinctions: the Order of the Red Star and the Order of the Red 
Banner.157  Upon reaching the rank of colonel, he was stationed at a strategic bomber base 
targeting Great Britain located in Tartu, Estonia.158  It was here that he became friends with the 
ethnic Estonian Colonel Ants Laaneots, of the local military district in Tartu.159  Thanks to the 
efforts of his “soon-to-be nemesis”, Dudayev rose to the rank of Major General in 1988.160
Dudayev’s 
Tartu Base 
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Dudayev had charismatic smile, but also a penchant for the dramatic.  When not in 
military uniform, his pictures typically show him in a dark three-piece suit and Italian fedora hat.  
On one occasion, Dzhokhar reportedly responded to a question regarding the state of his health 
by performing a standing backwards summersault—in his office no less.161  Anatol Lieven came 
to similar conclusions.  Describing his mannerisms like those of a “play-actor”, adding that, 
“What part exactly he thought he thought he was playing I’ve never been able to work out…”162  
Lieven recalls: “His speech was exaggeratedly clipped, emphatic, martial and authoritarian.  
When speaking in public, he combined this with a heavy stress of the last syllables of words.”163  
At astonishing moments, Dzhokhar was eccentric to a fault.  Neither did his sometimes-
absurd statements limit themselves to politics.  Much to the confusion of a Chechen mufti, 
Dudayev once came to the conclusion that, “The great religion of Islam must have emerged, not 
from the lifeless desert of Arabia among nomadic tribes, but in the earthly paradise among 
peoples of high culture and mutual respect.  That garden [sic.] of Eden was Chechnya, and it’s 
people, the Vainakhs, must have been the founders of the Islamic faith.”164  According to Valery 
Tishkov, the mufti did not know how to respond to Dzhokhar’s ability to debunk centuries of 
inaccurate history which was clearly aimed at keeping the Chechens down.  Dudayev even took 
the occasion during a visit to France, aimed at gaining support for his revolutionary regime, to 
instruct his astounded audience on some missing details surrounded the story of Noah and his 
ark.  According to Dzhokhar’s unique knowledge of ancient history, “the Ark landed in the 
mountains of Chechnya and Noah and his family were [sic.] the direct ancestors of the Vainakhs. 
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165Mankind, therefore, owed its salvation from the Flood to the Chechens.”   On a third occasion, 
he marveled at an ancient stone structure in Baalbek, Lebanon, coming to the not-so-private 
conclusion that it was of such exquisite design that it had to be crafted by the Vainakh people in 
ages past.166
Dudayev’s domestic proclamations were even more fantastic. Lieven recounts that 
Dzhokhar used the occasion during a speech shortly after being elected president to inform the 
Chechen people on television of a covert plot by the FSK to “attack Chechnya with an artificial 
earthquake,” musing that “when I visited Chechnya in February 1992 people were still talking 
about this supposed threat.”167  In another public display of brashness, Dudayev held a press 
conference during which Lieven reported: “He three times quoted Harry Truman’s alleged words 
that ‘there is no language in which you can talk with Russians,’ and four times called Russia a 
‘satanic power.”168  The most extreme example of Dudayev’s propensity to be abrasive was 
when his acting-Vice President Yandarbiyev was attempting to signal to the Russian government 
that the Chechen government was prepared to negotiate a non-military solution to the crisis in 
December 1994.  According to Lieven, “Dudayev was raving that ‘Russism [sic.] is worse than 
Nazism,’ and that ‘Boris Yeltsin is the leader of a gang of murderers’ and his regime the 
‘diabolical heir of the totalitarian monster.’”169  If this was not enough to insult the Russian 
government, Dzhokhar allegedly met with emissaries from Moscow before the invasion and 
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proceeded to harangue the captive audience for at no less than thirty minutes before hearing 
anything they had to say.170
The confluence of Dzhokhar’s unique personality and the historical context of his time 
come together to mold a revolutionary leader, a model Soviet military officer who became swept 
up in the tide of Chechen nationalism and became its symbolic figurehead. It is difficult to 
flippantly assume that Dudayev’s character flaws—his quick temper and slight arrogance—set 
the events to come in motion.  The sheer complexity of the revolution he came to lead was 
influenced by many actors and intervening events.  Indeed, Dudayev’s revolutionary movement 
was more than a coup led by a Latin American-style dictator; it was an eruption of national 
grievance and part of a wider phenomenon sweeping across the disintegrating Soviet Union as a 
whole.   
 
RUSLAN KHASBULATOV 
 
 
The other Chechen whose career was intentionally advanced by Zavgayev was Ruslan 
Khasbulatov.  Like Dudayev, Khasbulatov was born in Chechnya and became a child of the 
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deportations. While in exile, Khasbulatov lived in Petropavlosk region, located in the northern 
expanses of Kazakhstan.171  After his return, Khasbulatov went on to higher education and 
eventually became an economics professor at the Plekhanov Institute in Moscow.172  Yeltsin’s 
democratic movement allowed him an opportunity to become involved with politics and he was 
elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) in 1990 from a Grozny electoral district.  
According to one account, Khasbulatov was a “born political manipulator, who took swimmingly 
to Moscow’s political intrigues.”173 Zavgayev intervened and saw to it that Khasbulatov was 
made on of Yeltsin’s deputies in the CPD. 
 
ANATOMY OF THE NATIONAL AWAKENING 
The radicalized strain of Chechen nationalism which peaked in the early to mid 1990s was a 
work in progress.  Beginning in July 1989 the Chechen Bart (Unity) Party, “the first overtly 
political organization” in Checheno-Inguh ASSR, emerged as a byproduct of frustration with 
Zavgayev’s half-hearted genuflecting to liberal-spirited “reforms”.174 The leaders of Bart 
attended the August 1989 First Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus in Sukhumi, 
Abkhaziya. It was at this meeting that the Bart leaders first advocated creating—or perhaps more 
accurately resurrecting—a federated North Caucasus state.175   
The indigenous ethnic groups succeeded in forcing the resignation of seven Russian 
regional first secretaries by way of sustained rallies and hunger strikes in the republic.176 
Additionally, the aftermath of the March 1990 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies 
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(CPD) in the ASSR revealed the strong level of support for the emerging radical democrats in 
Moscow.177  Zavgayev was not unaware of the ebb and flow of the political tides around him.   
In order to solidify his position he had himself elected Chairman of the republican 
Supreme Soviet, believing that the combined powers of Party leader and head of government 
would allow him to retain tight political control over the republic and also give him considerable 
spoils to buy off emerging would-be elites in the future.178  Even the expansion of his influence 
in the ASSR was not enough to satiate Zavgayev’s need for security.  He was subsequently 
elected as a deputy to the CPD and admitted to full status as a USSR Communist Party Central 
Committee member.179  Always hedging his bets, Doku Zavgayev was grasping at straws.  
To be fair, he found himself in an awkward situation.  Hints that Chechen nationalism 
was beginning to build into a popular political movement presented difficult complications for 
Zavgayev.  Choosing to neither whole-heartedly endorse nor make the fatal mistake of 
attempting to suppress the movement, Zavgayev made public genuflections to the emerging 
nationalists.  What harm could come of a simple town hall meeting?  The answer to that question 
would be a painful lesson in ethnocratic politics; it would cost him his job.  
 
THE CHECHEN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
Along with the parade of sovereignties, came the gathering of national congresses. Leaders 
gathered and expressed their groups’ respective rights and privileges, a great show indeed.  The 
gathering about to take place in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was in no way without precedent. 
One student of these affairs explains: 
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National groups held their own congresses in 1990-1992, creating leadership bodies for each nation, 
including its diasporas. The bodies established included the Tatar World Congress, the Mary-El 
Council, the World Chuvash Council, and the All-National Congress of the Chechen People.180
 
While not without precedent, the Chechen case would be unique.  In Chechnya, much 
more radical, nationalist Chechens formed the organizing elite of the All-National Congress of 
the Chechen People on 27 November 1990 (Obshchenatsional’nyi Kongress Chechnskogo 
Naroda; OKChN).181  Like many of the other national congresses, the Chechen’s was “convened 
to put political pressure of the local authorities to speed up political change and to celebrate 
Chechen history and culture in a way that had never been possible before.”182  Unlike many of 
the other congresses, OKChN represented the political aspirations of a generation of Chechen 
nationals who went unrepresented in the Soviet republic power structures and civil service.  
Among other things, the OKChN proclaimed an end to the revisionist view of Chechnya’s 
voluntary integration with Russia, publicly calling for the “nationwide censure of any Chechen 
who supported the ‘propaganda of Vionogrdov’s pseudo-scientific conceptions.’”183    
Despite its nationalist composition, the Congress enjoyed the official sanction of the 
republic’s power structures.  Zavgayev, always the opportunist, attempted to garner the support 
of the Chechen nationalists by using his Party and Supreme Soviet positions to fully endorse the 
Congress.  It appears that his hope was to further build his national credentials; after all, he was 
the first ethnic Chechen to assume the office of the  First Secretariat and was personally 
responsible for advancing the professional careers of Chechen military officers and politicians.  
To be safe, Zavgayev placed the Congress and its leadership under the vigilant surveillance of 
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184the republic’s KGB chief, Igor Kochubei.   What Zavgayev did not foresee was that he had 
foolishly opened the floodgate to radical nationalism and that he was standing in the path of 
rushing current. Perhaps it would be a fitting end. 
The bulk of the OKChN membership included various clan elders and rural groupings; 
after all, the bulk of the urban population usually fell along two complimentary lines: ethnic 
Russians and Communist Party-member Chechens.185  As the name suggests, the OKChN 
excluded the Ingush people.186  The leadership of the OKChN was comprised of a small clique 
including Lechi Umkhayev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Yaragi Mamodayev, Beslan Gantemirov, 
and Yusup Soslambekov.  Umkhayev was the man directly responsible for organizing the 
Congress, intending on it acting as an umbrella institution for the disparate Chechen nationalist 
organizations.187  Yandarbiyev brought the table his well-networked Vainakh Party, having 
“branches in almost every village.”188  Mamodayev was a shady and overweight, but extremely 
affluent, petroleum industry businessman from the Chinkho teip who “bankrolled the new 
movement.”189  Naturally, Mamodayev later became the economic policy leader of the national 
movement.190  Gantemirov, also from the Chinkho teip, was a policeman-turned-criminal who 
formed the paramilitary Islamic Path Party, many members of which formed the core of the 
Chechen National Guard.191  Later, Gantemirov was given the operational command of the 
Guard.192  Soslambekov, convicted of rape during his university studies in Moscow, performed 
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much of the grass-roots work of the Congress.  Despite his less than virtuous character, 
Soslambekov’s oratory genius elevated him to the unofficial position of what Carlotta Gall and 
Thomas de Waal dubbed “the people’s tribune”193 and what another writer referred to as the 
“demagogue of the revolution”194.  It was this revolutionary core, with the approval of the 
majority of the Congress, which selected Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev Chairman of the 
Executive Committee (ispolkom) on 1 December 1990 and Commander in Chief of the Chechen 
National Guard.195   
 
WHY DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV? 
There are three reasons why Dzhokhar, a Chechen who spent an overwhelming majority of his 
life outside of the republic and in the service of the Soviet armed forces, was elected to chair the 
ispolkom.  First, Dudayev was able to explain the national cause in a simplistic-yet-compelling 
manner.  Indeed, Yandarbiyev described Dzhokhar’s speech to the Congress as “short but very 
striking.”196  Reportedly, Major General Dudayev weaved the militant imagery of Chechnya’s 
past with the contemporary national cause saying, “Do not draw your kinzhal from its case, do 
not draw it without cause, but if you do draw it, do not put it back without doing battle.”197  In 
this manner, Dudayev the outsider managed to display his time away from his homeland did not 
diminish his knowledge of Chechen culture and history.  Whether it was a show or it was a 
genuine outburst of national euphoria, his words found a very receptive audience. 
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Secondly, a Dudayev Chairmanship filled the practical role of settling the political 
jockeying among the various teips.198  For all intensive purposes, Dzhokhar was an outsider who 
could be trusted to be above clan loyalties, but possessed the added benefit of belonging to the 
small and rather insignificant Ertskhoi teip.199  “With Dudayev in the lead,” one scholar 
assessed, “no major clan or teip would a priori be in a position to control the movement, thereby 
contributing to its pan-national character and hence possibility to represent the entire Chechen 
people.”200  Even amongst the more radical nationalist groups, clan politics needed to be taken 
into account.201
202Finally, there was the role of the “Wedding General”.   Chairmanship was intended to 
be a ceremonial position and who better to give the position to than the first Chechen General 
wearing his magnificent dress uniform?  Moreover, the original intent of the ispolkom itself was 
to oversee the implementation of the Congress’s decisions, not to make policy itself.203  
Therefore, elevating the outsider Dudayev to the Chairmanship was largely a decorative trapping 
to a rubber-stamping body.  As two reporters put it, Dudayev “lent grandeur but no substance to 
the proceedings.”204  Dudayev was certainly not unaware of his role. Dzhokhar was likely 
indifferent to his ceremonial role, despite his notorious ego. After all, Dudayev still retained his 
responsibilities as the commander of his bomber base in Tartu.  As such, he enjoyed all the 
respect and deference the position there entailed.  Major General Dudayev thus returned to 
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Estonia and Umkhayev carried out the responsibilities in his absence until Dudayev resigned his 
command in March  1991, following his refusal to allow landing rights to the intervention forces 
intended to put down the Estonian national uprising.205  It seemed at this point that there would 
be no revolution.  The nationalists were allowed to conduct their Congress, its so-called 
Chairman returned to his base, and Zavgayev found himself with no real political challenge. His 
gamble seemed to bear fruit. 
 
THE AFTERMATH 
The close of the OKChN brought with it the linking of the radical nationalists into a single 
national front.  With it, the ispolkom became the single voice of the Chechen national idea; for 
all intensive purposes, it became the revolutionary elite.  Additionally, the OKChN gave Major 
General Dudayev a forum in which he could evaluate the mood of Chechen politics.  Dudayev 
could prod the crowds to see what worked and what did not.  He arrived in Chechnya and found 
an embryonic form of national sentiment waiting to be reborn.  Moreover, in his function as the 
Tartu base commander, Dzhokhar saw similar events unfolding while deployed in Estonia.  
Finally, the OKChN demanded the declaration of Chechen sovereignty.  While the 
republic’s Supreme Soviet complied with this demand, it was just another example of Zavgayev 
attempting to muddle though and remain in power—all he managed to do was to add last-minute 
desperation to his political obituary.  Declaring sovereignty was strictly a ceremonial nod to the 
                                                 
205 Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya , p, 94; Cornell, p. 207; and Gall and de Waal, p. 88-89. Gall and de Waal 
add the interesting detail that when Yeltsin was dispatched to negotiate with the Estonians, a threat against his plane 
flight back to the Moscow led Dudayev to allow him the use of a black Volga to dive back into Russia in. It must 
have been quite a scene. 
 60 
nationalists, and by no means unique; it was just another front in the political battle unfolding in 
Moscow. As Nikolai Petrov explains:  
The cascade of declarations of sovereignty among Russia’s autonomous regions can be seen as a 
legacy of the late Soviet era’s period of state disintegration and a continuation of what happened 
with the republics of the Soviet Union…The parade resulted from the epic power struggle between 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev attempted to bypass Russia’s leadership and 
invited the leaders of some of the Russian autonomous republics to sign the new Union Treaty 
with the leaders of the Union republics. Yeltsin, in turn, appealed to the autonomous republics to 
seize as much sovereignty as they could handle.206
 
Indeed, Gorbachev invited Zavgayev and Tatar Party boss Mintimer Shaimiyev to the 
1991 Union Treaty conference in Novo-Ogarevo, giving them special attention, subsequently 
convincing Yeltsin that Zavgayev was not a political ally in his efforts to create a new political 
order.207
Despite the mutual antagonism between Zavgayev the partokrat and Yeltsin the 
‘democrat’, Doku was a screwed pragmatist. Entertaining the idea that he could negotiate a 
favorable status for the Checheno-Ingush ASSR within a new framework, he gave Yeltsin a red-
carpet reception during his March 1991 trip to the North Caucasus which was intended to drum 
up support for the upcoming Russian presidential elections.208  During a 1996 interview, Yeltsin 
Nationalities advisor Galina Starovoitova recalled:  
Zavgayev behaved exactly…like an Oriental party [sic.] boss. They were all playing a double 
game…They put us up in the best places outside of town, there was  a huge guard, plentiful food, 
a lot to drink, they tried to stop us from encouraging ordinary people and speaking at rallies. They 
were like normal Soviet functionaries.209
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It began to appear that he might survive no matter what the fallout was in either Moscow 
or the republic.210  What Zavgayev did not foresee was that he was standing in the path of a 
rushing current of radical nationalism. “The attempts of [Zavgayev]…to place himself at the 
head of the national movement misfired spectacularly,” wrote Richard Sakwa, “as outsider 
groups ousted the newly empowered Chechen communist elite.”211  Zavgayev seemed to be 
doing everything half-way.  He waned to survive in office, but he did not sufficiently appreciate 
the degree of nationalism sweeping across the Chechen political landscape.  It was at this point 
that the pendulum of Chechen political power began to swing back to the highlanders.  As the 
highlanders were the least represented group in politics, it is not surprising that they formed the 
bulk of the revolutionary movement.  
 
THE RETURN OF DUDAYEV 
The OKChN was undoubtedly a tipping point in the course of Chechen politics, but the little 
political change it affected was by no means truly revolutionary.  Indeed, the OKChN simply 
created a well-organized nationalist constituency.  Moreover, as acting ispolkom Chairman, 
Umkhayev managed to tip-toe around contentious issues and avoided provocative radicalism.  
Dzhokhar’s return, following his defiant stance to the attempted intervention in Estonia, forever 
changed the balance-of-power in the nationalist movement.  
A whirlwind of political events erupted upon his return.  On 17 March 1991, Gorbachev’s 
“All-Union” referendum was held.  When compared to other ASSRs, the 58.8 percent turnout of 
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212eligible voters was  low, with 75.9 percent (44.6 percent of eligible voters) voting in favor.   
Second, the RSFSR passed the “On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples” legislation the 
following month which “immediately became a banner for all aggrieved groups within the 
Russian federation; in Chechnya it was seen as affirming a right to restore a lost independence 
and to create their own statehood.”213  Thus, Dudayev returned home in the middle of the 
attempts by both Gorbachev’s USSR and Yetlsin’s Russia to co-opt the peoples of the ASSRs for 
support, each offering his own political carrots.  The important point is that both placated the 
ASSRs’ self images of national uniqueness.  In the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, the mutual 
admissions made by the USSR and the Russian government regarding national rights made 
Chechen nationalism a cause célèbre and legitimized the aspirations of the revolutionary elite.  
Dzhokhar may not have had policy-making authority as ispolkom Chairman, but he soon 
learned that he did possess Richard Neustadt’s power of persuasion.214  Indeed, in the coming 
months Dudayev learned to use the bully-pulpit well.  In his capacity as Chairman, Dudayev—
supported by members of the Vainakh Democratic Party, Islamic Path, and the Green 
Movement—declared in May that the republic’s Supreme Soviet was powerless, using the 
November 1990 declaration of sovereignty as a legal justification for his assertion.215  While it 
would be expected that Zavgayev, himself the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the Party 
First Secretary, would have either denounced the recalcitrant General or had him arrested, he 
simply ignored the direct challenge to his authority.216  It is plausible that Zavgayev did not 
know how to respond at all; it is also possible that he did not take General Dudayev seriously.  
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Whatever the cause of his pause, the primary effect of Zavgayev’s inaction was to make him 
appear weak.  
Next, Dzhokhar displayed a true military officer’s keen appreciation for procedures when 
he decided that his largely-ceremonial status of Chairman implied his corresponding ability to 
call another Congress together.  Drawing upon the perceived legitimacy of the first Congress, 
and restricting the pool of delegates to those who shared an acceptable level of support for the 
nationalist cause, the Congress convened 8-9 November 1991 and declared the creation of an 
entirely new “Nockhi-Chu” Chechen state. Dudayev proudly announced:  
There is a single and indivisible Vainakh people with a place of honor for each of its five member 
nationalities: Chechen, Ingush, Orstkhoy, Malkhistin, and Akkin. Today history gives us a unique 
chance to establish that fact by creating a single Vainakh statehood.217
 
Despite his rhetorical commitment to the common Vainakh identity of the Chechen and 
Ingush people, the Congress was composed entirely of radical Chechen nationalists.  Eventually, 
it would call for the bifurcation of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR into ethnically-homogenous 
entities.  The implication of the Nockhi-Chu state was a political entity independent of Russia—
and possibly no longer part of the Soviet Union either.218  To be fair, the true intent of the 
declaration of sovereignty was not to go it alone, but rather to work within the framework of the 
new Union Treaty on the condition of receiving the status of a full-fledged union republic in the 
new USSR.219  Moreover, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the ispolkom conferred upon itself the 
sole right to executive power in the republic.  When Dudayev subsequently announced the 
appointment of his deputies, the names of moderate leaders were noticeably absent, especially 
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220that of Lechi Umkhayev.   At last, the radical nationalists had successfully hijacked the 
national movement in a marvelous coup.221  
It was in this manner that Dudayev returned home to his native soil and began to push the 
limits of his authority as ispolkom Chairman.  In fact, whatever authority he managed to wield, it 
was conferred upon him by those who viewed him as a symbol of the national idea.  He didn’t 
need to have authority on paper; his authority rested in those who heard his calling and were 
inspired to act.  In many ways, Dzhokhar was a man destined for such a calling. But the call to 
greatness was not enough; he needed an opportunity to catapult the revolution to power—it turns 
out he didn’t need to wait very long. 
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7.0  THE AUGUST PUTCH AND THE CHECHEN REVOLUTION 
 
 
 
Revolutions always appear to succeed with amazing ease in their initial stage, and the reason is that the men who 
make them first only pick up the power of a regime in plain disintegration; they are the consequences but never the 
causes of the downfall of political authority. 
- Hannah Ardent, On Revolution 
 
 
A central theme of the Chechen Revolution is that, while being outwardly anti-Russian, it is, like 
so many other now-independent members of the former Soviet Union, intrinsically tied to the 
democratic Russian Revolution.  Indeed, Matthew Evangelista posited the claim that a “key 
factor in the political mobilization within Chechnya, as in much of the rest of the Soviet Union, 
was not only or primarily nationalism, but anti-communism.”222  Gorbachev’s twin pillars of 
reform, Glasnost and Perestroika, unwittingly unleashed political and social forces that could not 
be tamed.  Every concession made toward democratic reform emboldened, rather than assuaged, 
the aspirations of would-be elites and nationalist movements.   
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The August Putsch provided the opportunity that was absolutely essential to their 
success.  When the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) placed Gorbachev 
under house arrest, the local Party First Secretaries were faced with a dilemma: to side with the 
GKChP hardliners or support the brazen Boris Yeltsin in protest. Oddly enough, Yeltsin’s anti-
coup standoff enjoyed the support of a student in Moscow he would come to revile: Shamil 
Basayev. Balancing the associated costs and benefits, the great majority said ‘niet’ to both and 
became fence-sitters.  Not to stand out in a crowd, Zavgayev did nothing.  For all intents and 
purposes, it was a rational decision and nothing less than typical.  His band-wagoning of 
indifference became self-inflected political suicide.  “Instead of going unnoticed,” mused 
Sebastian Smith, “he became conspicuous by his silence and in stepped Dudayev.”223  Because 
of his silence to the actions of the GKChP, Zavgayev became an unacceptable choice to both the 
anticommunists and the nationalists.224  Needless to say, there was not much of a constituency 
left to court. 
225Dzhokhar protested the GKChP’s seizure of power from the first day.   It is certainly 
possible that Dudayev saw his defiance of the putsch as a potential springboard that would allow 
himself and the Congress to assume power.  Despite this cynical view, it is also very likely that 
Dzhokhar the idealist was enraged by the GKChP’s attempt to forcibly roll back Gorbachev’s 
political and social reforms.  Let us not forget that this was the same man who refused to allow 
Soviet intervention forces landing rights on his base in Estonia and directly told his staff not to 
interfere with the nationalist meetings and rallies.  
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The OKChN responded to the putsch by declaring a general strike and calling for mass 
demonstration in Grozny’s Sheikh Mansur Square.226  Matthew Evangelista alleges that the 
demonstrators were given 100 rubles and day and fed large quantities of meat for their efforts.227  
Zavgayev, outmaneuvered and desperate, declared a republic-wide state of emergency which 
was never really enforced.228  The problem was that any state of emergency necessarily had to 
enjoy the approval of the Russian government; after all, Zavgayev ultimately answered to 
Moscow.  Much to the dismay of Zavgayev, such approval did not exist; both Yeltsin and 
Khasbulatov were against him.229  Moreover, Police Major-General Aslanbek Aslakhanov, an 
ethnic Chechen serving in the CPD, made a personal visit to convey a “strong warning” to 
Zavgayev not to use force in an effort to preserve his regime.230  Dudayev and his OKChN were 
seen as allies in the struggle to root out the Soviet holdovers.  Thus, the republic’s communist 
government was powerless to stop the resulting seizure of the state television station on 22 
August and ispolkom Chairman Dzhokhar’s official announcement of “the Chechen 
Revolution.”231    
Support for the Revolution was not unanimous.  As in all revolutions, there are always 
those with something to lose when the current political order is turned upside down; the Chechen 
case was no different.  “Some opposed the revolution because of its strident nationalism; 
…others because the downfall of the old regime meant the end of their status as a pampered 
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232Soviet elite.”   In fact, much of Dudayev’s power base relied upon the rural populace, who 
were both relatively poor and of highland descent.233
According to Magomed Zaugayev, then chief of the KGB Department on Organized 
Crime, Chairman Dudayev telephoned Khasbulatov on 26 August and inquired if Moscow would 
mobilize the Grozny garrison if the OKChN choose to dissolve the republic’s Supreme Soviet 
and that Khasbulatov make it clear to Dudayev that it would not.234  Additionally, KGB chief 
Igor Kochubei testified to the Russian Security Council that,  
Moscow demanded [on 26 August] that the guard be removed from Zavgayev and support for the 
local supreme soviet [sic.] by MVD and KGB structures in this republic be stopped…People 
carrying weapons then appeared among the demonstrators for the first time.235  
 
OUT WITH THE OLD… 
Confident that they enjoyed the silent approval of Moscow, the Chechen National Guard stormed 
the Supreme Soviet on 6 September 1991.236  Sebastian Smith noted that the “Chechen 
nationalists could taste victory over the entrenched communists and Dudayev was their prophet.  
‘A slave who does not try to free himself is twice a slave,’ he said, words that became part of his 
personality cult, the Dzhokhar cannon.”237  During the Guard’s raid of the parliament building, 
the Russian Chairman of Grozny’s Supreme Soviet, Vitali (Victor) Kutsenko, was either pushed 
out a window or voluntarily jumped out of it238—perhaps viewing suicide as preferable to 
whatever the National Guardsmen would do to him.  Either way, the capital city’s local 
communist leader quite literally fell from power.  
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Zavgayev himself was “physically dragged out of the building” and subsequently 
managed to escape north to his ancestral village.239  Khasbulatov made a trip to Grozny on 14 
September and allegedly announced that he would “bring Zavgayev to Moscow in an iron 
cage.”240  Not to be outdone by Khasbulatov (especially when speaking on the same stage), 
Dudayev rebuked the visitors from Moscow: “No one is going to determine how Chechnya is 
ruled anymore.”241  
The following day, the republic’s Supreme Soviet, chaired by Khasbulatov and 
surrounded by the National Guard, held its last meeting and voted  officially to dissolve itself.242  
Quite unsurprisingly, the vote was unanimous.  Executive power was officially transferred to the 
Provisional Supreme Council, headed by Professor Huseyn Ahmadov.  The Council was to 
remain in power until 17 November, when elections were scheduled to take place.243  The 
reality, however, was quite different.  Indeed, Ahmadov never really held any true power, except 
on paper; whatever authority he possessed, it was short-lived.  Thus, the period of dual 
sovereignty in the initial stages of the Chechen Revolution never truly happened.  Ahmadov had 
all the trappings of authority, but no real power.  Dudayev’s ispolkom lacked legal authority, but 
it possessed great influence.  That the ispolkom lacked legal authorization was irrelevant; it had 
all the moral authority it needed and it alone represented the true vision of the revolution.  
Dudayev’s conviction in the infallibility of the radical national cause was an existential truth that 
neither Lechi Umkhayev nor Ahmadov could fully understand.  More importantly, he did not 
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blame them for their ideological ineptitude.  Instead, he would reveal to them the true face of the 
Chechen Revolution 
 
…IN WITH THE NEW 
The OKChN ispolkom succeeded in removing Zavgayev and the rest of the communist leaders 
from power, and did so with the support of Moscow.  More importantly, they had managed to 
marginalize the moderate elements within the revolutionary movement.  What the Russians did 
not realize, or at least did not care to realize, was that Dudayev was determined to press on with 
an even more radical agenda—anti-communism was necessary, but not sufficient.  The real 
Revolution would not be complete until the sons and daughters of Chechnya breathed 
independent air.  With this goal in mind, the National Guard—the true vanguard of the Chechen 
Revolution244—removed the final two symbolic obstructions: The Provisional Council and the 
Grozny KGB. 
The Provisional Council was the first go.  On 5 October, the OKChN’s National Guard 
stormed the building, ending the façade of Ahmadov’s authority.  The ispolkom, and ultimately 
its Chairman, Dzhokhar Dudayev, became “the revolutionary committee for the transitional 
period with all powers.”245  For all intensive purposes, the Council had operated with the 
approval of the OKChN anyway; however, Ahmadov’s position apparently posed an 
unacceptable threat to the ispolkom in the upcoming scheduled elections.  After all, it was they 
who had done all the hard work in removing Zavgayev in the first place.  This self-image entitled 
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them to act in the best interests of the Chechen people; for in seizing power, it was the entire 
Chechen people, not the just the OKChN’s leadership, that was the true beneficiary. 
The remaining presence of the KGB was the other major obstacle.  The Revolution could 
never be consolidated so long as the symbolic institution of Russian power remained.  Granted, 
Moscow gave strict orders to the KGB and MVD not to interfere; thus it was perhaps more out of 
principle than any direct threat to the revolutionary leadership that Gantemirov’s National Guard 
stormed the Grozny KGB building.  In any event, their raid procured the weapons necessary to 
defend the Revolution in the short-term.246
 The raid on the KGB headquarters was an extremely provocative move; it was an 
act that Moscow could not ignore. In an effort properly to gauge the appropriate response, KGB 
chief Ivanenko and Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi made an official visit to Grozny.  
According to Ivanenko, 
“I said I would try to free the building peacefully, meet with the elders, I explained the complexity 
of the situation in the North Causaus. Rutskoi in reply told me how he solved problems in 
Afghanistan [as a former fighter pilot]. ‘A kishlak (village) fires at us and kills someone. I send up 
a couple of planes and nothing is left of the kishlak. After I’ve burned a couple of kishlaks they 
stop shooting.’ That is more or less, he says, what we need to do here.”247
 
Despite his official position, Ivanenko’s personal account suggests that Rutskoi may not 
have been the appropriate person to send on a sensitive diplomatic mission.  His pride and ability 
to quickly lose his temper mirrored that of Dudayev.  Upon returning to Moscow, Rutskoi 
became convinced that, like any other malignant blood clot, Dudayev needed to be removed. 
The storming of the KGB headquarters in Grozny began a series of escalatory moves and 
countermoves between Moscow and Dudayev’s revolutionary movement. Immediately following 
his trip to Grozny, an appalled Rutskoi appealed to the Russian Supreme Soviet on 8 October to 
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act, claiming that Dudayev’s grip on power rested upon the shoulders of approximately 250 
men.248  A stern official statement demanded the self-disarmament of what they called ‘illegal 
armed formations’.  “As no one has succeeding in disarming the Chechens in 200 years,” 
cleverly described two observers, “it was a clear threat to use force.”249  Dudayev responded by 
calling for a full mobilization of the Chechen male population.250  Gall and de Wall’s account of 
the Russian reaction is telling: 
On 19 October Yeltsin spoke for the first time on Russian television about Chechnya. He said the 
situation has become intolerable and condemned the ‘openly anti-constitutional and provocative 
actions of the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People and its 
leader, who are striving to destabilize the situation in the republic and to seize power through the 
organized armed detachments of the so-called “National Guard”’...If the Congress did not go 
along…he would be forced to ‘restore constitutional order.’…It was much too late…One of 
Dudayevs’ deputies, Hussein Akhmadov, called Yeltsin’s speech ‘the last belch of the Russian 
Empire’.251  
 
With the Provisional Council gone and the headquarters of the KGB occupied by the 
National Guard, the revolutionary leadership felt secure enough to make one more change: the 
date of the upcoming elections.  Winning the election would finally confer upon them the 
popular legitimacy they already knew to possess in the first place. Electoral victory would bring 
about the revolutionary regime and a new Chechnya. 
 
THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS 
According to the agreement following the transfer of power to the Provisional Council, elections 
were scheduled to take place on 17 November.  The problem was that the Gantemirov’s National 
Guard had already disposed of the Council and the ispolkom was now in power.  Eventually, 
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Dudayev came to the conclusion that the prior agreement was now null and void: no Provisional 
Council, no 17 November elections.  The question of elections in Chechnya was not a matter of 
if elections would be held but rather when they would take place; and the perspective of the 
revolutionary leadership was that sooner was better than later.  Thus, it was announced that 
presidential and parliamentary elections would be held early on 27 November 1991.  Needless to 
say, Moscow became furious. 
Despite threats from the Russian leadership, the elections were conducted and Dudayev 
emerged victorious, earning 90.1 percent of the vote.252  The conduct of early elections was 
characterized as “chaotic”.253  The official turnout of eligible voters was declared to be 72 
percent, while the opposition suggested it was actually 15 percent.254 The complicated logistics 
of conducting the elections earlier than originally planned undoubtedly resulted in a lower 
turnout; however, “whole villages in the mountains turned out enthusiastically.”255  Moreover, 
Estonian Prince Peter Volkonsky, who observed the elections, was amazed at the response of the 
Chechen people: “After the election I was at a meeting of old men.  I did a V for victory sign and 
shouted ‘Marsho’ (‘Freedom’ in Chechen).  These old men stood up, like at a rock concert, and 
shouted ‘Marsho’.  I am an old hippie but I have never experienced such a response.”256
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Fulfilling the promise he made prior to being elected, President Dudayev declared 
Chechen independence on 1 November 1991.257  An essential component of Dudayev’s 
proclamation of independence from Moscow was the Chechen-centric focus of the decree. 
Dudayev explained that, “The Ingush must travel their own path of hardships in the struggle for 
statehood.”258   The following day, the newly-elected Chechen parliament voted to ratify 
Dzhokhar’s declaration of independence for the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Chechenskaia 
Republia Ichkeriia).259  At long last, the Revolution became a tangible thing: the Chechens had a 
nation-state of their own.  
 
 
THE ABORTED INTERVENTION AND THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME 
It is only when the lower classes do want to carry on in the old way and when the upper classes cannot carry on in 
the old way that the revolution can triumph. 
- V. Lenin, Selected Works 
 
The day after President Dudayev’s declaration of Chechen independence, Khasbulatov was 
officially confirmed as the speaker of the Congress of People’s Deputies and promptly 
characterized the results of the Chechen presidential election as invalid.  Despite Khasbulatov’s 
desire to attack the legitimacy of Dudayev’s rule, Rutskoi became determined to shoot Dudayev 
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out of office.  Again, it appears that Rutskoi was convinced that his methods of problem-solving 
during the Soviet-Afghan War would yield the best results.  
Taking advantage of the October Revolution holiday on 7 November, and in the absence 
of President Yeltsin and the majority of his policy-making staff, Rutskoi saw to it that a state of 
emergency was signed.  He later met with KGB-chief Ivanenko, MVD Minister Andrei 
Dunayev, and Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov, threatening them with criminal charges 
should they undermine his actions.260  Additionally, General Dudayev was to be arrested for 
anti-constitutional actions.261
Rutskoi’s central obstacle to carrying out his grand coup was that the Yeltsin-led Russian 
state had yet to formally create its own Ministry of Defense forces.  True coercive power still 
resided in the institutions of the USSR.  Therefore, Gorbachev’s exclusive approval as CPSU 
First Secretary was necessary for the use of Soviet Union armed forces to reinforce Russian 
MVD troops. Gorbachev later recalled: 
Everyone was playing some kind of game. Rutskoi, brandishing his sword, said, ‘give me several 
divisions and I’ll put it down and crush the separatists and Dudayev’ and so on. Suddenly 
Shaposhnikov, the Defense Minister, and the Interior Minister Barannikov ring me up and say, 
‘Mikhail Sergeyevich, Rutskoi is asking us for troops.’ I say, ‘No decisions without my 
agreement, absolutely none.’ I ring up Khasbulatov and say, ‘Have you gone mad?’ Khasbulatov 
was against [sending in troops], I have to say objectively. So I say, ‘Why are you dragging me into 
this? Where is your President?’ Khasulatov said, ‘I’d also like to know where he is.’262
 
  In typical fashion, President Dudayev scoffed at the threat of Russian 
intervention.  As before, he called for the mobilization of Chechen fighters. Soslambekov was 
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263appointed Minister of War and they awaited the Russian response.   The response came when 
600 Russian MVD troops were landed at the Khankala military airbase on 8 November, just 
outside of Grozny.264  Despite Gorbachev’s direct order that Soviet forces could not participate, 
it appears that Chief of the General Staff Vladimir Lobov “willingly passed around the order [to 
intervene].”265  For some odd reason, the logistics behind the attempted coup “went comically 
wrong”: weapons supplies were sent to a second base, while reinforcements were sent a third.266  
By the next morning, Dudayev’s forces has completely surrounded the base and a mass-protest 
involving “hundreds of thousands” of people erupted in Grozny.267  
As Russian MVD spetsnaz forces found themselves hopelessly surrounded, the Kremlin 
faced a second crisis.  Shamil Basayev and two other Chechen associates managed to hijack a 
178-passenger Aeroflot TU-154 the same day and reroute it to Turkey, where he demanded the 
withdrawal of Russian forces.268  According to former U.S. counterterrorism official Dr. Paul 
Murphy, Basayev was rewarded by President Dudayev for his efforts by being commissioned as 
a colonel and being assigned to a command within the Presidential Guard.269
After taking his oath of office a few hours after the debacle at Khankala, Dudayev made 
time to meet deputy Interior Minster Vyacheslav Komissarov and negotiate the withdrawal of the 
besieged MVD force.  They were promptly allowed to leave the Chechen state in a long caravan 
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270of buses.   If all this was not enough to embarrass Moscow, the Caucasus-wide ‘Confederation 
of Mountain Peoples’ (KNK) announced that they were mobilizing partisan volunteers to repel 
the Russian intervention the following day.271  Not surprisingly, the state of emergency was 
revoked by the Khasbulatov-led Russian Supreme Soviet on 11 November.272   
President Dudayev had defiantly stood up to the Russian state and won.  The intervention 
produced the exact opposite effect of its intent, Dzhokhar was now a hero.273 Journalist and 
author Sebastian Smith offered his own analysis of the events: “On one hand, Moscow proved 
incapable of taking decisive action and negotiating in good faith. On the other hand, Dudayev 
discovered that setting his countrymen against the Russian bogeyman was the key to his 
popularity...the die was cast.”274  
There is no doubt that the personal battle between Gorbachev’s struggle to preserve the 
Soviet Union and Yeltsin’s desire to usurp Gorbachev’s authority was central to the inability of 
the latter to put an end to Dudayev’s intransigence.  That being said, the Gorbachev-Yeltsin 
rancor was not enough to make for the debacle that transpired during the fall of 1991.  
Dudayev’s rhetorical outpourings reflected the grievances and aspirations of an entire generation.  
The revolution no doubt possessed a vanguard, a core leadership that constantly reminded 
a people dissatisfied with their lot in life and status in society that they possessed the ability and 
the right to recreate that society, to create a new political order. But it was the people, consumed 
by the sense of a proud nation scorned, who picked up weapons and were willing to sacrifice 
themselves to the cause.  The Chechen case is not unique in this sense—the altar of 
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independence is often stained red with the blood. Almost a year after the aborted (or botched) 
coup attempt, Dudayev explained Russia’s reluctance to roll the iron dice of war in simple terms: 
“We…[had] shown that we were ready to die.  That is the only language the Russians 
understand.”275  Regarding this, it is tempting to criticize him as an opportunist megalomaniac, a 
third-world despot willing to risk the lives of his people for only ambition’s sake; but to do is to 
miss the true man behind the Soviet general’s uniform.  
From Dudayev’s perspective, no doubt colored by his career as a dashing Soviet military 
officer with combat experience, politics necessarily involved overt attempts to coerce whomever 
he was dealing with; in other words, politics was war.  It is not clear if Dudayev read Clausewitz 
and simply misunderstood the text, or if his propensity to provoke his adversaries reflected a 
keen understanding of their actual willingness to carry out the threats made against him.  
Whether he was mad or just exceptionally shrewd, after being elected president and having 
thwarted the attempted coup against him in 1991, Dudayev managed to checkmate Yeltsin’s 
Russia.  
This chapter has discussed how Dudayev and the nationalist revolutionary elite exploited 
the mass opposition to the August Putsch and toppled Zavgayev’s communist regime in a 
marvelous coup.  In this manner, the generation of exiled Chechens rose to prominence and was 
able to guide the destiny of their people, for bettor or for worse.  While successful in ousting the 
communist elite, the Chechen people were heading for disaster. 
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8.0  DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV’S CHECHNYA: LIFE UNDER THE 
REVOLUTIONARY REGIME 
We know to our sorrow that freedom has been better preserved in countries where no revolution ever broke out, no 
matter how outrageous the circumstances of the powers that be, and there exist more civil liberties even in countries 
where the revolution was defeated than in those where revolutions have been victorious. 
-Hannah Ardent, On Revolution 
Revolutions in general no more give rise to democracy than capitalism gives rise to revolutions. 
-Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World 
There was a minister of economics, but no economy, a foreign minister but no diplomatic recognition, mountains of 
presidential decrees on law and order, but only the rule of the gun. 
-Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains 
As with most revolutions, Dzhokhar’s revolutionary regime filled the vacuum of crumbling 
Soviet authority.  More than this, the Chechen Revolution symbolized the political separation 
from Russian hegemony.  Also like many other revolutions, the Chechen revolutionary regime 
became extremely aware that replacing a regime was relatively simple; creating a new political 
order and governing was a much more daunting challenge.  Even so, the revolutionary regime 
survived longer than most observers thought possible.  In fact, the survival of the regime had less 
to do with the efficacy of governance than in the resiliency of the Chechen people.  That being 
said, it is a story that ended in tragedy for both the revolutionaries and those consumed by it. 
 
The State of the Revolutionary State 
Life under the revolutionary regime provoked one of two reactions: some were euphoric about 
their long lost independence; others became quickly disillusioned.  On one hand there was the 
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façade of political and social transformation, the veneer of true revolution.  One the other hand, 
“President Dudayev seemed much more interested in the idea of calling Chechnya independent 
than in the practicality of making it work.”276
Dzhokhar’s national revolution brought with it the ceremonial trappings of a great 
revolution. Lenin’s statue in Grozny’s central square (formerly known as Lenin Square and now 
renamed Sheikh Mansur square) was toppled and replaced with the symbolic statue of a wolf 
howling in either defiance or reverence to the moon.  The sculpture also shared the hallowed 
ground with the new Chechen flag; it was a solid green rectangle bifurcated by white and red 
stripes.  More than simple visual aides, Dzhokhar’s regime marked the advent of Revolutionary 
time.  Quite literally, Chechnya ceased to be on Moscow time and jumped an hour ahead.  After 
all, if the Revolution freed the Chechens from the bondage of their servitude, should it not be 
fitting that the sunrise touch the Chechen mountain peaks at least an hour before the towers of 
the Kremlin?  The Revolution was a justification in itself for anything.        
Independence and self-determination are wonderful concepts, but they presuppose a 
myriad of social and political institutions that govern the activities of everyday existence.   These 
institutions come together in some way to form the state.  The state then carries out a 
predetermined set of functions under an agreed-to set of rules.  The revolutionary regime in 
Chechnya had extreme difficulty not with the conceptual but with the logistical aspects of 
independence and self-determination.  Viewed in a negative legal sense, sovereignty was 
freedom from communism and freedom from Russian domination.  Constructing a new political 
order from that conceptual framework was another matter entirely.  
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The greatest shortcoming in the revolutionary state unsurprisingly had to do with the 
most basic of functions: lack of adequate government services.277  Healthcare was a disaster 
under Dzhokhar.  There were repeated cholera scares and a chronic shortage of the most basic 
hospital supplies such as penicillin.278  Even when they had basic medical supplies, many 
hospitals and clinics were forced to close for lack of clean running water, electricity, and 
heating—completely discounting the fact that the staffs were not being paid their salaries.279  
The revolutionary school system, if one can label it as such, was no better than revolutionary 
healthcare.  Aside from the same problems regarding withheld wages and little or no heating, the 
few schools that operated beyond the urban areas were predicated upon the self-help system; the 
teachers agreed to work for free and the villagers found ways to get them to school.     
Even in a major city like Grozny, the trash began to slowly accumulate on the streets and 
streetlights were more often than not unlit adornments.280  Additionally, telephones rarely 
offered any predictable service.281  Despite the plethora of high-end European cars zipping about 
the cities in an unruly fashion, roads were in disrepair to the extent that automobile body shops 
became one of the few very profitable licit businesses under the revolutionary regime.282  The 
Revolution promised not only to set the Chechens free, but also made quite a few mechanics 
relatively wealthy in the process.  
A report by International Alert declared that the revolutionary state had “made impressive 
beginnings” and that “Chechen society is characterized by a remarkable degree of political 
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283openness and freedom of expression.”   Anatol Lieven came to a different conclusion about 
Dzhokhar’s Chechnya. Lieven believed that it was all a façade:  
The picture of state collapse in Chechnya is by no means contradicted either by the mushrooming 
of Chechen ministries and bureaucrats or by the increase in the secret police [(DGB)]. The first 
was simply a reflection of the privatization [sic.] of the state, as in Russia, and the buying off of 
individuals and groups by giving them non-working state jobs; the second was to defend 
Dudayev.”284  
 
Whatever is to be said of Dzhokhar’s revolutionary state, he was “committed” to it being 
a secular one.285  He was not interested in creating a republic governed by religious rule; after 
all, religious rule was what happened only when fanatical Dagestani Avars took over, not 
Chechens. 
286President Dudayev modeled the revolutionary constitution upon that of Estonia.   The 
Chechen parliament, elected along with Dudayev, quickly became a “lively debating 
chamber.”287  The Revolution also promised, and by all accounts upheld, the freedom of the 
press in the republic.288  Nor did the state suffer from the laziness of the chief executive.  
President Dudayev worked long hours, beginning his working days in the afternoon and not 
going to bed until around dawn.289  Perhaps this too was another example of Revolutionary time. 
Reserving the office of Prime Minister for himself, President Dudayev offered the 
position of first Deputy Prime Minister, effectively head of government, to Salambek Khajiev, a 
former Soviet Minister of the Chemical Industry.  Khajiev declined the appointment because 
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Dudayev was unwilling to give him sufficient authority to enact economic policy decisions.  In 
an interview, Khajiev recalled: 
I told him I wouldn’t take part in this because he had a typically stateist conception of things He 
was a typical military man: force, order, and submission!...I said we should reassure the people 
that we were heading for independence and that he had in the first place to deal step by step with 
the economy but not in the way he wanted, keeping everything in the state sector…but he had a 
typical old way of thinking, that everything should be firmly in the hands of the commander of the 
division. I said that was not realistic.290
 
Shamil Beno, a Jordanian-born member of the Chechen disapora, became the first 
Foreign Minister.  Beno strongly disagreed with President Dudayev over policy toward Moscow 
and joined Khajiev’s Daimokkh opposition party in July 1992.291  His departure was primarily 
over the growing influence of Mamodayev (an abrek recently elevated to Minister of Finance) 
and Gantemirov (appointed Mayor of Grozny and head of the police), both of whom had been 
essential  in the overthrow of Zavgayev’s government.292 Moreover, Foreign Minister Beno 
became extremely annoyed when Dudayev adopted the annoying habit of publicly announcing 
personal agreements and pledges made to his regime by foreign governments—which only 
served to incur the wrath of Moscow on those who reportedly made them.293  In another 
instance, Dudayev  told a Palestinian journalist that he developed “a plan to destroy the Israeli 
state,” to which Beno replied that the president must have been mistranslated.294  Dudayev was a 
fiasco when he traveled abroad in his capacity as head of state.  It was just too much for Beno to 
handle. 
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 The Revolutionary Economy 
Prior to the revolution, Chechens lived under a system that effectively relegated them to second-
class citizens.  There were artificial barriers at every turn to prevent upward mobility, especially 
amongst those of highlander blood.  The Revolution, which was really a counter-revolution 
seven decades in the making, sought to place the Chechens once again as masters of their land.  
Despite all this good will, Dzhokhar’s Chechnya soon faced an economy which plummeted into 
“terminal decline”295, rather than becoming the “second Kuwait” 296  Dzhokhar had promised to 
his people.   
To be fair, the disaster that became of the Chechen economy was partly a result of the 
Russian blockade.297  That said, Dzhokhar personally insisted on freezing the price of bread in 
revolutionary Chechnya at one ruble, a symbolic policy based less upon practicality and more 
upon principle—all the while exacting a toll on the state budget, which contained specific 
subsidies designed to make this artificial price possible.298 Yeltsin’s government realized that a 
possible strategy for eliminating its Dzhokhar problem was to undermine the revolutionary 
regime’s ability to provide an acceptable standard of living for its people; however, the blockade 
was full of holes—especially along the Chechen-Dagestani border.  Additionally, all that was 
necessary to pass through the inconvenient Russian checkpoints one actually encountered was 
sufficient reserves of bribe money to cause the border guards to look the other way.299  Despite 
its inability to prevent the flow of goods and people between Russia and revolutionary 
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Chechnya, the blockade did manage to curtail the flow of vital resources from abroad: foreign 
aid, loans, and foreign-direct investment (FDI).300  Even so, revolutionary Chechnya was a safe 
haven. The construction of a new international boundary—even if unrecognized by the powers 
that be in the Kremlin—prevented Russian authorities from pursing any criminals who fled onto 
“sovereign” Chechen territory.301  
Even so, some elements in Moscow were also complicit in keeping Dudayev’s regime 
afloat.  Federal pension payments from the Russian central government, estimated by once 
source at 2.5 billion rubles302 303, came into Chechnya until March 1993.   Additionally, Dudayev 
pulled off a “financial coup” in 1992 when Estonia issued its own domestic currency and 
delivered all of its ruble reserves to Dzhokhar’s struggling regime.304  Perhaps it was an 
unofficial ‘thank you’ for not allowing the intervention troops to land while he was still in 
command of the Tartu base.  
Chechnya also benefited from petroleum-related business—at least initially.  Oil 
extraction steadily declined in Chechnya.  According to once source, the revolutionary state 
extracted 2.6 million tons in 1992, and only 1.2 million tons in 1993; by 1994 only one in every 
fifteen Chechen oil wells still yielded any black gold.305  Nevertheless, Chechnya did possess 
                                                 
300 Georgi Derluguian, “The Structures of Chechnya’s Quagmire,” PONARS Policy Memo 309 (November 2003), p. 
2. 
301 Smith, p. 132. 
302 See Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, p. 74. Valery Tishkov claims that the total amount of 
Federal transfer payments was 4 billion rubles, a much higher amount. See Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn 
Society, p. 66. 
303 Gall and de Waal, p. 125. 
304 Smith, p. 132. 
305 Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya, p. 126. 
 86 
306what Yegor Gaidar once called “the largest oil-refining enterprise in Russia.”   Thus, refining 
Russian crude became the revolutionary regime’s “real cash cow”.307  
From 1991 to-1994 elements within the Russian government facilitated the flow of an 
estimated 23 million tons (with an estimated worth of $300-400 million in 1993 alone) of 
Siberian Russian crude to revolutionary Chechnya through the Black Sea corridor.308 What these 
numbers to not show is that, according to Yegor Gaidar, Russia reduced the flow of crude to the 
revolutionary regime every year (approximately one-third of the 1991 total shipment in 1992, 5 
million tons less in 1993, etc.).309  Yusup Soslambekov claimed that the revolutionary state’s 
refineries produced 4 million tons of diesel, 1.6 million tons of petrol, 125,500 tones of kerosene, 
and 36,600 tons of industrial lubricants during 1992, in total an estimated $130 million in 
profits.310  Refining Russian crude though was not enough to feed the state budget.  The ordinary 
person survived in an economic self-help system. In this manner the Revolution was kept afloat 
by a vibrant shadow economy. On the subject of pipelines, Dzhokhar’s revolutionary regime 
allegedly came up with the absurd idea of constructing a pipeline to the Middle East in order to 
sell them Chechen drinking water.311
 
GETTING BY AND GETTING RICH 
The Chechen Revolution unleashed social forces that consumed the foundations of the old 
regime.  The Soviet Policy of preferential treatment for ethnic Russian and Party-member 
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Chechens deprived the revolutionary regime the human capital it needed to reconstitute the 
economy, provide regulatory oversight, and encourage licit entrepreneurship.  Instead, the 
population was schooled in creating its own opportunity and it did so in a spectacular fashion.  
According to two observers, “Dudayev’s Chechnya was a mafioso’s dream.”312  “In general,” 
writes Anatol Lieven, “Grozny’s emergence as a centre [sic.] of smuggling, money-laundering 
and fraud gained the Chechens many allies, as well as many enemies, throughout the world of 
Russian business.”313  In agreement with this analysis, Sebastian Smith referred to the free 
economic zone in Chechnya as “just another shady joint-venture”, quite simply an example of 
collusion between Muscovite and Chechen businessmen.314  Mark Galeotti blames the illicit 
boom squarely upon Dzhokhar himself, castigating him as a “self-aggrandizing opportunist”.315 
Valery Tishkov provides an interesting analogy from Moscow’s point of view: 
The description of Chechnya as a ‘free criminal zone’, provided by Sergai Sakhrai, a Russian 
deputy prime minister, is well known. Emil Pain and Arkady Popov, from the president’s 
Analytical Centre, compared Chechnya and Dudayev’s regime to the Medellin cartel in Colombia 
and to [G]eneral Manuel Noriega’s regime in Panama.316   
 
To be fair, this section should include the caveat that “to a large extent the Chechen 
criminals simply mirrored what was happening around them [in Russia].”317  The new political 
environment and economic opportunities, combined with a lack of oversight, favored the bold; 
boldness just happened to be a quality that the Chechens possessed a great deal of.  John Dunlop 
even suggested that Russian charges of a ‘criminal revolution’ in Chechnya were tantamount to 
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318“the pot calling the kettle black.”   Journalist Tom de Waal similarly wrote, “None of the 
criminal problems associated with Chechnya were unique to Russia, only the blatant way in 
which the criminality was flaunted.”319  Also like in the rest of the Russia, an elite class 
empowered by hordes of new money rose up, almost overnight.320   
The new rich drove 7 Series BMWs, AMG Mercedes, and Porches—apparently even a 
Rolls-Royce or two.  They were clothed in designer Italian suits, wore Rolex watches, and 
walked in custom-made boots.  Even Dzhokhar’s secret service (DGB) employees got in on the 
action.  Anatol Lieven recalled run-ins in which he found himself talking to what appeared to 
him as: 
…a Las Vegas cowboy all of five foot four inches tall, in a leather jacket and sharply-pointed 
cowboy boots set with silver stars, wearing a thick gold chain around his neck, another round his 
wrist, a gold watch and a huge gold ring with a silver medallion…they were the very image of 
Latin American political thugs, and, I thought probably with about the same degree of real 
patriotism and stomach for a real fight. In this of course I was quite wrong. Thuggish they were; 
cowards they most decidedly were not.321
 
322The Grozny bazaar was at the center of the Chechen illicit economy.   It was a place 
where “literally anything could be bought.”323  Even Wal-Mart would have been envious of both 
its basement-level prices and extreme product diversification.  While shortages and inflationary 
spikes were ripping through Russia, Grozny was a place where people could find foreign luxury 
items, electronic devices, exotic fruits, Turkish rugs, Kalashnikovs, grenades, and even rocket-
                                                 
318 Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya, p. 129. Raymond Finch also notes that a second popular Russian 
description of Chechnya was that it was a “gangster state”. See Raymond Finch, “Why the Russian Military Failed 
in Chechnya,” Foreign Military Studies Office Special Study No. 98-16 (August 1998), p. 2.  
319 Tom de Waal, “Chechnya: The Breaking Point,” in Richard Sakwa ed. Chechnya: From Past to Future (London: 
Anthem, 2005), p. 98-101.  
320 Smith, p. 124; Gall and de Waal, p. 102. 
321 Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, p. 81-82. 
322 Smith, p. 124; Gall and de Waal, p. 102. 
323 Gall and de Waal, p. 124. 
 89 
propelled grenade launchers.  Moreover, it seemed to be in operation at all hours of the day and 
night.    
The foreign goods were mainly acquired by unrestricted flights in and out of the Grozny 
airport, renamed Sheikh Mansur Airport by decree of the revolutionary regime. The sheer 
volume of the flights was impressive, with an estimated 100-150 flights per month outgoing and 
incoming.324  Curiously, Moscow did nothing to prevent the airport from functioning in this 
manner, despite the relative ease of using Russian military air assets to do so.325  Gall and de 
Waal describe the so-called ‘shuttle-tours’ as follows: 
A group of individuals formed a ‘tour company’ and leased an aeroplane [sic.], often from 
Ukraine or Azerbaijan; they then advertised [sic] for customers and flew them to Turkey, the 
Middle East, even as far as China. The ‘shuttles’, as the traders were known, would buy up 
consumer goods, bring them back to Grozny, and resell them in the Grozny market, undercutting 
average Russian prices by about a third. The tour company paid dues to Grozny airport of about 
$20,000 a month and cleared the way with Russian air traffic control, presumably for bribes.326
 
It was a remarkable case of market adaptation.  The shuttle-tour companies provided a 
service to aspiring entrepreneurs who otherwise had to deal with the somewhat constricting 
effects of the Russian blockade.  Allegedly, by 1994 approximately one in every two Chechen 
adults was connected in some way to the shuttle-tour companies.327   
With regard to the weapons trade, Chechnya was both a transshipment state and a buyer 
of light arms.328  At one point Chechnya achieved the dubious distinction of being “the largest 
black market clearing-house for weapons in the CIS,” with one observer noting that arms could 
be “purchased at the open-air market like apples and cabbage.”329  The narcotics trade was 
different.  For all intents and purposes, the lack of controls in the republic provided a perfect 
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330place for transshipment.   The Institute of Strategic Research, associated with the Russian 
Foreign Ministry, claimed in 1996 that President Dudayev negotiated a laissez-faire policy with 
Moscow-based organized crime groups  allowing the passage  of Tajik and Afghan narcotics in 
and out of the republic Reportedly,  Dzhokhar apparently demanded a greater share in the profits 
in November 1994; thus the resulting war in December was sometimes interpreted as just another 
“drug deal gone bad”.331  Whatever the circumstances of the Chechen drug connection, it is clear 
that the revolutionary regime did not actively prevent Chechen territory from being used as a 
logistical hub in the narcotics trade.332
Independent Chechnya also became a center for moonshine petroleum. Essentially, oil 
transit pipelines were tapped (47,000 tons in 1993 alone333) and refined into usable but low-
quality product in the basements of ordinary houses, at one point in 1998 reaching an estimated 
“200 clandestine oil refineries.”334  In fact, one source claims that the pipelines were “riddled 
with holes” and that Moscow estimated that it would require at least $55 million dollars to repair 
them.335  In support of this narrow view of privatization, Chechen Ballaudi Movsaev happily 
explained, “If something is on your territory that means it’s yours, even if it’s a pipeline.”336  
The logic isn’t extremely difficult to follow.  Whatever passed through Chechen territory was the 
property of its sovereign people.  The Revolution finally made the Chechens masters of their 
house.   
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The Revolution also produced a generation which became extremely adept at financial 
crimes.  They became referred to as vosdushniky (air-men), a term referred to those who “could 
create wealth out of nothing.”337  According to Russian sources, approximately 36 percent of 
seized counterfeit currency was allegedly of Chechen origin.338  Another prominent financial 
crime was the 1992 aviso scandal, whereby one Chechen group managed to net an estimated 60 
billion rubles ($700 million in 1992 dollars).339  Essentially, wire transfers were made from fake 
accounts in Chechen banks to Russian banks, where the money was promptly extracted before 
the Russian banks could catch the error.  The practice was not stopped until July 1992.  On top of 
all this, revolutionary Chechnya became a giant money laundering machine, especially for 
Russian criminal groups.340
 
The Russian Farmer Jones 
Do you know what would happen if we pigs failed in our duty? Jones would come back! Yes, Jones would come 
back! Surely comrades…surely, there is no one amongst you who wants to see Jones come back.” 
-George Orwell, Animal Farm 
 
…the leaders of the revolutionary movement begin to warn against…intervention long before it actually starts…it 
serves to explain the inability of the dictatorship to fulfill its promises… 
- T. S. Hamerow, From the Finland Station 
 
 
It is natural to wonder why Dzhokhar’s fiasco of a state managed to hold together. “Dissent was 
widespread,” described two observers “although you had to seek it out because people were 
reluctant to speak out against President Dudayev.”341  Said-Khmazat Nunuyev, a Chechen 
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elected to the CPD with Khasbulatov, offers the following assessment: “After suffering Tsarism 
and Communism the people haven’t breathed the air of freedom enough.”342  This was likely the 
best explanation of the unfolding events.  The spectacular fiasco that was the revolutionary 
regime required explanation and Dzhokhar’s boogeyman was an easy choice: Russia.  “The 
general who wore pin-stripe suits rather than uniform so that people would not mistake him for a 
dictator became just that—a banana republic strongman.  Unable to manage his own tiny 
country, he turned his attention to baiting Russia.”343  Gall and de Waal agree with this 
assessment: “The Russian threat was still [in 1994] the Chechen leadership’s trump card and it 
was a message that had a sympathetic audience.  The nearer you got to the mountains, the more 
you found people willing to defend Chechen independence.”344  To be sure, Moscow played the 
part of villain extremely well, ensuringing President Dudayev’s allegations fell upon sympathetic 
ears. 
The first manifestation of an impending Russian intervention aimed at putting down the 
Revolution occurred in October/November 1992.  Essentially, a wave of violence erupted 
between the Ingush and the North Ossetians over what the Ingush believed (with good reason) to 
be a territorial irredenta.  Federal MVD forces swept in to force a cessation of violence and 
worked their way east to the Chechen border, likely an attempt to coerce Dudayev into settling 
for less than independence by the implicit threat of military intervention.345  Dzhokhar called 
Yeltsin’s bluff for the second time and mobilized for war; the Russian MVD troops were quickly 
recalled. 
                                                 
342 Quoted in Gall and de Waal, p. 106. 
343 Smith, p. 134. 
344 Gall and de Waal, p. 105. 
345 Knezys and Sedlickas, p. 21; Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya, p. 149. 
 93 
The second challenge to the Revolution came from the Chechen opposition.  A group 
calling itself the “Coordinating Committee for the Reestablishment of a Constitutional System” 
attempted to seize Grozny with 150 armed fighters on 31 March 1993.  They succeeded in 
capturing the television and radio stations until they were expelled from these positions by 
Dudayev’s National Guardsmen.346  The incident led President Dudayev to grant himself 
emergency powers to deal with the traitorous opposition, the self-appointed enemy of the people. 
Chechnya’s parliament disagreed with Dzhokhar and passed legislation that gave 
Mamodayev legal authority to form a “Government of Popular Trust”.347  President Dudayev 
subsequently dissolved the parliament by decree and appointed Yandarbiyev acting Vice-
President; the parliament refused to recognize Dzhokhar’s authority to disband the body and 
elected Soslambekov Chairman.348  In response, President Dudayev exercised a state coup; 
Dzhokhar declared a state of emergency, enacted a curfew in the capital, and once again relied 
up his National Guard, ordering them to forcibly disband the brazen republican parliament, the 
Grozny assembly, and constitutional court.349  To maintain the illusion of constitutional restraint, 
Dudayev installed a new parliament that was led by a relative from his teip, Isa Idigov.350  
Secondly, a “constitutional collegium” court, consisting of seven personally-appointed judges, 
replaced the Constitutional Court that sided with the former parliament.351
Following his self-coup, Dudayev was almost assassinated in a brazen attack conducted 
by Gantemirov’s Urus-Martan-based opposition forces and Chonchoi teip members.352  
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Amazingly, Gantemirov’s men entered the capital and approached the Presidential Palace, to 
unleash a hail of automatic gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades at President Dudayev’s office 
window, wounding two of his bodyguards.353  Four months after surviving this attack by 
opposition forces, the Presidential Palace was surrounded by Dzhokhar’s own forces; the putsch 
was a conglomerate of Chechen spetsnaz, OMON (paramilitary police commandos), Colonel 
Shamil Basayev’s recently-returned ‘Abkhaz battalion’, and the Shali tank regiment.354  Against 
all odds, Dzhokhar managed to engage in bilateral talks with each of the respective unit leaders 
and remain in power.  President Dudayev managed to remain at the helm of the Revolution 
despite two coups, one from the opposition and the other by his own elite forces, and a brazen 
Wild West-style assassination attempt.   
The second opposition coup attempt came on January 1994.  Announced by the shadowy 
“Committee for National Salvation”, Ibragin Suleimenov led a poorly-trained force of men into 
Grozny; he was arrested by the DGB the following month.355  It is not clear who the leaders or 
membership of the Committee was.  It is possible that Gantemirov tried using a larger force to 
accomplish what his assassins were previously unable to.   
Most likely, the Committee was just the Coordinating Committee under a new name, 
given the much larger scale of the operation relative to Gantemirov’s assassination plot.  By all 
accounts, the Coordinating Committee was the name of the opposition group headed by the 
primary anti-Dudayev protagonist and Nizaloi teip member, Nadterechnyi district Mayor Umar 
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356Auturkhanov.   In any event, by May 1994 the opposition also came to include President 
Dudayev’s former personal bodyguard, Ruslan Labazanov—the only one of Dzhokhar’s 
bodyguards not a member of his teip.357  With his stronghold in Argun, Labazanov formed the 
Niiso (Justice) Party after his falling-out with Dudayev over allegations of Labazanov’s 
involvement in a Moscow-based back fraud scheme.358  Labazanov incited a 12 June 1994 
militant rally in Grozny’s Sheikh Mansur Square during which Basayev’s Abkhaz battalion 
responded and effectively disarmed the protestors.359  One again, Colonel Shamil Basayev was 
instrumental in preserving the revolutionary regime; dissent to Dzhokhar abounded but the 
Revolution survived, and preserving it became an end in itself. 
The second direct attempt on President Dudayev’s life transpired on 27 May 1994.  A 
remote-controlled explosive erupted amidst a Presidential motorcade, detonated underneath the 
second of three cars—the usual vehicle President Dudayev traveled in.360  For whatever reason, 
Dudayev and his family were riding in the third car on this occasion and the blast killed Chechen 
MVD minister Magomed El’diev and his deputy instead of Dudayev.  The Chechen government 
blamed Russia’s secret services for the blast due to the device’s level of sophistication, but the 
likely culprit was Labazanov.  Money can buy plenty of sophisticated weaponry—especially in 
revolutionary Chechnya—and he had plenty of it to go around and a publicly-professed vendetta 
against Dzhokhar.  
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 AN INTER-TEIP WAR…WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THE KREMLIN 
The spring and summer of 1994 brought the internal conflict in revolutionary Chechnya to a 
head as the Russian secret services began bankrolling the opposition’s counter-revolutionary war 
against President Dudayev.  The opposition was composed of Zavgayev’s powerful Nizaloi teip 
(led by Umar Auturkhanov) and Gantemirov’s Chonchoi teip, supported actively and passively 
by members from Labaznov’s and Khasbulatov’s respective teips.  In the course of events 
leading up to Russia’s direct military intervention in December 1994, the opposition gained 
control of 50 percent of Chechen territory (7 of 14 regions).361  Khasbulatov also operated, but 
along the periphery.  After all, he was a member of the opposition but he wanted to be the one 
leading it.  With these hopes in mind, he undertook a “peacekeeping” mission in March 1994, 
reportedly drawing crowds as large as 100,000.362  
Borrowing a tactic from President Dudayev’s playbook, Arturkhanov’s Provisional 
Council held the “Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya” from 3-4 July 1994.363  It was an 
attempt to elevate the questionable legitimacy surrounding the Provisional Council, hoping to 
present itself as a national unity government and not just a lowlander institution.  Despite its 
attempt to garner republic-wide legitimacy, the Congress’ attendees were mostly those who 
previously supported Arturkhanov and the Council; that is to say, they attendees were drawn 
from a narrow group of those who dwelled closer to the Terek River than the southern 
mountains. Following this, the Kremlin officially recognized the Council as the sole legitimate 
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364authority in the republic.   It was around this time that the Council began to receive covert 
financial and military aid from the Russian Counter-Intelligence Agency (FSK), under the 
leadership of Sergei Stepashin.365  Dzhokhar’s DGB chief, Sultan Geliskhanov, estimated that 
the FSK was providing at least 100 billion rubles to the Council.366   
During this period of political jockeying, President Dudayev held his own “People’s 
Congress” on 10 August 1994. The composition of the People’s Congress was the exact opposite 
of Arturkhanov’s Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya, mainly the clan leaders of the southern 
mountain regions. Unsurprisingly, both Zavgayev and Khasbulatov were dubbed “enemies of the 
nation” and Arturkhanov was given a death sentence in absentia.367  It was in this process of 
political escalation that the stage was being set for a final battle between Dudayev and his 
Moscow-supported opposition.  “Chechnya,” wrote two Russian military experts “began to smell 
like gunpowder.”368
At long last, the final battle between the two Chechen forces seemed to transpire during 
September when the Provisional Council’s forces launched a serious coup attempt.  The 
opposition forces attacking Grozny were supported by Russian helicopters (Mi-8 “Hip” transport 
and Mi-24 “Hind” attack) and armored assets, including 70 tanks.369  For a variety of reasons, 
including the poor quality of the Council’s army, the coup was repelled. Every time the 
opposition launched an operation to take the capital and oust Dudayev, there were requests to 
receive reinforcement from federal troops; these requests were seen as a non-option from the 
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perspective of Moscow, who learned that the induction of federal forces only bolstered 
Dudayev’s position in revolutionary Chechnya.370  Yeltsin’s government was willing to allow 
the civil war between the highlander and lowlander teips to continue, while continuing to arm 
and fund the lowlanders.  This reluctance to intervene directly was most evident on 15 October 
when opposition gunmen entered Grozny and effectively took the city. After requesting 
reinforcements from Moscow, they withdrew from the city at 4pm the following day because 
Yeltsin’s administration was unwilling to reenter a federal presence.371  They wanted to give 
their proxy war against President Dudayev one more chance to succeed. That chance manifested 
itself on 26 November.  
The final coup launched against Dzhokhar Dudayev’s revolutionary government was an 
extremely large undertaking.  It involved170 tanks, a 5,000-man invasion force—including 85 
Russian soldiers covertly recruited by the FSK from the Kantemir and Taman divisions that were 
promised thousands of dollars for their participation in the coup.372  The invasion force was 
supplied with communications equipment that did not operate on the same channels, effectively 
dooming any chances of proper command and control of the forces;373 the operation was doomed 
from the start.  The resulting confusion of the combined FSK-recruited Russian troops and the 
various counter-revolutionary groups allowed Dudayev’s National Guard to mount a highly 
effective positional defense in Grozny’s urban jungle.  In the end, the operation was a fiasco and 
20 captured Russian soldiers were shown on television when Moscow denied federal 
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involvement; later the revolutionary regime even threatened to execute them if Moscow 
maintained such denials.374  As one journalist mused, “Such is the price of secret wars; when 
they go wrong; they become horribly public…”375  It is amazing that Yeltsin survived the 
catastrophe.  His “democratic” administration had covertly funded and armed a proxy war in 
what the administration professed to be an internal matter.  In the end, Russian Ministry of 
Defense (MOD)—not Ministry of Interior (MVD) internal troops376—were paraded on television 
by the recalcitrant revolutionary Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. 
By the beginning of December 1994, Dzhokhar’s revolutionary regime was again solidly 
in power, with the opposition forces reeling from multiple failures to force Dudayev out of office 
in successive botched coup attempts.  Between the attritional effects of the battles and the efforts 
of Dzhokhar’s DGB, the opposition was systematically being hunted down “with the bitter 
contempt reserved for brothers who betray a cause.”377  This contempt for those who refused the 
call of the Revolution-- whether  the opposition or disbanded parliament and constitutional 
court—is neither surprising nor unique.  Brinton explained the terror of the radicals as follows: 
Liberty for everyone, liberty, full, free, and fair, is of course the ultimate goal.  But such 
liberty at present would mean that men corrupted by the bad old ways would be able to realize 
their wicked plans, restore the bad old institutions, and frustrate the good men. On reflection, the 
extremist continues, it is clear that we must distinguish between liberty for those who deserve it, 
and liberty for those who don’t, which latter is of course, false liberty, pseudo-liberty, license or 
anarchy.  God had given liberty to the Saints—true liberty, which is obedience to Him—but he 
clearly did not give liberty to the sinners.  You repress papists as you would repress devils.  To 
argue that such sinners ought to be left alone would have seen to seventeenth-century English 
Puritans as absurd as it would to us to suggest that yellow-fever-bearing mosquitoes be left alone.  
Robespierre himself phrased it with classic neatness: the revolutionary government, he said, was 
the despotism of liberty against tyranny.  For Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a 
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necessary transitional stage, in which the last vestiges of the capitalistic mentality are wiped 
out.378   
 
The significance of the Revolution was that “Chechen Independence became the 
exception rather than the rule—a major eyesore for a Russian government seeking to consolidate 
state power.”379  As Yeltsin attempted to build a new political order, Dzhokhar Dudayev was 
constructing his own; and it would be separate from that of Russia.  If Dzhokhar’s insults 
weren’t sufficient to embarrass Yeltsin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky presented another “growing 
challenge to his authority [and] President Yeltsin began to look for an opportunity to reassert his 
control.”380  In this manner, war became a means to outmaneuver Zhirinovsky and an end to his 
efforts to reconstitute a new Russia. 
It appears that the highlanders, perhaps the least affected by the gross inadequacies of the 
revolutionary government, found the idea of mountaineer nationalism professed by the 
revolutionary leader a sufficient reason to allow him to remain in power.  Of course, their 
support was also a function of the poor military performance of the pro-Moscow opposition. The 
Revolution was again safe and Dzhokhar was its hero, its stalwart champion.       
             
MAKING SENSE OF THE REVOLUTION 
Dzhokhar Dudayev led the Chechen Revolution against Doku Zavgayev's decedent and hollow 
communist regime; however, Dudayev’s regime quickly failed to live up to the people’s 
expectations.  Far from elevating the downtrodden and abused Chechen nation from its collective 
misery, the Revolution unleashed its own form of desperation.  Additionally, Dudayev and his 
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followers represented the radical wing of the OKChN.  Dudayev’s decisive action during the 
August Putsch allowed him to checkmate not only Zavgayev, but also the moderate 
revolutionary Lechi Umkhayev.  Umkhayev maneuvered cautiously and made every effort not to 
widen the revolutionary agenda.  It is precisely for this reason that Dudayev was able to 
completely eclipse him.  
The rise of the radical revolutionaries in Chechnya is not unique.  Fitting with Brinton’s 
explanation of how the radicals come to power, Dudayev’s position in the OKChN and his 
monopoly of control over the National Guard were critical.  As Brinton explained, “The key to 
the success of the extremists lies in their monopoly of control over these organizations—the New 
Model Army and Independent Churches, Jacobin clubs, and soviets.”381  Also fitting into 
Briton’s model, Dzhokhar’s radicals came to power upon the wings of a coup.382  Moreover, as 
in other revolutions, General Dudayev’s radical clique represented a small niche of Chechen 
society.  To be sure, there was a mass reaction in support of the Revolution; but it was an effect, 
not a cause of it.  Indeed, “The masses do not make revolutions. [however,] they may be enlisted 
for some impressive pageantry once the active few have won the revolution.”383
The Revolutionary elite succeeded in overthrowing the vacuum of authority, but failed in 
replacing that vacuum with a consolidated and effective state; perhaps, that was the intent from 
the beginning.  That is to say, the Revolution was not only about anti-communism and national 
self-determination.  As Lieven suggested, the Revolution was a traditionalizing counter-
revolution: a “revolt…against the modern state...”384  Richard Sakwa generally agrees with 
Lieven’s counter-state thesis, noting that the “anarchic egalitarianism of a people unused to state 
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385authority refuses to subordinate itself even to its own legitimate authorities.”   The state, or 
more accurately what the Chechens perceived the state to be, was artificially and brutally 
imposed upon a people whose organic clan and federation system of governance never required 
its nullification to begin with.  Thus, the future vision of the Revolution was to turn back the 
clock prior to Russian annexation, and all that was brought with it.   
Freedom was what the revolutionary regime promised, but in reality it only managed to 
bring about something between “a loose tribal democracy and a personal autocracy” and 
ultimately what Robert Montagne dubbed “‘ordered anarchy’ in which  a society appears to an 
outside observer to be utterly chaotic and riven by internal feuds but in fact obeys extremely 
strict rules and restraints in its behavior…”386  Further, Northwestern University professor 
Georgi Derluguian explains that “neither totalitarianism nor democracy could emerge in the 
unruly and collapsing Chechnya [because] dictatorship and democracy, in their own ways, are 
difficult to build and maintain…[absent of] functioning bureaucratic institutions.”387
 
WHY THE 1994-1996 WAR? 
The explanations of the Russian invasion focus upon a variety of reasons.  Most claim that the 
domino-theory threat, that Chechnya would be only the first of many republics to secede, was an 
unacceptable risk for a myriad of reasons.  Usually involved in this explanation is the 
significance of the hydrocarbon deposits in the Caspian basin and the growing importance of 
these deposits to the Russian government.  Some see it as a giant debt-collection operation for 
nonpayment of weapons and illegal narcotics transshipment shops.  Another explanation for the 
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war is the personal enmity between Yeltsin and Dudayev.  All these are true to some degree.  
The problem is the more simplistic of these miss the forest for the trees.  Precisely as Stephan 
Walt predicted, balance of threat theory explains why the Chechen Revolution, from Moscow’s 
point of view, needed to be put down like any other “mad dog”. 
The fear that the Chechen Revolution would spread threatened Moscow’s interests on a 
number of levels.  First, an independent Chechnya was different than an independent Estonia—
or Afghanistan for that matter.  For centuries, the North Caucasus has been at the center of 
Russian strategic interests.  Secondly, amidst all the other newly-independent countries, the 
threat (whether real or perceived) of a second round of disintegration was simply unacceptable to 
the Russian leadership.  Third, the oil refineries and pipelines that were located on Chechen 
territory made a viable, independent Chechnya a very real possibility.  Thus, the Russian 
leadership first tasked the secret services to remove the revolutionary cancer in Chechnya using 
the indigenous opposition.  When this strategy failed, the Russian military was sent to succeed 
where the opposition had failed in December of 1994.  To Yeltsin’s chagrin, by August of 1996 
the Chechen revolutionary forces were mounting highly-successful counter-attacks and retaking 
Chechen territory, forcing him to accept a cease-fire with Chechnya half in and half out of the 
Russian Federation.   
The Chechen Revolution and the rise of the radical forces under Dudayev had provoked a 
war and remained, albeit at the cost of Dudayev’s life.  Amazingly, President Dudayev managed 
to escape countless special operations aimed at eliminating his charismatic hold over the 
Chechen people.  Assassinating him, the theory went, the Chechen guerrillas would lose morale 
and eventually sue for peace.  The theory was wrong.   
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Dudayev was an elusive target because of the civilian population’s willingness to shelter 
him from the Russian forces.  Dzhokhar’s weakness was never his inability to secure aid, it was 
his method of communication.  While making one of several calls on his satellite telephone, 
some of which aimed at negotiating an end to the war, Dudayev was assassinated by a missile 
that locked onto his phone’s signal on 21 April 1996.388  Even after the confirmation by his 
security service and wife of his death, articles were printed and rumors abounded about how 
Dzhokhar would soon return in glory to once again lead his nation.389   
This chapter discussed the nature and failure of the revolutionary regime to function as a 
responsible and effective state.  The inability of the revolutionary regime to properly function 
allowed the rapid criminalization of the state.  Additionally, the period of independence from 
1991-1994 gradually built up to a military crisis with Russia.  This crisis was only exacerbated 
by the inflammatory rhetoric and pride of Dudayev—a satanic pride only matched by Russian 
President Yeltsin.  The resulting Russian invasion was a fiasco for the Russian military and a 
tragedy for the Chechen people.  Eventually, the Frankenstein that was the Chechen Revolution 
claimed the life of its creator.  Even so, the idea of Dudayev and his irrevocable commitment to 
the national idea lived on and the Chechens won their freedom—for a time at least. 
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9.0  THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
Dzhokhar Dudayev’s Chechen Revolution managed to survive the First Chechen War.  It seemed 
that even the federal armed forces could not put it down.  After Dudayev’s assassination, the 
much more moderate Aslan Maskhadov assumed the Chechen Presidency; thus began the 
Second Chechen Revolution.  The interwar period between the signing of the Khasavyurt Peace 
Accords in Dagestan and the incursion of illegal Salafist formations into Dagestan in 1999 
marked the second great battle between the moderates and the extremists.  The difference 
between the extremists of late 1990s, when compare to the OKChN radicals of the early 1990s, 
was both ideological and geographic.  While the OKChN radicals were ardent nationalists and 
demanded Chechen independence, the Salafist radicals believed the true Revolution would 
revive Imam Shamil’s Islamic Republic—extending from the Black to the Caspian Sea.  The true 
revolution, in the minds of the new radicals, would transcend clan and ethic loyalties under the 
common banner of the Islamic revolution.   
 
MASKHADOV’S REGIME     
Dudayev’s Chief of Staff and former Soviet artillery Colonel, Aslan Maskhadov, was elected 
President of Chechnya on 27 January 1997 during which “Chechen voters turned out in high 
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390 391numbers.” He received 65 percent of the vote .  The elections were declared to have been 
legitimate by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).392  Maskhadov 
defeated the current revolutionary leader and radical member of Dudayev’s clique, President 
Yandarbiyev.393  Yandarbiyev disagreed with Dzhokhar’s secularist state and instead wanted to 
return Chechnya into an Islamic state394—to the days of Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil.  To 
this end, Yandarbiyev introduced a constitution similar to Sudan and invited paramilitary fighters 
into a “Shari’a Guards” unit in order to enforce the rulings of the Shari’a courts.395  Shamil 
Basayev, the leader of the so-call Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, also ran in the election 
and received 22 percent of the vote.396  Victory in the 1997 Presidential elections proved to be a 
hollow victory for President Maskhadov.    
Maskhadov was the brilliant field commander who led the amazing assault on and 
recapture of Grozny on 6 August 1996.397  Subsequently, Maskhadov personally negotiated the 
Khasavyurt Peace Accords with Russian Security Council chairman General Alexander 
Lebed.398  Moreover, it was Maskhadov who represented the victorious Chechens in economic 
negotiations with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.399  Truly, President Maskhadov 
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was a legitimate heir; he became the new embodiment of the Revolution.  Unlike Dudayev, 
Maskhadov was a moderate.400  Also unlike Dzhokhar, Aslan possessed a “sober, modest 
character.”401  Upon election, Maskhadov advocated creating “a ‘common sphere’ with Russia in 
economic, military, and educational matters…”402  Moreover, unlike the radical revolutionary 
field commanders, Maskhadov did not believe that the Chechen revolution needed to be exported 
to other areas of the North Caucasus to keep it safe at home.403   
Precisely because he was a moderate, Maskhadov desired a secular state but was 
challenged  by political rivals, themselves former field commanders, who mobilized support 
from the wave of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across the North Caucasus.404  Elise 
Giuliano believes that the shift from national to religious rhetoric was a strategic maneuver to 
compensate for the lack of Western support for Chechen independence.405  There were also 
many very practical obstacles to Maskhadov’s government.  
President Maskhadov inherited a debacle of a country.  The First Chechen War (1994-
1996) had shattered the state’s infrastructure.  The capital city of Grozny and many other urban 
areas were essentially reduced to rubble by Russian air-to-ground attacks and artillery fire 
missions.406  The Chechen republic was shattered by combat operations during the 1994-1996 
war.  If the Chechens can be socially described as a pre-modern society (not that such a claim is 
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entirely accurate), then the Russian military forces saw to it that they also had a pre-modern 
economy. British military analyst C W Blandy described: 
The position of President Maskhadov in trying to restore a physically scarred, economically ruined 
and psychologically damaged country to a semblance of normal life, was describes at that time as 
being ‘along a bridge that is finer than a hair and sharper than a knife.’407  
 
Moreover, the Kremlin made every effort to undermine Maskhadov’s battle to build a 
state.  According to the 1996 Khasavyurt Peace Accords, Moscow assumed some responsibility 
for providing reconstruction money to the Chechen government.408  While the initial flow of 
money was to reach 62 billion rubles, Maskhadov’s government only received 16 billion.409  
Additionally, the Russian Duma attached requirements for reconstruction funding in the 1997-
1998 budget, requiring that the Chechen government publicly rescind demands for 
independence.  This precondition assured that Chechnya would never see the money.  
Maskhadov may have been a moderate, but he was still a revolutionary.  As a matter of principle, 
he would not betray the spirit of Dzhokhar’s Revolution.  Perhaps it was out of spite or the result 
of an intentional strategy, that Moscow left Chechnya largely to fend for itself; it was also a 
strategy that was self-defeating.  “By not taking any action in the period of reconstruction in 
Chechnya from 1997 to 1999,” wrote Jeronim Perovic, “Moscow clearly missed an opportunity 
to develop a relationship of trust with Maskhadov and other moderate forces that would have 
created the basis for constructive dialogue about the future of the republic.”410  That being said, 
Lieven qualifies the criticism of Moscow’s denial of funding with the argument that “most of the 
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aid would most probably not have been used for reconstruction. The corruption and criminality 
of senior Chechen officials, like Vice President Vakha Arsanov, is all too well known...”411  
Either way, no one will ever know what effect the reconstruction money would have had upon 
the Chechen polity.  Perhaps Maskhadov could have used the money to undermine the radical 
revolutionaries; perhaps the 2002 Dubrovka Theatre siege and the Beslan hostage-taking tragedy 
might not have unfolded; no one will ever know.  What can be said is that President Maskhadov 
was placed in an impossible situation in a devastated country—devastation enacted upon that 
country by the Russian military.         
Tragically, at the very time the Revolution had managed to survive and a member of the 
moderate wing of the revolutionary elite had taken power, the war-time solidarity began to 
crumble; the honeymoon was soon to be over.  In what Tishkov calls “internal social chaos” 
various bands of armed formations (most led by former field commanders of the First Chechen 
War) began to pursue their own visions of the Revolution.412   
 
THE RETURN OF THE RADICAL REVOLUTIONARIES 
Aslan Maskhadov led the forces that preserved the Chechen Revolution in 1996, negotiated the 
cease-fire that ended the First Chechen War, and decisively won the Presidential election, but 
was confronted from the beginning by the radical wing of the revolutionary party.  If that was not 
enough of a precarious position, he had no “army” to speak of; the fragmented and autonomous 
armed formations of the First Chechen War were largely unwilling to be reconstituted under 
centralized command and control mechanisms.413  The autonomous, cell-like composition of the 
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413 Lieven, “Nightmare in the Caucasus,” p 150. 
 111 
Chechen formations that helped them excel at tactical swarming operations turned out to be the 
greatest weakness of President Maskhadov. 
A core of radical field commanders began to challenge the authority of Maskhadov’s 
secular state.  Their ranks included such notables as Shamil Basayev (bolstered by his close 
relationship with the foreign fighter Khattab), Salaman Raduyev, Abi Barayev, and Abdul 
Melikh Mezhidov.  Basayev’s radicalization was partly the psychological consequence of his 
experience in the First Chechen War and his grandiose vision of the true Revolution. Anatol 
Lieven’s encounter with Basayev in 1995 was telling: “His eyes had sunk deeper into his head, 
and over the next years were to sink further and further; meanwhile his beard, which had been 
short and piratical, grew longer and bushier, until by the end of the year he really did resemble a 
Mujuahid of old.”414  One of the most irritating things to Basayev was that his fellow Chechens 
were unable to remain loyal to the Revolution, that they betrayed it for a paycheck.  In one 
instance Basayev chastised a fellow Chechen who cooperated with the pro-Moscow 
“collaborators” as a police major to the point that the man was reduced to tears: 
Aren’t you ashamed to sit here before us while the Russians whom you serve are committing such 
crimes? Are you a Chechen? Are you a man? You were born a Muslim, but tell me, can you say 
‘La illaha il’Allah’, when you serve the Russian murderers? What would it cost you just to leave 
here and go back to your family? Would they shoot you for it? We could get the Russian army out 
of here peacefully if it were not for people like you helping them. We are not asking you to fight, 
just to stand aside and not harm your own nation.415
 
To Basayev, the national idea fell tragically short in mobilizing sufficient amounts of 
committed supporters for the Revolution.  The nationalist model of the former-Soviet Central 
European countries was not successful in Chechnya.  What Basayev needed was a local 
paradigm.  Thus, like Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil, his approach would revive the idea of 
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the Caliphate; the love of Islam could transcend the ethnic fault lines that abound in the North 
Caucasus and usher in the true Revolution—the Revolution Dzhokhar could only have dreamed 
possible.  To the commander that the Georgian military forces so feared in the early 1990s, 
Maskhadov’s state was a betrayal of the revolutionary cause.  What’s more, these events mirror 
Brinton’s analysis regarding how moderates in the revolutionary movement are overcome:   
[The moderates were] confronted very soon with armed enemies…They found against them an 
increasingly strong and intransigent group of radicals and extremists who insisted that the 
moderates were trying to stop the revolution, that they had betrayed it, they were as bad as the old 
regime—indeed, much worse, since they were traitors as well as fools and scoundrels. 416
 
Salaman Raduyev, a relative of Dudayev, managed to share the same gene that inspired 
Dzhokhar to blurt out the outlandish provocations he was so well known for.  Reportedly, 
Raduyev declared, “Only Allah and General Dudayev alone can order me to stop fighting.”417  
As Dudayev was dead and the Archangel Gabriel was not appearing before him, there was little 
chance he could be persuaded to transition to a constructive civilian life.  Indeed, he was a wild 
card from the start.  Abi Barayev and his Islamic Special Forces Division (IPON) was simply too 
involved in the kidnapping industry to submit himself to constitutional rule.418  Despite the 
presence of significant amounts of armed and combat-seasoned radicals, Maskhadov remained in 
power because they were too disorganized and politically divided to mass their forces and 
forcibly remove Maskhadov419; perhaps they thought they could simply embarrass him out of 
office by publicly disregarding his demands to disarm and demobilize.   
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By the close of 1998, President Maskhadov’s government was in dire straits.  He presided 
over a broken country and was lacking promised federal aid from Moscow.  What little true 
authority he had, more a result of his renown as Dudayev’s Chief of Staff than his governmental 
position, was quickly challenged by the radical wing of the revolutionary elite.  The radicals 
became determined to carry out what Maskhadov was too practical, and perhaps too squeamish, 
to do himself.  Shamil Basayev represented the psychological profile Brinton included in his 
analysis so many years ago: 
In all our societies these radicals were very conscious, and usually very proud, of their small 
numbers.  They felt definitely set off from their countrymen, consecrated to a cause which their 
countrymen were certainly not consciously and actively equal to.  Some of the radicals may have 
satisfied themselves that they really represented the better selves of their fellow countrymen, they 
were the reality of which the others were the potentiality.  But here and now they were very sure 
that they were superior to the inert and flabby many.420
 
What’s more, Chechnya’s eastern neighbor, Dagestan, was immersed in political crisis.    
In order to understand how the Chechen radicals came to the forefront of the revolutionary 
movement, we must understand the Dagestani connection, for it is this connection that led to 
dvoevlastie and the Second Chechen War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
420 Brinton, p. 152. 
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10.0  CHECHNYA’S SECOND REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND THE RISE OF 
THE RELIGIOUS RADICALS 
 
Source: http://www.tribalchase.com/images/map/mS1064581380.jpg 
  
Maskhadov’s regime was in trouble from the beginning of its inception; however, Chechnya’s 
hard-fought de facto independence became further undermined by the effects of powerful 
political forces developing in Dagestan.  It was these ethnic and religious battles in the 
neighboring republic which created opportunities for Chechen field commander to interfere in 
Dagestani internal politics; exported religious radicals to Chechnya, allowing cohabitation 
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between Chechen and Dagestani groups; and facilitated the incursion of a combined force of 
religious radicals into Dagestani territory across Chechnya’s eastern border.  This operation 
represented the rumble of a much larger earthquake: the advent of a militant pan-Caucasian 
Islamic revolutionary vanguard, much more radical in political belief than Chechen national 
radicals of the early 1990s. 
 
Political Developments in Dagestan 
 
Though most groups within Dagestan agreed that integration in a post-Soviet Russia was the best 
thing for their country, the extreme ethnic diversity of the republic required special attention to 
the political institutions that would be needed to ensure stability.  In theory, democracy 
empowered the individual.  The danger of democracy in Dagestan was that the republic had no 
common polity.  Rather, it was a territorial space composed of many mutually-distrusting ethnic 
groups; none of which enjoy a majority of the population.  Still, the idea of presidentialism was 
entertained – but not for long. 
Dagestan needed to find a way to construct a state whose institutions would be mutually 
acceptable, or at the very least tolerable, to all involved.  Federalism was considered, but the 
existence of ethnic enclaves threatened to flirt with state disintegration.  Proportional 
Representation was a second option, but it too carried with it drawbacks—particularly for the 
smaller ethnic groups.  A grand consensus was achieved and Russia’s first consociational 
republic was ratified by the Dagestani people on 26 July 1994.   
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Consociational democracy facilitates the interaction among political elites drawn from ethnic 
and social cleavages within a given society. 421  Truly, the adoption of a consociational system is 
but an indicator of a state that has inter-ethnic mutual distrust as a founding premise.  
Majoritarian systems, while providing minimum protections for minority groups, are expressly 
structured to produce policies that create political winners and losers.  What’s more, the losers 
theoretically chose to view the negative outcome as legitimate.  Thus, devoid of a uniform 
majority group, majoritarian systems carry the assumption that coalition politics and centrist 
platforms are the norm rather than the exception.  Such systems seek to alleviate ethnic 
competition by institutionalized power-sharing.  Following this system, Movladi Magomedov 
was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council, the executive arm of the government intended 
to rotate among the ethnic elites.   
 
The Battle for True Islam: The DUMD and its Discontents 
Islam in Dagestan—and in the North Caucasus as a whole—had the unique ability to transcend 
many divisive ethnic cleavages.  In the absence of higher authority, Dagestani Islamic leaders 
“proved the essential arbiters among groups belonging to rival nationalities and helped to keep 
the peace and prevent armed clashes.”422  That being said, the leadership of the state-sponsored 
religious board (DUMD), which was a badge of honor and source of ethnic competition in 
Dagestan, became dominated by the Avar ethnic group.  Upon confirmation, the Avars began to 
attack the teaching of rivals who became smeared as mutashayhks (spurious shaykhs) under the 
cloak of official state authority.423
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This “Avarization” of the DUMD was endorsed by the executive body of the Dagestani 
republic, the Supreme Scouncil (SC).424  In a quid pro quo relationship, the Avar-dominated 
DUMD tacitly agreed to restrain its Islamic program to social issues, rather than pursue a 
politically-oriented Islamist program.  This mutual agreement between the “Darghinized” state 
apparatus425 and Avar-led DUMD limited the agenda of political Islam to a program of social 
Islamism.426  In effect, the bifurcation of political power and religious authority created a 
“symbiotic relationship” between the DUMD and political power structures; the former 
legitimized the latter and the latter guaranteed the control of the former.427  In this manner it 
became difficult to avoid charges that the Dargin and Avar elites (and by association the Avars 
and Dargins as a whole) were securing the domination of republic vis-à-vis Dagestan’s smaller 
ethno-national groups.  Whatever the merit of such accusations, the DUMD’s unequivocal 
support of the Dagestani government came at the cost of public support.428  Moreover, as faith in 
the stewards of official Islam began to wane, a new wave of religious discourse began to 
challenge the very legitimacy of Sufi Islam.  At this point it is worth detailing the arrival and 
impact of what became known as ‘Wahhabi’ Islam.  More accurately, Russian Wahhabis can be 
termed “neofundamentalists”429, a much more inclusive term for such views.   
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The proliferation of neofundamentalist views in Dagestan, particularly amongst 
Dagestanis who were disillusioned by the 1990s economic crisis and the rampant political 
corruption,430  quickly became a source of instability. In this manner,    
The [Salafi] dzhamaat offered a solution to the prevailing social chaos, criminality, and economic 
deprivation of post-Soviet life.  Indeed, the dzhamaat had its own militias and effectively resisted 
organized crime.  Visiting journalists described the Wahhabi villages as safe, orderly, clean, ad 
prosperous.431
 
The Wahhabis came into conflict with the authorities due to both theological and socio-political 
reasons.  Particularly, the Wahhabis frowned upon the Sufis lack of orthodoxy.  Local customs 
mixed with local ancient pagan beliefs insulted the Salafists.  “For fundamentalists,” explains 
Olivier Roy, “there is nothing in these cultures to be proud of, because they have altered the 
pristine image of Islam.”432  Moreover, the political alliances that were fashioned between the 
Islamic scholars and Dagestan’s political elite instilled a sense of “disillusionment with the 
former [that] has increased with the corruption of the latter.433
Theological differences aside, “the ‘Wahhabis’ public call for the establishment of an 
Islamic order—social as well as political—was a direct challenge to the partokratiia and all it 
represented,” 434 and thus a threat to the state itself.  In this manner, the Russian Wahhabis 
deviate from neofundamentalist orthodoxy and enter into the realm of the Islamists435:  they 
create Islamist parties and seek to reinstitute an Islamic Imamate.  Thus, Russian Wahhabi 
groups represent a somewhat bizarre, contradictory nexus between the larger Islamist and 
neofundamentalist movements in the world.  Because the Wahhabis presented a threat to the 
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authority of both the partokratiia and the stewards of “official Islam”, the government began to 
use its resources to place pressure upon the ‘Wahhabis.’  As the level of state scrutiny increased, 
the movement began to become more radicalized.  This radicalization sparked sporadic armed 
conflicts around Dagestan.  In one such instance, disagreements over whether to face Mecca or 
the casket during a funeral in Chabanmakhi erupted into a firefight involving 450 men armed 
with automatic weapons.436
In was in the midst of all these developments, political and spiritual, that the Dagestani 
state was subject to a series of crises that threatened to unravel the entire fabric of the ethno-
national consensus—the final of which would have disastrous consequences for Maskhadov’s de 
facto independent Chechen state.  Indeed, as Dagestan threatened to unravel, the Chechen 
revolutionary radicals began to see their moment of opportunity.  The next revolution was 
drawing near 
 
A LITANY OF CRISES 
The confluence of reoccurring crises inspired by the rising power of power SC chairmanship and 
Movladi Magomedov’s—that is the say the Dargin’s—firm hold of the position (contrary to the 
principle of executive rotation), parallel with the creation and support of an “official” state 
authority on Islamic matters, provides a useful context to view the series of shocks that the 
Dagestani political and social systems underwent in the second half of the 1990s.  In fact, they 
are central to understanding them.  Without these conditions, it is possible—and indeed more 
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than likely—that the rise of the radical, the August-September 1999 events—and thus the Second 
Chechen War, would not have transpired. 
 
THE 1996 CRISIS  
 The first of the crises was solved with relatively little effort, but it set the stage for the many of 
the future events.  Magomedov was nearing the end of his term in 1996 and would be replaced, 
according to the constitution, by another SC member of a different ethno-national group.  
Magomedov had led the Dagestani government since the end of the Soviet times and was not 
eager to allow his position, and the political spoils associated with his position, to rotate.  In an 
effort to avoid the inconvenience of constitutional authority, Magomedov appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for a legal waiver that would allow him to remain in office.  In effect the 
ruling of the Court was that 
the constitutional provision on the State Council was of a provisional nature, since the fathers of 
the Constitution had merely wanted to ‘try out’ the new institution.  The Constitution established a 
‘transitional’ term for the first chairman, with future terms stretching four years, and therefore this 
special provision for the transition period could be modified in light of the situation.437
 
It was in this manner that Magomedov, a member of the Soviet-era partokratiia, changed 
the constitutional rules of the game and extended the term of the SC Chairman to four years.  
With the official nod of Dagestan’s Constitutional Court, Magomedov would remain in office 
until new elections were held in 1998.  Unfortunately for Dagestan, but perhaps fortunately for 
Magodemov, the 1997 Gerlakh raid would preempt the upcoming 1998 decision.   
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THE GERLAKH RAID 
While the proximate cause of the first crisis was purely internal, the second seems to be 
attributed to a mix of Dagestani and Chechen problems.  The battle for the souls of the Dagestani 
peoples periodically erupted in localized armed conflict, such as the Chabanmakhi funeral 
standoff.  Additionally, weak central authority and state-building in Maskhadov’s Chechnya 
permitted, or at the very least could not prevent, field commanders from maintaining their own 
autonomous armed formations.  Naturally, as Dagestan placed increasing pressure upon its own 
Salafists, well-armed and well-organized Chechen Salafists threatened to link the two groups.  
Field commander Khattab’s 1997 raid on a RF base in Dagestan’s Buynaksk region only seemed 
to confirm these fears. 
438The pre-dawn raid consisted of three platoons (approximately 115 gunmen)  with the 
stated objective of acquiring several Russian-built T-72 tanks.439  The Gerlakh base was home to 
the 136th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 5th Russian Army in and located near the larger 
area of Buinaksk.440  Hours later, the dismayed attackers were forced to retreat back into 
Chechen territory as they fled the local and Federal security forces.441 The Central Front for the 
Liberation of the Caucasus and Dagestan claimed responsibility for the incursion.442
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The storming of the Federal base in Gerlakh was not a joint effort by the various Chechen 
field commanders; instead, it was the primarily the enterprise of local Dagestanis.443  Leading 
these fighters was the foreign-born mujahad best known by his nome de guerre, Khattab.444  
Born Saleh Abdullah Al-Sewailem, Khattab allegedly came from a prominent Saudi family.445 
According to one source, he was offered a chance to study in the United States and instead 
traveled to Afghanistan in 1987 to battle the Soviets.446  Khattab apparently remained in 
Afghanistan until 1991, before leaving for Tajikistan, later Azerbaijan, and finally to 
Chechnya.447
Though the raid was unsuccessful in its stated aims, the raid had many consequences.  
First, the growing presence of home-grown ‘Wahhabis’ led local and Federal observes to link 
them with neighboring Chechnya’s spill-over effects.  In effect, the ‘Wahhabis’ were now 
officially a “fifth column” in Dagestani society.448  Second, the raid exposed the relative 
weakness of the area to rebel incursions.449  Third, the timing of Khattab’s attack might have 
been the most important factor.  The People’s Assembly of Dagestan was scheduled to vote on a 
local version of a July 1997 RF law that, among other things, placed limitations upon foreign 
missionaries.450  Thus, it seems that the attack was meant to derail an upcoming vote that would 
be detrimental to Dagestan’s local ‘Wahhabis’.  Khattab had a special connection to the area.  He 
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had taken a previous opportunity to set up a local training camp and married a girl from a 
‘Wahhabi’ village.451  Be that as it may, the Assembly passed of the law on the ‘Freedom of 
Confession and Religious Organizations’ on 22 December 1997.452
The law restricts publication, acquisition of publications, construction of mosques, use of 
buildings, the forming of (and membership in) associations suspected to be ‘Wahhabi’.453  In 
effect, “It empowered the DUMD to supervise all religious associations established less than 
fifteen years before its adoption and authorizes it to grant or deny them the right to communal 
practice of their religion.”454  The resulting crackdown, facilitated through the DUMD’s 
expanded powers, resulted in the emigration of approximately 300 Dagestani ‘Wahhabi’ families 
to Chechnya.455  This fact is crucial to understanding the August-September 1999 events. 
  With the religious exiles came the “septuagenarian spiritual leader of the Dagestani 
Salafis, Bagaudin Kebedov.”456  Additionally, “the newly arrived Dagestani religious dissidents 
conveyed the false impression that Dagestani society was ready to wage a war against Russia” 457  
This point should not be lost upon the observer.  Exiles agitate, awaiting the day they may 
triumphantly return to their ancestral homes; they are in fact hopeful elites.  In this context, the 
combined ‘Wahhabis’ formed the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria Chechnya and Dagestan 
(KNID) and a “Peacekeeping Brigade.”458   
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In the wake of intra-Dagestani sectarian strife, an unsuccessful raid by Magomedov’s 
forces facilitated the evacuation of religious dissidents into a Chechen state plagued by a vacuum 
of central authority.  In these conditions, Salafist exiles and Chechen bandformirovaniya (bandit 
formations) formed networks that would prove crucial to the August-September 1999 events.  
The KNID “united malcontents”459 in both republics and caused a seismic shift in the balance of 
power in Chechnya between the moderates and the radicals.  For the first time since the death of 
Dzhokhar Dudayev, the radical revolutionaries were united in a common front.   Even with all 
this, a final crisis would rock the Dagestani republic, creating the conditions in Dagestan for the 
August-September incursion. 
THE MARCH 1998 CRISIS 
Magomedov managed to avoid the first hurdle to the consolidation of his power over the SC in 
1996 with the Constitutional Court’s waiver.  The extra two years of executive power did 
nothing to reduce his ambitions.  The central problem was that consociational requirements 
mandated that he allow his executive authority to rotate in 1998.  This inconvenient problem led 
Magomedov to instigate a constitutional crisis that opened the floodgates of ethnic and religious 
tensions in the republic. 
The aftermath of Magodemov’s gamble threatened to undermine the very basis of the 
1994 grand consensus, effectively ending the mechanism through which Dageastan’s ethno-
national antagonisms were managed, provoking a poorly-planned ethnic coup attempt.  
Additionally, the corruption and relative weakness of the system, supported by Dagestan’s 
official Islamic authorities, led three local ‘Wahhabi’ villages to directly challenge the 
sovereignty of the central government.  Taken into context with the Dagestani émigrés in 
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Chechnya who formed links with various bandformirovaniya field commanders, these events 
contained all these evidence necessary for those looking to confirm the statements of the 
Dagestani exiles regarding the revolutionary potential of the republic.     
Magemodov set the future events in motion on March 1998 when he appealed to the 
People’s Assembly to repeal the rotation and term-limit principles (Article 93) of the Dagestani 
Constitution.460  Curiously, the SC, representing the elites of Dagestan’s respective ethnic 
groups, also supported the maneuver; but there were irregularities all around.  70 of the 111 
Deputies in the Assembly who voted in favor of the constitutional change “were—and in fact at 
the moment still are—people whose jobs, material prosperity and career perspectives were 
entirely dependent upon the executive branch.”461
The new constitutional arrangement “set off a chain of events.” 462  Makachkala was rocked by 
mass protest.  It was during this time that the Khachiliev Affair transpired.       
Amidst public outcry in the capital, mainly by ethnic Laks, Nadirshakh and Magomed 
Khachiliev stormed the buildings of SC and Assembly with approximately 200 armed men.463  
One student of Dagestani politics analyzed that “deep down the problem was rooted in the 
question of power and influence between the Darghins of the one hand and the Avars and the 
Laks on the other.”464   
Due to their symbiotic relationship, the Avar-dominated DUMD originally supported the 
government. By August 1998 the situation had changed; both the DUMD and the Avar National 
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465Front called for Magomedov’s resignation.  More than just opening the Pandora’s Box of 
ethnic competition, Magomedov’s unique capacity to avoid constitutional obligations convinced 
three villages in the Buynaksk region that it would be necessary to take governance into their 
own hands. 
The declaration of a “sharia zone” by the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and 
Kadar challenged both the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the Dagestani state.466  
In the ensuing republic-wide chaos local insurgents stormed the local police station, only to later 
engage in a firefight with the entire police force (150 officers) of the Buynaksky region, the later 
of which was forced to leave in “total defeat.”467  In effect, the local ‘Wahhabis’ had taken 
advantage of the Makhachkala riots to carve out a “little Chechnya” on Dagestani territory.  In 
this manner, Magomedov’s political victory exacted a terrible cost.  By July 1998, 1000 men 
armed with automatic rifles in Karamakhi were demanding the resignation of the entire 
Dagestani government, advocating unification with the de facto independent Chechen republic, 
and calling for the evacuation of all Federal forces from the republic.468
Magomedov’s government addressed the more immediate of the two problems first and 
chose to concentrate of the instability in the capital of Makhachkala.  The greatest source of 
instability surrounded the assassination of Dagestan’s Chief Mufti Saidmagomed Nadir 
Abubakarov, whose car exploded while leaving the vicinity of a Makhachkala’s Central 
Mosque.469  Many observers blamed the ‘Wahhabis’ but Gadji Mahachev, the leader of the Avar 
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470national movement and deputy in the People’s Assembly, blamed the Dargins.   Thus, the 
threat of civil war took precedence over formulating a response to the Kadar Zone’s declaration 
of self-rule, leading to the political compromise that followed.471  This decision led them to 
extend special rights to the “Kadar Zone.”472   
Mounting instability in the republic forced the hand of the Federal Centre.  The Kremlin 
dispatched MVD RF Minister Sergei Stepashin.  The stated official explanation of his visit was 
to coordinate the investigation of Abubakarov’s assassination.473  The Federal Centre, much like 
Magomedov, saw the pressing need to resolve the threat of civil war in the republic.  The Federal 
Centre could not ignore the precedent being set by the Kadar Zone; but again, the Centre agreed 
with Magomedov’s reasoning and Stepashin negotiated a political compromise in September 
1998. In so doing, “Moscow had intervened in favor of the Wahhabis, and in effect set the 
precedent of establishing an autonomous zone within Daghestan.” 474  According to the terms of 
the ‘protocol of agreement’475:  
[The Kadar Zone] agreed to allow the police into the villages, but refused to permit the re-
establishment of the police station in Karamakhi.  They also retained the right to organize armed 
patrols to keep law and order in the villages, while the disarming of the population was agreed to 
in principle but postponed indefinitely.476
 
These events have shown that Magomedov consolidated his hold over the SC 
Chairmanship, effectively ending the grand bargain that was struck in 1994 and provoking the 
second constitutional crisis in two year.  Rejecting the existing consociational political order, 
Magomedov created a de facto Presidential system in a country that had twice rejected the idea 
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overwhelmingly.  Additionally, Magomedov’s consolidation of power frustrated the ambitions of 
would-be elites among Dagestan’s other ethno-national groups, especially the Avars and the 
Laks, threatening the Lebanonization of the Dagestani republic.  Moreover, the struggle to 
control the Dagestani state—perceived by many moderate ‘Wahhabis’ as inherently corrupt—led 
to the carving out of an autonomous “sharia zone” along Dagestan’s common border with 
Chechnya.  This turn of events created an aurora of legitimacy around Dagestan’s exiled 
Salafists in Chechnya, many of whom who had networked with Chechen bandformirovaniya 
field commanders.  What’s more, one of these field commanders (Khattab) was married to a 
Dagestani woman living in Dagestan’s now-autonomous Kadar Zone.  It was this complex web 
of internal developments in Dagestan, combined with the inability of Maskhadov’s Chechen 
state to curtail the independent activities of bandformirovaniya field commanders, which opened 
the opportunity for the August-September 1999 incursion into Dagestani territory.  
 
CHECHEN DEVELOPMENTS 
The cohabitation of Chechen field commanders and Dagestani émigrés created a dangerous 
situation.  The 1998 Crises destabilized Dagestani society and culminated in a cross-border 
incursion into Dagestan from Chechnya by a combined group of Dagestanis, Chechen radicals, 
and foreign fighters loyal to the Chechen cause—the result of which would doom any dream of 
Chechen independence and force Maskhadov to either join the radicals or risk being hunted by 
both the federal authorities and the Chechen radicals. 
Initially, Maskhadov tried to co-opt the radical revolutionaries; later he tried to coerce 
them.  Unlike Dudayev who surrounded himself with loyal members of his extended family, 
Maskhadov staffed his regime with those who possessed similar ideological persuasions; that is 
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477to say, his government was made of revolutionary moderates, not members of his teip.   As 
Maskhadov became aware of the growing power of the new radicals, he attempted to cloak 
himself in the façade of radicalism in hopes of gaining support.  Thus, President Maskhadov 
starting walking down the slippery slope that led to his eventual death in 2005.  First, Maskhadov 
began to adopt the rhetoric and look of the new radicals, occasionally blurting out anti-Semitic 
diatribes and allowing his beard to grow longer.478  Second, he invited Basayev into his 
government, giving him the position of prime minister in February 1998.  Third, Maskhadov 
disbanded the parliament, instituted Shari’a law, and replaced the constitutional government with 
an Islamic-style Shura.479  Basayev subsequently left the government and growing Chechen 
internal instability forced Maskhadov to declare a June 1998 State of Emergency, culminating in 
Basayev and Raduyev’s demands for Maskhadov to resign.   
Together with the other KNID members, Basayev formed the mekhkan shura on 9 
February 1999, effectively creating dvoevlastie in the republic for the first time since the dual 
sovereignty of the OKChN and the Provisional Supreme Council following the collapse of 
Zavgayev’s regime.  Moreover, the mekhkhan shura proved Maskhadov was no longer 
effectively in control when MVD RF Major General Gennadi Shipgun was kidnapped on 
Chechen soil.480  It was a clear provocation to the Russians and a manifestation of Maskhadov’s 
weakness—the new revolutionary radicals were testing the waters and finding them favorable.             
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The August-September 1999 invasion into Dagestan should not have been, and perhaps 
was not, a surprise.  Khattab’s 1997 raid was a brazen example of a Chechen field commander 
acting independent of Chechen central authority in order to interfere in the internal politics of the 
Dagestani republic.  Additionally, Chechen law enforcement arrested at least 24 ethnic Nogai, 
allegedly on their way to one of Khattab’s camps in May 1998.481  Moreover, “in 1998 no less 
than 157 organizations were registered in Chechnya with the declared aim of unifying the 
Caucasus or parts of it.”482  The new radical revolutionaries were training and mobilizing an 
army. 
The danger of the ‘Wahhabi’ émigrés was not ignored by Maskhadov.  Using the power 
structures still loyal to him, he cracked down on them and they were allegedly responsible for the 
assassination attempts against him.483  In one such instance, a car bomb narrowly killed him.  In 
desperation, Maskhadov asked Moscow for help in October 1998484; the help never came.  Thus, 
the Dagestani and Chechen radicals went into Dagestan in August 1999 to spread the flames of 
the true Revolution.  The cross-border incursion signaled the triumph of the radicals in Chechnya 
and the beginning of the Second Chechen War.  This geographic widening of Revolution, made 
possible by the convergence of the two revolutions, caused the Russian government to believe 
that stability in the North Caucasus and the integrity of the Russian Federation could only be 
preserved absent a revolutionary Chechnya.  This time, there would be no cease-fire.       
This chapter described how Maskhadov’s weak government became embattles by a 
powerful armed element of former resistance fighters.  The conduct of the First Chechen War 
transitioned the primary loyalties of the fighters from Chechen national radicals to Sunni Islamic 
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radicals.  During this struggle in Chechnya, internal struggle in Dagestan resulted in the exile of 
Islamic radicals to Chechnya and began the process of revolutionary convergence.  This alliance 
between the Chechen and pan-Caucasian Islamic revolutionary movements eventually led to the 
Second Chechen War and ultimately the synthesis of the revolutions.   
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11.0  THE CHILDREN OF THE REVOLUTION 
Periods of great stress, of mass psychosis and intense struggle call forth marginal qualities with otherwise may have 
remained dormant, and bring to the top men of a peculiar neurotic mentality. 
- J. L. Talmon, Origins of Totalitarian Democracy 
 
The Revolution schooled the country in violence. The populace received its political education in a period of 
forcible permanent changes. From it the nation acquired an enduring tolerance of illegality, disputes about rules, 
and the practice of revolt. 
-Jacques Solé, Question of the French Revolution 
 
 
It is a central thesis of this study that the Russian Federation is currently in campaign against the 
children of the Chechen Revolution.  In some ways, the children have sought to export the 
Revolution to the surrounding republics to protect it at home; in others, they sought to export the 
Revolution under the auspices of a pan-gorsty agenda—regional liberation through the 
geographic expansion of the Revolution’s reach.  Unlike after the First Chechen War, Moscow 
was more or less able to maintain a friendly government in Chechnya after major operations 
concluded in the Second Chechen war.  That being said, there were also limits.   
While enlisting the support of Mufti and later President Akhmad Kadyrov, Basayev’s 
forces were able to assassinate him on 9 May 2004 when an improvised explosive device (IED) 
composed of two 145mm artillery shells exploded underneath his observation deck in Dynamo 
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485Stadium in Grozny.   The killing of the former Chechen Mufti was a major blow to both 
President Putin’s “Chechenization” policy and to the Chechen people: 
Throughout Chechnya they remembered Kadyrov on 10 May—customs permit this. People 
expressed commemorations: “Allah forgive him[”]—and added: [“]if he wishes”.  Earlier they 
wished Kadyrov would be president for life—and it came true. Chechens in general love to give 
advice to the Almighty.486  
 
After his untimely death, Kadyrov’s son Ramzan was elevated to the post of Chechen Prime 
Minister.  In this manner, the former insurgent confirmed his willingness to carry on his father’s 
politically moderate stance on Chechen political status.  Despite this, the radicals still operate 
and have succeeded in destabilizing the entire North Caucasus.  
 
CAUCASIAN AFTERSHOCKS 
The rise of Dzhokhar’s regime was like an earthquake and its aftershocks are manifesting 
themselves across the North Caucasus.487  Yeltsin and Putin both have warned that separatism in 
Chechnya would destabilize the entire North Caucasus.  They were correct in this assertion, but 
incorrect in their analyses of the chain of causation.  Separatism, ethnic conflict, and Islamic 
extremism are mutations of the same infection in the North Caucasus: the Chechen Revolution. 
“The Chechen Republic,” echoes a report from the Zurich-based International Relations and 
Security Network, “now forms the center of a larger crisis zone.”488  Anatol Lieven put forth an 
even more provocative simile: “It is as if Moscow had a mixture of Afghanistan and Sierra 
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489Leone for a neighbor.”   While most of these analyses are recent conclusions, a 1995 U.S. 
Army War College study prophetically states that the instability in Chechnya “is only the most 
recent manifestation of the acute disorder that pervades the entire Caucasus and Transcaucasia 
as well.”490    
Despite these analyses, some Russians still retain a Chechen-centric focus. Former 
Yeltsin aide Emil Pain, while admitting the transference of the Chechen struggle to other areas of 
Russia, suggests that, “There are today two counter-terrorist operations [in Russia]: one is in 
Chechnya and the other is in the rest of Russia…However, neither campaign has been crowned 
with success.”491  Make no mistake about it; the North Caucasus is now part of a unified theater 
of war.  Basayev’s amazing ability to subsume Caucasian militant groups under his command 
finalized their process of regionalization. His demise—whether from personal incompetence or 
brilliant special operation by the Russian special services—leaves leadership vacancy that 
threatens to split the hydra of unified Caucasian militancy back into disparate and unorganized 
parochial struggles. That being said, it is entirely too early to be confident that no one exists to 
assume the helm of the Caucasian Front.  Not all Russian observers suffer from tunnel vision. 
Dagestani Avar Ramzan Abdulatipov, Chairman of the People’s Assembly of Russian and 
Federation Council member, is quoted as saying: 
I have been repeating for a decade: we are not in control of the situation in Chechnya which is 
explainable, but we claim to be in control of the situation surrounding Chechnya! In fact, the 
situation around Chechnya is no better than inside the republic. In some directions, including the 
[Dagestani] problem, the authorities are unaware of the actual situation.492
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Abdulatipov’s analysis is a heartening and necessary admission. To pretend that the 
North Caucasus is just another part of Russia is a fallacy of gross proportions. “Whichever 
autonomous republic you are in—from Dagestan, to Karbardino-Balkaria or Adygea—the scene 
is the same,” writes Sebastian Smith, “The map says that you are on the southern border of the 
Russian Federation, but this is in theory. In fact, you have left Russia long ago…”493   
Transcaucasia, of which the North Caucasus is only a part, is the geographic crossroads of two 
major civilizations and contains a plethora of tribal and ethnic relationships that create a level of 
complexity that no other region in the world of comparable size can rival.    
 
VIOLENCE BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT THE KREMLIN’S SUPPORT 
The sheer complexity of the struggle that began with Chechnya and now manifests itself in the 
orgy of insurrection in the North Caucasus as a whole is astounding. A self-sustaining cycle of 
violence, sometimes targeted at civilians, is the only manner of existence that many in the region 
know to be reality. “These events,” describe Vladimir Degoyev and Rustam Ibragimov, “seem to 
have formed a systematic process with deep-lying sources of reproduction.”494 In just the 
Chechen republic alone, “violence long ago replaced politics as the main arbiter of disputes.”495  
The penchant to habitually use violence is the scarlet letter of radicalized politics, the 
mark of the revolution. Simon Schama’s description of the French Revolution offers an insight: 
“From the first year it was apparent that violence was not just an unfortunate side effect from 
which enlightened Patriots could selectively avert their eyes.  It was the Revolution’s source of 
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496collective energy…it was its heart and soul.”   It is very much the same with the Chechen 
Revolution. Valery Tishkov provides an interesting perspective from a Chechen named Musa: 
“This war brought all sorts of scum and vermin out of the mire, and it will take a huge effort to 
put then back in the pit. Evil lurks in all men...The Result is a fiendish maelstrom that’s hard to 
control.”497  What makes human disasters like Dubrovka and Beslan possible is the dedication of 
the extremists to what they are convinced is a holy cause.  As Brinton described:  
In general, only a sincere extremist in a revolution can kill men because he loves man, attain peace 
through violence, and free men by enslaving them.  Such contrasts in action would paralyze a 
conventionally practical leader, but the extremist is quite undisturbed by it.498
 
Nor is the extra-legal use of violence limited to the boyeviki.  Indeed, the Federal and republican 
forces of order can be just as dangerous—if not more dangerous—than the separatists and the 
Islamic radicals.  Harvard University’s Mark Kramer explains that, “Russian troops have 
engaged in widespread torture, rape, forces disappearances, mass arrest operations, kidnapping, 
and summary executions.”499  On the other hand, many suspect that the wave of disappearances 
during Akhmad Kadyrov’s federally-sanctioned administration was the work of his “private 
army-turned-police” under the command of his son Ramzan.500  Additionally, the republican 
prisons in Tsentotoi run by Kadyrov’s forces “is still considered the bleakest place in Chechnya, 
even more so than the widely known wartime concentration camp Chernokozovo.”501  Such is 
the reality of modern Chechnya.   
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INSURGENT METASTASIS 
The insurgent boyeviki groups are presently undergoing a transformation.  Shamil Basayev 
managed to consolidate many North Caucasian groups under an umbrella, bringing the other 
gorsty into his fold.  His recent death metastasized the Front; what was once unified is now 
threatening to become diffuse and disparate.  From one point of view, it seems like a victory for 
the federal and pro-Moscow republican forces if Doku Umarov is unable to keep the Front 
stitched together or if the Russians are able to assassinate him. That said, Alexander Golts offers 
a cautionary note to the benefits of the Front’s demise: 
When the actions of the enemy are controlled from a single centre, it is always possible to 
infiltrate it and to learn of his plans. There is always the possibility, with help and technology and 
good intelligence, of learning where the enemy is concentrated in order to prepare for his blows. 
When the resistance is decentralized…the problems are only increased, because it is impossible to 
track the activity of 10 or 20 or 50 field commanders who don’t take orders from anyone and who 
prepared their own operations based only on their own ideas.502
 
FOR NATION? FOR GOD? FOR REVENGE? 
 
“If religion takes precedence over the secular constitutional order, the Spanish Inquisition and Islamic 
Fundamentalism in a strongly expressed form will appear.” 
- President Dzhokhar Dudayev, 12 August 1992 Interview with Literaturnaya gazeta 
 
Many authors have taken the position that the hold of Islamic radicalism now overshadows—and 
in many ways replaces— the cause of the national idea for many insurgent groups.  This 
increasing trend of politicized Islam supports the thesis that the second group of radicals 
represents the vanguard on their own revolution, independent of the OKChN ispolkom’s 
revolution in the early 1990s.  The reason for this was that Dudayev’s revolution rested upon the 
politicization of Chechen ethno-national identity.  The second revolution, which began to 
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materialize in the inter-war period and became radicalized in the late 1990s, appealed not to 
parochial, exclusive national groups, but to those whose primary loyalty was transnational.  
Admittedly, some of the prominent Chechen leaders in the Wahhabi movement simply use Islam 
as a means to mobilize resistance to Russian authority.  Even so, their pan-Islamic trappings and 
rhetoric find receptive ears and willing recruits.          
One of the reasons why the so-called Wahhabi message has such a captivating appeal is 
the simplicity of both its message and prescriptive political program.503  It is perhaps an irony 
that a people who were never prone to such beliefs and are known for their uncommon levels of 
hospitality, especially directed to strangers, are now commonly referred to as terrorists and 
pictured as fanatical, indiscriminate killers; however, it is a characterization earned by events 
such as Dubrovka and Beslan. In point of fact, Islam had little to do with the First Chechen 
Revolution.504  Unlike Kadyrov’s endorsement of Maskhadov in 1997, the Chechen Mufti 
refused to endorse the candidacy of Dzhokhar Dudayev.505  Specifically, it was the First 
Chechen War that was responsible for sowing the seeds of a generation of radical jihadis.506  As 
one analyst put it, the conduct of the first war aimed at restoring constitutional order in the 
republic “spawned new elements that were to shape the second conflict.”507  Indeed, “Radical 
Islam in Chechnya,” explains Elise Giuliano, “is a product of the war rather than a cause of 
it.”508  
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Islamic fundamentalism has not eclipsed the national struggle yet. The two sometimes 
run parallel, sometimes interesting, and other times exist in two different planes simultaneously.  
Until his untimely death President Maskhadov “continued to define Chechen separatism as a 
nationalist rather than religious mission.”509  His assassination hid not end the national focus of 
the separatist struggle.  The current separatist leader and Ichkerian President, Doku Umarov, 
inherited both the political role of assassinated separatist President Saydulayev and the 
operational command of Basayev’s militant umbrella network: the Caucasus Front.510   
“President” Umarov was born in 1964 in a village called Kharsenoy, which means he is 
not a product of the Kazakh exile. He also served in the Borz special division, commanded by 
Ruslan Galayev and closely linked to Shamil Basayev.511  Umarov is committed to the idea of 
Chechen independence and views Islamic rhetoric simply as a convenient means to this end512; 
these views are most likely why he supported Maskhadov’s campaign for the Chechen 
presidency in 1997 after he was promoted to the rank of general.513  To this end, Peter Shearman 
and Matthew Sussex have written: “Russian authorities are not fighting an international war in 
Chechnya; rather they are struggling to prevent the Russian state from fragmenting…”514  Most 
of the militants in the North Caucasus are Muslims; most of the militants use bombings as one of 
many tactics; but the majority of the causes for such violence are ethnic and tribal, not Islamic.  
Simply put, the American and Russian ‘wars’ on terrorism are not symmetric in their respective 
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definitions of the enemy, not symmetric in their area of operations, and not symmetric in their 
causes. 
 The Kremlin is striving to maintain the territorial integrity of its borders in a region 
annexed by both the Tsarist and Soviet administrations.  The White House is responding to 
attacks initiated and funded by groups operating in another hemisphere. One of the few 
similarities between them is there likely duration, what the Pentagon calls the ‘Long War’.  The 
Russian government’s war is exponentially longer.  Moshe Gammer has pointed out that 
Chechen resistance fighters often refer to the struggle as the “Three Hundred Years War”. 
Aside from the most obvious causes of the widespread use of violence is one of the oldest 
of Chechen tradition—the vendetta.  Anna Politkovskaya calls this eye-for-an-eye approach, 
directed at both the federal, republican forces, and separatist forces as a “non-political ‘third 
force.’”515  Indeed, Simon Roughneen notes a poll conducted in 2003 that claimed revenge 
(inspired from brutal federal tactics) accounted for 69 percent of Chechen suicide attacks, while 
a mere 8 percent suggested that they were religiously inspired.516  While years ago, Chechens 
were reluctant to insult or harm another for fear of vandetta, violence in Chechnya is now a part 
of the political system.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
515 Quoted in Derluguian, p. 3. 
516 Simon Roughneen, “Blowback – Russia Needs to Rethink North Caucasus: Recommendations to the Russian 
Government,” The Oxford Council on Good Governance, Security Section (October 2004), p. 2. 
 141 
  
 142 
12.0  EPILOGUE: CHECHEN THERIMDOR AND CONTINUED INSTABILITY IN 
THE NORTH CAUCASUS 
As time goes on…pressures are relaxed: the special tribunals give place to more regular ones, the revolutionary 
police are absorbed into the regular police—which are not necessarily the equivalent of the London bobbies; they 
may be agents of the NKVD—and the block, guillotine or firing squad are reserved for the more dramatic criminals. 
It is not, of course, that that political life shortly assumes the idyllic stability some of our own contemporaries like o 
describe as the Rule of Law…Along with amnesty to former moderates, there goes on a reverse process of 
repression and persecution of unrepentant revolutionists of all sorts. 
- Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution 
 
In this study, I have presented the description of two Revolutions.  The first Revolution led by 
Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev replaced the communist old regime of Doku Zavgayev. The 
Second revolution represented the advent of a Sunni Islamic revolution with pan-Caucasian 
appeal.   
Dudayev and his followers were the radical members of the OKChN and would settle for 
nothing less than the creation of an independent Chechen nation-state, provoking the First 
Chechen War.  After the war, the revolutionary moderates, embodied by Aslan Maskhadov, rose 
to power and were quickly challenged by a new breed of revolutionary acolytes whose gospel 
was that of Puritanical Islam.  Additionally, these new radicals believed that true Revolution 
espoused this gospel as a universal doctrine, thus requiring them to spread the Revolution to 
other areas in the North Caucasus.  Thus, unlike the First Chechen War, the Second Chechen 
War somewhat validates Stephen Walt’s thesis. What explains this? 
Chechnya was a part of Russian territory, and because Chechnya was one of many 
Muslim republics in a small geographic region, Yeltsin’s government went to war with 
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revolutionary Chechnya not because they feared Dzhokhar’s regime would entice other’s to 
secede, but because the example of Chechen independence might cause other republics to rethink 
their status and possibly demand more autonomy from Moscow.  Paradoxically, the cause of the 
First Chechen War was the reverse of Walt’s thesis.  The parochial nature of Chechen 
nationalism inherently precluded the universality of the OKChN revolutionary ideology.  Thus, it 
would have been insulting for Dudayev’s Chechnya to proselytize Chechen nationalism to the 
Avars or the Kumyks.  If anything, such actions would have been met with complete failure.  
What was dangerous about Chechen independence was not the fear of other North Caucasian 
republics succumbing to the Chechen Revolution, but to their own revolutions based upon ethnic 
ascription.  They would not be bandwagoning with Chechnya; rather, they would be creating 
their own destinies outside the political framework of the Russian Federation.  Moscow’s fears 
of regional destabilization resulting from the Chechen Revolution became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  Ironically, it was not the radical Chechen nationalists who created this instability, but 
the children of the Chechen Revolution, the new Islamic radicals who are a product of the First 
Chechen War that was designed to prevent such a threat.  
Taking into consideration that both the nationalist radicals and new Islamic radicals were 
removed from power by two Russian interventions, the question remains:  is it possible that the 
Chechen Revolution has entered the Thermidor stage?  From all accounts, the answer to this 
question seems to be yes.  As of February 2007, former nationalist radical Ramzan Kadyrov is 
now the President of a pro-Moscow Chechen government.  Kadyrov has also managed to 
successfully reduce the pool of revolutionaries by the combination of punitive actions and 
amnesties.  In fact, many of the amnestied boyeviki are now part of the approximately 14,000-
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517man Chechen police force.   Moreover, the Chechen people are growing painfully tired of 
being caught between the radicals and the federal forces.518  In this environment, Chechen 
radicals still operate, but they are being systematically hunted down and exterminated by both 
Ramzan and the Russians.  At long last, the Chechen Revolution seems to be entering 
Thermidor.  That said, contrary to Marxist theory, history seldom travels along a linear path.  
Any number of events can radically alter the current devolution of the Chechen Revolution.  For 
the sake of the Chechen people, let us hope Marx was right this one time.  Even if this proves to 
be true, there is a much darker fate in store for the North Caucasus as a whole.  The aftershocks 
of the Chechen Revolution will echo here for years to come.  Quite possibly, the true revolution 
is still to come…                    
Close examination reveals that Chechnya experienced two simultaneously-occurring 
revolutions, one national and one religious.  In both cases, the revolutions became dominated by 
the radical wings of the revolutionary elite.  The national radicals were the first to dominate the 
political balance of power. For a variety of reasons, the national radicals were unable to 
consolidate and effectively govern the revolutionary state.   
Like many others, General Dzhokhar Dudayev’s Chechen Revolution was the result of 
the unraveling of the Soviet superpower.  His was a revolution that drew its collective power 
from generation of Chechens who were forcibly driven from their homes to Kazakhstan adopting 
the same methods Nazi Germany used on European Jews.  This shared misery solidified into a 
maelstrom of ultra-nationalist fervor, embodied in the marshal image of Chechnya’s first general.  
The First Chechen War was the crisis which propelled transformed the primary loyalties of many 
                                                 
517 Kramer, “Military Dimensions of the Russian-Chechen Conflict,” p. 214; Kramer, “The Perils of 
Counterinsurgency,” p. 10; Perovic, p. 24; and Vachagaev, p. 18. 
518 Blandy, “Chechnya: Continued Violence,” p. 9. 
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nationalists in the mid 1990s.  That is not to say that those affected no longer held national 
sentiments. Rather, the brutal conduct of the war intensified their religious beliefs.  This cause-
and-effect relationship is unsurprising and not in the least unique.  If it was, “there are no atheists 
in foxholes,” would not be a common phrase.   
At the height of national fever, following the Khasavyurt Peace Accords in 1996 and the 
election of President Aslan Maskhadov, the national radical’s inability to provide order added to 
the growing influence of the religious radicals. Eventually, Chechnya experienced a second 
period of dual sovereignty, this time between competing revolutionary groups.  The Russian 
military drive south of the Terek River in January 2000 resulted in a renewal national loyalty.  
That being said, the Second Chechen War empowered both the radical nationalist and the 
religious radicals. This is because the war resulted in a strategic alliance between the two groups 
of radical revolutionaries.  In sense, this is similar to the experience of revolutionary China 
during the Japanese invasion when ideologically-incompatible adversaries temporarily put their 
differences aside in order to expel foreign invasion.  Had the Chechens emerged victorious in the 
second war, it is likely that the alliance would have broken down and resulted in renewed 
confrontation.  Instead, the Russian initial victory and subsequent harsh counterinsurgency 
policies prolonged the alliance between the Chechen radical-nationals and the pan-Caucasian 
religious radicals, allowing the formation of Basayev’s Caucasian Front.  
Let us remember that Brinton’s theoretical framework explains that the moderates are the 
first to rule when the revolutionary party seizes power.  In the Chechen case, the moderates were 
those of the exile generation who did not push for self-determination, or at least were unwilling 
to seek independence as early as their radical counterparts.  Rather, the moderates of the OKChN 
(the national moderates) were fairly satisfied with political reality following the First Congress—
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the time of dual sovereignty in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR.  The brazen, militant wing of the 
OKChN (the national radicals) dramatically expanded the scope of the Revolution, directly 
challenging the sovereignty of the Russian state.  Instead of the moderates failing to live up to 
their promises, it was Dzhokhar’s national-radical government that was the fiasco.  Indeed, in the 
period of dual sovereignty, the moderates of the OKChN ispolkom monopolized the bully pulpit 
of the Chechen national movement, gradually influencing policy decisions adopted by Doku 
Zavgayev’s functioning state infrastructure.  Following this line of argument, it was the radicals 
who failed to bring utopia to the Chechen people, not the moderates.  The failure of the national 
radicals to retain the loyalty of the revolutionary core allowed them to be co-opted by the 
religious radicals, the vanguard of a separate, pan-Caucasian revolution. The First Chechen War 
was the crisis which propelled transformed the primary loyalties of many nationalists in the mid 
1990s.  That is not to say that those affected no longer held national sentiments.  The following 
diagram represents this argument: 
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Thus, while Brinton distinguishes between intra-revolutionary moderates and radicals, 
the theory does not anticipate that a society can find itself pinned between the confluence of two 
unique revolutions.  Shamil Basayev’s domination of this movement was a testament of his 
remarkable ability to transcend his ultra-nationalist image and assimilate into the Caucasian-wide 
radical religious movement.  This revolutionary convergence lasted until his death in the summer 
of 2006, resulting into the bifurcation of the revolutionaries.  Though each group continues to co-
opt each other for strategic reasons, true unity no longer exists; instead, these relationships reflect 
the mutual acceptance that an alliance similar to the First and Second Chechen wars offers the 
most utility.  Paradoxically, Moscow’s successful decapitation strategy against Basayev 
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bifurcated the Front, reducing its ability to conduct large-scale combined operations; however, 
this insurgent metastasis correspondingly reduced Moscow’s ability to penetrate and combat the 
insurgent groups.    
Though Russian President Vladimir Putin was successful killing Basayev and atomizing 
the revolutionary alliance, the Russian state still faces a resilient insurgency from the Islamic 
revolutionary elite and a lingering insurgency from those Chechen radical nationals who still 
carry on the struggle for national independence.  The two revolutions still attempt to co-opt each 
other for tactical purposes; however their incompatible strategic visions preclude their 
reunification, undermined further by Umarov’s deep and narrowly-defined Chechen nationalism. 
Whatever his convictions, the Chechen resistance has been relegated to a mere annoyance for the 
Kremlin.  The Islamic Revolution still unfolds. More importantly, it is this revolution that is far 
more dangerous for Russian than the Chechen national cause due to broader appeal, current 
demographic trends, and lack of legal social mobility in the region. The future of political 
stability in the North Caucasus is a future of instability. 
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